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ABSTRACT
This study a t t ampt s to ch ar ac t.e r i ze the distribution of negative
polarity items in English, and to delimit the role of NPIs within
sentence grammar.
The recalcitrance of NPIs to a purely syntactic analysis has long
bee nob s e r ved, not ab1yin Bake r (1970). I tis a r 9uedt he I' e t hat the
pr imary trigger is negation, a sufficient condition on NPI
acceptability being a syntactically defined relationship to negation;
and that all other triggers are to be defined in terms of a semantic
relation to negation, logical en t a i Ime nt , The structure of this
pro p0 sal ismai n t a i ned, but wit h Ina j 0 r a 1 t era t i 0 il S •
Fir 5 t , the .§.~!!!.a~li~ (;. e . s t rue t ur a1) con II ; t ion IIIus t be s tated
on logical form rather than on surface structure: in the LF of a
sentence containing an NPI the NPI must be represented as occuring in
the "unme d i at e scope' of the negation operator. It is shown that this
notion of tmme d t a t e scope, which also plays a r o l e in qr-amma t t c vl
pr oce s s e s such as qover nman t and in 'pragmatic quantification'.
s i In i 1a r 1yeo ns t r a ins the dis t rib uti 0 n of' f r e e c hoi ce' itOy and 0 tho r
quantifiers. This con s tr-a i n t cannot be defined on surface syntactic
structure: NPIs thus provide empirical evidence about the existence
and syntax of LF, a level of linguistic representation at which
log i cal s t rue t urei s rep I' e sen ted and wh i chi s the i ntel' f ace betwoen
sentence qr anmar and s eman t i c s . Further evidence about the synt.ax of
LF is provided by arguments that the negative polarity quant.ifier an~
must be represented as an existential rather than a un i ve r s a l
quantifier.
Second. the ~,gmi!n!i.& condition on sentences with NPIs which do
not meet this structural condition is to be stated in tel'1115 of their
literal meanings; the availability of such sentences for utterance.
however, is affected by conversational intent and real wor l d beliefs.
This analysis of NPIs, which posits as the primary trigger a
s t rue t u r a 1 r e 1a t ion ton ega t ion and de fin esot her t rig 9e r sin t e r Ins a f
their semantic relation to this pr imary t r i qqe r , is con t r a s t e d with a
quite different account of NPIs proposed by Ladusaw (1919). who
attempts a unified and semantic analysis of all tr'iggers on the basis
of logical entailment alone.
Thesis Supervisor: Noam Chomsky
Title: Institute Professor
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7INTRODUCTION
A problem of long standing in the syntax and sernantics of English
is the analysis of 'polarity-sensitive' items. These are expressions
which can only occur in a positive env t r-onmen t , in the case of
positive polarity items (PPIs): or a negative environment, in the case
of negative-polarity items (NPIs). The class of PPls includes
~~~~r~l, ~Qmft, ~1ill. alr~~~~, WQ~l~ £~1hgL' Rrgl!~ (ADV.); the class
23
of NPIs includes gDY ,~~~L, ~nxmQr~ ,~~1, mY~~) millg (V), bUggg
4
(gn in~h), Qg ~ll ihat ADJ., !QQ, DQ!hgr V-iUg, ~~L~ !Q VP, hQ14 ~
~gngl~ !Q, ~~n ngln V-ing, h~yg ~ hQQg in figll, lift ~ fing~r. grint g
5
~LQR, in ~~g£~. ~Q mY~h a~, until (with punctative verbs), and Qat
6
.an g~~l.a~.b. NP I s are unacceptab 1e ins t ra i gil t f orwar d1y pas i t iva
sentences, as are PPIs in negative sentences with normal intonation:
(l)(a).I'm not pretty pleased with it.
(PPI in negative sentence)
(b) I am pretty pleased with it.
(PPI in positive sentence)
(2)(a).John has eaten so much as a bite.
(NPI in positive sentence)
(b) John hasn't eaten so much as a bite.
(NPI in negative sentence)
80th PPIs and NPIs occur in a wide range of environments, not just in
simple affirmative or negative statements like (l)(b) and (2)(b); both
may be found in environments such as the following.
(3) If-CLAUSES:
If you eatfsomething, I'll give you five dollars.
anything, I'll hit you.
(4) COMPARATIVE CLAUSES:
He knew more than [anYbOdY realized.
some people thought he did.
8(5) COMPLEMENT S OF IQQ:
He t s too young to (know anyth i og about it.
{hold several j3bs at once.
(6) QUESTIONS
Is fanyth i ng
(something
wrong?
(7) COMPLEMENT S OF SUBfBlSfQ:
I'ln surprised that hefate anything.
actually ate s omet h i nq ,
The obvious question that arises in connection with
polarity-sensitive items is, of course, what are they sensitive to?
What is a negat iva envi ronment or a pas it i ve envi r onman t , and what is
it about environments like (3)-(7) above that mak es t hem hospitible to
both NPIs and PPIs?
This thesis is an examination of negative polarity items in
Eng 1ish t wit h per i pher a1 refere nee top 0 sit i ve pol a r i t Y i t e In s . NPIs
are of particular interest since they seem to interact with thr-e
distinct levels of representation: ~ytf~~g ~~n1~~!i~ ~!ru~t~r~;
lQ~i,al fQ£ID, i.e. representations of logical structure generated by
sentence-grammar interpretive rules; and
semantic representations generated by the
interaction of linguistic knowledge with other cognitive systems and
incorporating real-world beliefs, entailments, discourse intent, etc.
Thus negative polarity items may furnish some cl •• es about these
different levels of representation and how they interact with one
another: how autonomous are they with respect to one another and, when
it is clear that information represented at one level constrains the
possible representations at another level, how is this constraint
effected? I will attempt to specify the contributions of each of these
levels to the distribution of NPIs, with particular concern for the
9constraints on NPIs that are grammatical (i.e. statable on surface
syntactic structure or on logical form).
Chapter 1 is an examination of the at t emp t , in Lasnik (1975) and
Jackendoff (1969. ta72), to state a sufficient condition on NPI
acceptability in terms of sur f ac e structure. It is demons tr e t ed that
there is no surface structuro constraint on NPIs that is sufficient to
guarantee NPI acceptability.
Chapter 2 is an examination of the analysis of polarity items in
Baker (1970). Although I propose a major reformulation of his
definition of a negative environment and of other aspects of his
proposal, I maintain his distinction between a paradigm case, a
structural constraint stated on some level of sentence-grammar, and a
set of 'allusions', sentences in which NPls occur in an environment
other tha~ this par~digmatic one and are determined to be acceptable
by virtue of a semantic relation to the paradigm case.
In Chapter 3. I attempt to define this structural paradigm case
by formulating a restriction on r epr-e sen t a t i ons at the level of
logical form. The behavior of NPls provides some evidence that
1i n9u i S tic rep res e ntat ion s s i mil art 0 the for In lilae 0 f pre die ate
calculus are in fact constructed by the speakers of English. because
the statement of the paradigmatic environment for NPIs makes reference
to the notion of 'immediate scope' defined upon just such
representations. The notion of 'immediate scope' is also seen to play
a role in the distribution of 'free choice' ~nx and other quantifiers.
In Chapter 4 I examine the ~emantically (rather than
structurally) licensed 'allusions'. It is argued that a sentence
with an NPI which does not meet the structural constraint may still be
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acceptable if its literal meaning implicates some proposition which
does have the requisite logical structure. Uowever, whether or not it
is appropriate to utter such a sentence depends not only on the
possibility of such an implicature: utterance of the sentence will be
inappropriate if this implicature is not part of what the speaker is
using the sentenc9 to convey.
Chapter 5 concerns the quantifier a.n~: I argue that NPI .an~ is a
lexical re~resentation of the existential quantifier.
In Chapter 6, I examine a quite different analysis of negative
polarity, that of Ladusaw (1979). He proposes that the semantic
property of licensing 'downward entailment' is a necessary (although
not sufficient) condition on the ability of an expression to trigger
NPIs. Arguments are presented against this analysis.
In Chapter 7, I explore the probl~ms associated with the attempt
to eliminate explicit surface structure restrictions on NPIs.
In Chapter 8, I consider the question of what NPIs are and
whether they are marked in the lexicon.
11
FOOTNOTES
1. NPI .anx. as in (i). is to be distinguished f r om 'free choice' gn~,
as i n (i i ) .
(i) He didn't eat any peas.
(ii) He can do anything.
In the following chapters I will rep,'esent NPI gn~ by the existential
quantifier; this move will be defended in Chapter 5, where I consider
the question of whether the two gn~S can be collapsed.
2. I will not treat non-polarity 'positive ~nymQLg' here.
3. Both ~gt and mu~h can be stressed or unstressed in negative
envi ronrnents; both can also occur in certain non-negative
environments. but only if stressed.
(i) He hasn't done it yet/yet.
(ii) I'll do it yet/.y~t.
(iii) I don't have much/much interest in the project,· but
I have some interest.
(J(iv) There has been much/*much interest in the project lately.
4. IQg has an NPI and a non-NPI usage. Sentence (i) below is
ambiguous between (ii)(a) and (ii)(b), while 12Q in (iii) has only the
sense of 'excessively', as in (ii)(b).
(i) He doesn't have too many friends.
(i1)(8) He has few friends.
(b) He does not have the problem that the set of his
friends 1s excessively large.
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(iii) He has too many friends.
5. With durative verbs, as in (i), Yiltil has the meaning
'continuously up to': it may be regarded as a universal quantifier
over time. It may also occur with negate~ punctative verbs, as i~
( i i ) .
(i) He slept until noon.
[At: t is a time~noon] (he slept at t)
(ii) The baby wasn't born until noon.
NOT [Et: t is a time ~ noon] (the baby was born at t)
OR
[At: t is a time < noon] NOT (the baby was born at t)
It is unclear whether this sense of ynlil with negated punctative
verbs is to be characterized as existential rather than as universal,
or whether until can uniformly be characterized as un i ve r sal (since
negating a punctative verb creates a durative predicate). The
problems associated with the representation of until are similar to
thosa associatod with ~nx: since A NOT is equivalent to NOT E, it
takes some scrounging to find contexts which reveal the ccr r ec t
representation. See Chapter 5 on the question of whether' both NPI any.
and 'free choice' ~n~ are to be represented as the ~niversal
quantifier, or whether at least NPI an~ is to be represented as the
existential quantifier& Until with negated punctative verbs will be
treated as an NPI.
6. See Bolinger (1960) for a more extensive listing of NPIs; see
Chapter 8 concerning the delimitation of the class of NPIs.
CHAPTER 1: SURFACE STRUCTURE ACCOUNTS
As demonstrated by sentences (3)-(7) in the Introduction, NPls
may occur in the absence of overt negation. However, negation is (it
will be argued in the following chapter's) the pr i mary NPI 'trigger',
(By 'trigger' I mean any expression by virtue of which an NPI is
acceptable.) Thus a theory of NPIs must contain an account of the
conditions under which NPIs may be triggered by negation: these will
be sufficient but not necessary conditions on NPI acceptability. In
this chapter I will examine several attempts to formulate these
sufficient conditions as restrictions on the surface
configuration of an NPI and the negative trigger.
structure
The most obvious example of the interaction between NPIs and
surface structure is furnished by sentences like (1):
(l)(a)*Anybody didn't laugh.
(b)*The man (who didn't laugh) ate any peas.
From (I)(a) it can be determined that the negative or other 'trigger'
must precede the NPI, at least in some cases. and f r-om (l)(b) that it
must also command the NPI. Sentences (2)-(7) furnish further clues:
(2)(a) We never sighted any unicorns.
(b).Any unicorns we never sighted.
(3)(a) He didn't sight any unicorns.
(b)~Any unicorns weren't sighted by him.
(4) He didn't think that anybody would laugh.
(5)(a) It was not widely believed that John knew anything
about physics.
(b) That John knew anything about physics was not widely
believed.
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(6) From Ross (1967):
That he had stolen anything was never proved.
*finally proved.
(7)(a) It is impossible to find any green veget~bles there.
(b) Finding any green vegetables is impossible there .
• easy
1
(c)*Any green vegetabies are impossible to find there.
Sentences (2) and (3) show that this requirement that the negative
precede and command the NPI is to be stated on surface structure
rather than on deep structure (before topicalization and
passivization); sentence (4) demonstrates that tha negative may
(sometimes) be in a higher clause than the NPI that it triggers;
sentences (5)-(7) demonstrate that an NPI may precede the negative, if
it does not command it, in some sentences. This is not, of course. a
complete data set.
The sensitivity of NPIs to surface syntactic structure
demonstrated in (1)-(7) has encouraged attempts to find surface
structure conditions on the tl~iggering of NPIs by overt negatives.
For example, Klima (1964) represented NPIs as dar i ve d f r om PPIs
(~nx from ~Qm~, X~l from ~l[~~~X, ~nxmQr~ from ~1ill. until (with
punctative verbs) from R~lQL~' etc.) by a suppletion rule applying
after passive, in order to avoid generating sentences like (3){b)
above.
Negative polarity items, it should be po~nted out, are generally
regarded in these surface structure accounts as diagnostics of the
scope of negation: if an NPI can occur in a certain position in the
surface structure of a sentence, then that position is in the scope of
negation. That is. specifying the scope of negation is assumed to be
15
equivalent to specifying the distribution of NPIs, i.e. of those NPIs
triggered by overt negatives.
In section 1.1 I examine the account of the scope of negation
(and of the distribution of NPIs and 'nonreferential' quantifiers) in
Lasnik (1975); in section 1.2, that of Jackendoff (1969, 1972). All
of these accounts, it should be noted, determine the scope of negation
on the basis of dar i ve d structure rather than deep structure; see
Jackendoff (1969) for ar qumen t s that the scope of negation cannot be
defined on deep structures. In section 1.3, I arg~e for the
inadequacy of all such surface structure statements of the conditions
under which an NPJ may be triggered by overt negation.
. .
"
1.1 LASNIK (1975)
The discussion of negation in Lasnik (1975) is not specifically
directed at predicting the distribution of negative polarity items,
a l thouqt, he suggests that the distribution of an~, insofar as it is
conditioned by negative environme~ts, parallels that of negated
quantifiers. He describes a 'nonreferential' reading for quantifiers
(see b9low) which he assumes to be the mechanical result of occurance
in the scope of negation.
In his analysis the scope of negation is marked by the 'Not Scope
Rule', which assigns the feature '+negated' to quantifiers,
quantificational adverbs, and to Qg~aY~~ clauses: basically to
anything which is said to have scope relative to other logical
elements. A redundancy rule then assign~ the value '-referential' to
anything marked t+negated', including adverbials such as a hg~~ll~~
clause. The value '-referential' when as s i qne d to a quantifier
encodes the fact that a noun phrase modified by a '-referential'
quantifier does not establish a discourse referent (ignoring
intrasentential coreference); thus in sentence (B)(a) below, the
preferred reading (in which the negative has scope over the quantifier
mAnx) cannot be followed in the discourse by (B)(b). If m~nl is not
in the scope of the negat iva, however, then the NP wh i ch it mod if i as
may be antecedent to a personal pronoun as in (9). (Similarly,
'nonreferential' quantifiers may not be followed by nonrestrictive
relatives or expanded by 'namely ... ')
(8)(8) John didn't see many people.
(b) They were sorry tha~ he didn't see them .
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(9)(a) Many people didn't come.
(b) They were sorry that they didn't.
(Sentence (8)(a) has a reading in which mgn~ has wid~ scope with
respect to NOT; I will discuss alternate readings in Chapter 3).
This Not S~ope Rule assigns the value '+negated' to the
quantifiers and other logical elements listed above only und9r the
following two circumstances.
(1) If the quantifier or other logical ele~ent is commanded and
immediately preceded by nQl in surface structure, then the Not Scope
Rule obligatorily assigns this feature '+negated' to it. Since
certain quantifiers such as ~~m~ and ~~~gL~l are, in Lasnik's account,
inherently '+referential', marking them as '+negated' and hence (by
the redundancy rule) '-referential' wil1 result in the u~acceptability
of the sentence: the inherent and the assigned values of the feature
'referential' will disagree. Hence the unacceptability of llQl ~g~~L~l
m~n, in which ~!y~~l must be marked as '-referential'. Note that
this theory makes the incorrect prediction that the follow~ng sentence
will be unacceptable:
(10) He isn't someone whom I can really trust.
Since the Not Scope Rule obligatorily marks as '+negated' any
quantifier that immediately follows nQ1 in surface structure, we would
expect the inherently '+referential' quantifier ~Qm~Qn~ to be marked
'+negated' and hence '-referential', reSUlting in an unacceptable
sentence. But sentence (10) is acceptable. (However, i2m~Qni seems
to be able to occur in this position only when it is being used
pred1cativ81y.)
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(2) The Not Scope Rule optionally assigns the feature ~+negated'
if the quantifier or oth e r logical element is commanded by the
negati~e and to the right of it in surface structure, and if it is
within the same intonational phrase as the negative.
To summarize, this account predicts that NPIs, which are
inherently '-referential', will be acceptable if they occur to the
right of and commanded by a negative in surface structure, and in the
same intonational phrase with it. For in this event they may be
marked '+negated' and '-referential', and thus will be acceptable.
Specific criticisms of this and other surface structural accounts will
be given in Section 1.3, but note here that in Lasnik's account the
Not Scope Rule will fail to mark as '+negated' the NPIs in sentences
like (5)(b) and (6), in which an NPI precedes the negative but does
not comma-d it.
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1.2 JACKENDOFF (1969,1972)
Jackendoff (1969) presents a similar analysis of negation.
The scope of negation, in Jackendoff's account, is de t e r-m in ed by
a rule in which the negative, gener~ted in its surface structure
position, clim~s up the tree by an interpretive rule, taking wider and
wider scope:
We observe that the sur·face structure position of the
neg is always included in the interpreted scope. This
suggests that the principle of the scope rule is [optional]
expansion of the scope of the neg to larger and larger
constituents. Such expansion can be expressed by a rule
which raises neg from the node on which it is generated to a
dominating node. (P. 236)
What this rule does, then, is raise the nenative--consideridg, for the
moment, only sentences in which the negative is lexically represented
by DQ1--from its position in the VP (over which it always has scope)
to the S-node, giving it sentence scope.
Consider the following sentences, in which there is a quantifier
occupying sUbject position:
(11) Some people didn't laugh.
(12).Any people didn't laugh.
(13) Many people didn't laugh.
That the negative is restricted to VP scope in (11) and (13) is
demonstrated by the unacceptability of n~i!h~L-tags:
(14).Some of the boys didn't see anyone, and neither did 8il1.
Jackendoff argues (as does Carden (1973» that nii!h§£-tags--and also
positive tag questions with rising intonation--require that the
20
negative have S scope; thus the impossibility of a ngilh~r-tag in (14)
suggests that the negative has less than S scope, presumably VP scope.
The restriction of the negative to VP scope results from a requirement
that the 1eftmost logical element (whether quantifier or negative) be
moved first, and that only one such element be permittAd to occupy a
given node. Thus in (11) ~Qmg is moved first and, since the S-node
position is now filled, the negative is restricted to VP scope. In
(12), an~ in subject position has to be moved first, and thus the
negative is restricted to VP scope. 8n~ is thus unable to be in the
scope of negation. As in Lasnik's account, certain lexical items
(i.e. t NPIs) must be in the scope of negation, while others (;.e.,
PPIs) are not acceptable in the scope of negation. He proposes a
feature-changing system similar to Lasnik's.
He observes that the negative llQ! is unable to leave the clause
in which it occurs:
(15)*That John didn't go bothered anyone.
Since nQl is trapped in the lower clause, ~n~Qng will not be in the
scope of negation.
Notice that this account can handle sentences like (5)(b) and
(6)--the sentences in which an NPI is acceptable if embedded in a
sentential subject preceding nQl. Since the reading is always
available in which a quantifier has scope only over the clause in
which it occurs, it is possible 1n (5)(b) and (6) for ~n~!hill9 to be
~n the scope of negation: this is because it has scope only over the
subordinate clause 1n this reading. and thus does not occupy the
topmost S-node, which i~ thereby left open for the negative. In a
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footnote. Jackendoff claims that sentences in which NPIs occur in
sentential sUbjects preceding a negative in the ver~ phrase must be
treated by a different scope rule thatl the one which accounts for the
distribution of NPIs following the negative. This seems odd, since
his theory actually accounts for such sentenc~s when the lexical
representation of the negative is nQ1. Howe~er, he cites only cases
in which the negative is an adversative, as in (16):
(16) That anyone at all laughed surprised Bill.
(The reason for his claim that such sentences are to be treated by a
different rule is that adversatives, unlike llQt, do not trigger NPIs
in the same clause:
(17).That Bill laughed surprised anyone.
The unacceptability of sentences like (17) is discussed in Chapter 3.)
While his account is superior to lasnik's in its ability to
handle sentences like (5)(b) and (6), it is less inclusive in its
treatment of those sentences in which fiQ! does not have scope over a
direct object in the same VP:
(18) I didn't give anybody several of the questions.
(19)(a)'There were several questions that I didn't giv6 anybody.'
SEVERAL NOT ANYBODY
(b) 'There wasn't anybody who I gave several questions to.'
NOT ANYBODY SEVERAL
Let us consider only the reading (19)(a), in which ~~x~£~l is not
within the scope of negation. (The fact that it is under certain
circumstances acceptable negated, as demonstrated by (19)(b), is
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discussed in Chapter 3.) In lasnik's account, the scope of negation is
not represented as the association of the negation operator with nodec
on a tree; it could presumably end ~nywhere at all, although there are
certain circumstances which force it to be terminated (e.g., an
intonational break). So in his account the reading (19)(a) of (18)
presents no problem: the scope of negation simply terminates after
In contrast, Jackendoff's rule is not equipped to deal with
sentences like (18) with the reading (19)(a), since the negative,
associated in his account with higher and higher nodes on the tree,
cannot have scope over parts of constituents. Thus (19)(a) is not (in
this account) a possible reading of (18), since there is no node that
the negative operator could dominate (in its climb from its surface
position) and thereby cause ~n~YQg~ but not ~gygL~l Q1 !hg RrQQ1~m~ to
be in its scope.
In Jackendoff (1972) this account of the scope of negation is
modified; basically, this later account relies on the 'precede and
command' rule discussed above. Negation is characterized as one of a
number of modal operators which are borne by lexical items and which
place various conditions upon the identifiability of referents for NPs
in their scope. Negation imposes the condition that no referent may
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be identified for an NP in its scope. Everything preceded and
commanded by D2t or a neg~tive-;ncorporated quantifier like nQRQ~X is
(optionally) in the scope of the negation operator.
Thus he has eliminated his tree-climbing scope rule, and is now
proposing an account which is basically equivalent to Lasnik's. (His
claims about the correlat~on between lexical category and scope type
will not be examined here.)
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1.3 CRITIQUE OF SURFACE STRUCTURE ACCOUNTS
In the preceding sections I hav~ sketched two accounts of NPIs
which may be summarized roughly as follows.
A sufficient condition on the acceptability of NPIs is that they
occur in the scope of negation. The scope of negation maximally
includes everything to the right of and commanded by the lexical
realization of the negation operator in surface structure. As the
am~iguity of (20) below demonstrates, the scope of negation can fall
short of everything to the right of and commanded by fiQl or other
lexical realizations of negation: in the reading (21)(a) of (20), the
scope of negation stops short of m~n~. And, as has been widely noted,
this reading (21)(a) is not necessarily signalled by an intonation
break.
(20) He didn't answer many questions.
(21)(a) [MANYx: x is a question] NOT (he answered x)
(b) NOT [MANYx: x is a question] (he answered x)
If an NPJ occurs in the scope of negation, it is predicted t~
be acceptable. Neither Lasnik's nor Jackendoff's account is designed
specifically to account for the distl'ibution of NPIs, which are simply
assumed to be diagnostics of the scope of ~egation. This surface
structure account, therefore, may turn out to be inadequate e;ther
because it fails to predict the scope of negation from surface
structure or because 'occurence in the scope of negation' is not the
correct formulation of the sufficient condition on NPI acceptability.
It should be noted that, as sentences (3)-(7) in the Introduction
demonstrate, NPIs can occur in certain contexts without any overt
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negation at all. Clearly the surface structure account discussed here
is not intended to cover such contexts, but only to describe a
sufficient condition under which NPIs may be triggered by overt
negation.
Below I will consider two problems for this Lasnik/Jackendoff
surface structure account
The first problem is that, as has long been observed, the
acceptability of an NPI in an embedded sentence with the negative in a
higher clause depends upon the meaning, not just the syntactic
configuration, of the sentence. For example, the following sentonces
are structurally identical in all the relevant respects:
(22) I didn't realize that he knew anything at all about
photography.
(23) I didn't say that I had ever been to Istanbul.
(24).1 didn't(8dd that I had ever been to Istanbul.
(yell
(25) I don't think that she can help doing what she does.
(26).1 don't regret that she can help doing what she does.
If the scope of negation optionally includes everything that is
preceded and commanded by the lexical representation of negation,
(22)-(26) should all be acceptable since the NPIs in them are preceded
and commanded by n2!.
Thus occurence in the scope of negation (as defined on surface
structure) is not sufficient to guarantee NPI acceptability when the
trigger is overt negation. We could accordingly say that this
sufficient condition on NPJ acceptability is not merely that the NPI
occur in the scope of nega~ion but also that it occur in the same
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clause with the lexical realization of the negation operator. This
reformulation would have the effect that (22)-(26) above would not
meet this sufficient condition, and the acceptable (22), (23) and (25)
would be acceptable for the same as yet unsp&cified reasons as (3)-(7)
in the Introduction. However, this move will be of no help in
connection with a second and more serious problem.
The second problem for the surface structure accounts arises from
sentences like the following:
(27)(a) John didn't help us because he had (any) altruistic
sentiments--he just didn't have anything e15e to do.
(b)*John didn't lift a finger to help us because he had (any)
altruistic sentiments--he just didn't have anything else
to do.
(e) John didn't lift a finger to help us (,) because he was
busy--he would have helped us if he'd had time.
(28)(a) John doesn't do as well as Mary because he has (anYJ
talent--he gets a lot of help from his friends.
(b) -John doesn't hold a candle to Mary because he has
(any) talent--he gets a lot of help.
(c) John doesn't hold a candle to Mary because he never
works at all--if he worked, he'd do as well.
(29)(8) The bomb didn't explode at 6:00 because (any of) the
terrorists goofed--it was purely a technical malfunction.
(b) .Th9 bomb didn't explode until 6:00 because (any of)
the terrorists goofed--it was purely a technical
malfunction.
(Ignore irrelevant reading where ~XQ12~i is
durative.)
(c) The bomb didn't explode until 6:00 because somebody
goofed--it was supposed to go off earlier. but he
forgot.
(30)(a) John didn't yield to us with (much) enthusiasm: he was mad.
(b) -John didn't budge with (much) enthusiasm: he was mad.
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(31)(a) He didn't help us politely: he was rude.
(b) *He didn't lift a finger to help us politely: he was rude.
In the (a) sentences above, the adverbials (~~&gy~~ clauses,
purpose clauses, manner adverbials) are to be taken as in the scope of
negation: this reading can be forced by the presence of NPls in the
adverbial. What is relevant to the discussion, however, is the
varying acceptability of the NPIs preceding the negated adverbials:
the (b) sentences demonstrate that NPIs are unacceptable even
immediately following fiQ! if the adverbial is also in the scope of
negation. The (c) sentences demonstrate that NPIs are acceptablo in
this position if the adverbial is not negated.
That is, even in the same clause with and immediately preceded by
a negative, an NPI may be unacceptable. It is not the presence of an
NPI in the h§'AU~§ clause or other adverbial that renders an NPI in
the matrix S unacceptable: it will be unacceptable if the Qg~gY~~
clause is interpreted as being within the scope of negation. whether
or not the adverbial also contains an NPI.
Note that other types of adverbials do not seem to 'rob' NPIs of
the negative:
(32) The bomb didn't explode [PUNCTATIVE] until 6:00 during
(any of) the tests. TEMPORAL ADVERBIAL"
(33) Sue doesntt lift a finger around the house anymore.
TEMPORAL ADVERBIAL
(34) The glacier hasn't bUdged an inch ;n any direction.
that
DIRECTIONAL ADVERBIAL
(36) I didn't(budge my car an inch w;th (any of) the tactics that
tearn one red cent
you taught me. .INSTRUMENTAl ADVERBIAL
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Compare (35) with (36) below, which has a manner adverbial:
(36).1 didn't earn one red cent witn (any) enthusiasm.
In this section I will attempt to demonstrate that there is no
way to acc~unt for the unacceptability of (27)(b)-(31)(b) by a theory
which states the sufficient condition on NPI acceptability in terms of
surface structure. (Sentences (33)-(36) are argued in Chapter 4 to be
acceptable for reasons which are not relevant here.)
Consider the unacceptable (27)(b). The only possible surface
structure explanation of this unacceptability would be an appeal to
some syntactic structure of (27)(b) in which the Qg~~y~~ clause but
not the NPI lift ~ fing~L is in the scope of negation. It has been
suggested (e.g. in Williams (1975) that the node to which a Qg~~U~~
clause is attached determines whether or not it is in the scope of a
mAtl~ix negative: S-attached h~~gY~~ clauses are negated, while the
S'-attached ones are not. This may be correct--perhaps the scope of
adverbials is, unlike that of quantified NPs (as in (20» predictable
from surface structure--but it buys us nothing in connection with
sentences like (27). If the negated Dg~~y~~ clause in (27){b) is
attached to S, we would have to say that the negative has scope over
s: since Ii!! j fing~£ occurs in S, it is in the scope of negation and
should be acceptable.
There is, however, a fairly straightforward way in which
Jackendoff's 1969 rulA can be altered so as to deal with
(27)(b)-{31)(b), and in a way which accords reasonably well with
3
intuition. Let all NPIs except for .ant and iX,gr. prevent the
negative from 1nterpretiveJy 'leaving' any node which dominates an
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NPl. Thus in (27)(b)-(31)(b) the NPI in th& VP restricts the negative
to VP scope and hence the adverbial, which we will have to represent
as attached to S. cannot be in the scope of negation. In this
account, then, (27){b)-(31)(b) without NPIs in the adverbial are
simply impossible readings to get; with NPIs in the adverbial, they
are unacceptable since these NPIs will be outside the scope of
negation.
Confirmation of this account would be in the form of evidence
that expressions can be negated following NPIs as long as they are in
the VP with the negative. and the NPI. (Consider for the moment just
those cases in which nQl is' the lexical representation of the negation
operator.) There is such evidence if we explain the difference between
the set of motivational adverbials (e.g. h~~aM~g, in Q£~gr 12) and
manner adverbials on the one hand, and the set of instrument~lt
temporal, and directional adverbials (see sentences (32)-(35)) on the
other hand, by saying that the form9r are attached to S' or S
(correlating with the presence or absence of an intonational break)
and that the latter are attached to the VP. Then the' fact that
instrumentals, temporals, and directionals may be negated following an
NPI (as in sentences (32)-(35» is explained~ the NPI restricts the
negative .to VP scope but since these adverbials are in the VP they
will still be in the scope of the negative that has been so
restricted.
The impossibility of negated motivational or manner adverbials
following an NPI in the VP will be explained by saying that the
negative cannot leave the VP because the VP node dominates an NPI:
thus the S- or S'-attached adverbial will be outside the scope of
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negation.
An interesting bit of corroboration comes from sentences like
(37) and (38) below:
(37) Drew didn't lift a finger to save anyone.
(38).Orew didn't lift a finger in order to save anyone.
The difference in acc~ptability between (37) and (38) may be explained
by saying that in (37) 12 1.a~jl .a!lXQn~ is a VP compl emant and in (38)
in 2£di!: t2 ~A~i 4nX2ni is a purpose clause attached to S. Thus
AnX2ni is acceptable in the adverbial of (37): although the NPI lift A
fin.QiI: restricts the negative to VP scope, the comp l amen t 12 '§'51~~
AnX2nl i~ still in the scope of negatiun since it is VP-attached. In
(38), h~wever, lift A fing~£ 'traps' the negative in the VP and the
S-attache1 complement in Qr~~t lQ ~~y~ ~n~Qn~ is not in the scope of
negat ion: hence an~2n!l is unacceptab 1e in it, S i Ini 1ar 1y, an~Qn~ is
acceptable in indirect object position following an NPI:
(39) She dido'·t give a red cent to anyone.
This surface structural account of the scope of negation which
results from this modification of Jackendoff's rule is appealing in
its simplicity, and accounts for all the sentences like
(27)(b)-(31)(b) that have been looked at so fur. However, there seem
to be insurmountable problems.
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FIRST PROBLEM: In (40) below, the NPI adverbials AnxmQr~ and in
XIA£l follow another NPI, which presumably restricts the scope of n2!.
Therefor·e jln~mQr§ and in ~iilr~ mus t be at t ache d to the VP node:
otherwise they will not be in the scope of negation, since the
preceding NPI has restricted the negative to VP scope. However, in
(41) an~m2J:i and in XiaJ:~ follow rnotivational e dve rb t a l s . This is a
problem, because this revised surface s t ruc tur s account requires
motivational adverbials to be S- or S'-attached, in order to explain
why an NPI in the VP is incompatible with a negated motivational
adverbial. But if ~n~mQri and in ~iar~ follow an S- or S'-attached
expression, how can they be VP-attached? Thus we are forced to make
contradictory claims about theil' surface structure position.
(40)(a) The glacier hasn't bUdged an inch in years.
(b) She doesn't lift a finger around the house anymore.
(41)(a) I haven't gone to church because I wanted to in
years--I've just been going out of habit.
(b) Sarah doesn't perform in order to make money anymore
--she just enjoys performing these days.
SECOND PROBLEM: Some NPIs may occur in clauses with no negative
if the clause is embedded under a negative and a so-called
'neg-raising' verb such as think:
(42) I don't thi 11k that \ he 1 i ves here anymore .
•Mary didn't announce th89
(43) I don't think that he(Wl11 bUdge an inch.
thas written the paper yet.
There are two obvious ways to deal with 'neg-raising' verbs and
the scope of negation within the framework of our surface structure
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rule: (l)to say that neg-raising verbs (unlike other verbs) are
transparent with respect to negation, and allow anything in their
complement to be in the scope of the upstairs negative or (2) to posit
the existence of a 'neg-lowering' rule that transforms (44) to (46)
before the scope of negation is determined:
(44) I don't think that she went.
(46) I think that she didn't go.
Possibility (1), in which the scope rule is simply applied to
sentences like (43) 'as is', with no relocation of the negative, will
create an insurmountable problem: there is absolutely no explanation
for the unacceplability of sentences like (46) below:
(46) I don't think that hef.Will budge an inch
.has wri t t e:: ths paper yet
has resigned
because he has any aspirations for higher office.
The ~nly way that sentences like (27)(b)-(31)(b) are blocked, in
this account, is if the negative is prevented from leaving a node
dominating an NPI. If the negative starts out attached to· a node
higher than the node to which the NPJ is attached, there is no way to
prevent it from having scope over that node, and hence the NPI should
be acceptable.
Possibility (2), in which there is a 'neg-lowering' rule, would
explain the unacceptability of (46) above: it would have been
transformed into (47) prior to t~e applic&tion of the scope rule; the
negative would, as usual, be prevented form taking scope beyond the VP
since there is an HPJ in the VP.
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(47) .1 think that he won't budge an inch because he has
any aspirations to higher office.
There are two serious problems associated with this analysis.
The first problem is: the presence of nnx in sUbject position of
sentence (48) below should render the sentence unacceptable, because
the negative should be unable to leave the VP (since there is an NPI
in the VP) with the result that Anxb2~X is not in the scope of
negation.
(48) I don't think that anybody gives a damn about Harold.
The second problem associated with the 'neg-lowering' rule
approach to 'neg-raised' sentences is that (a~ often noted) sentence
pairs like (49) and (50) are not always synonymous.
(49) I think that Bill doesn't beat his cat because he loves it.
(50) I don't think that Bill beats his cat becau~e he loves it.
The two sentences share one reading: the reading in which the
speaker claims to believe that Bill beats the cat but for some reason
other than love, i.e. the reading in which the Rg~aU~~ clause is
negated. However, -(49) has another meaning: the speaker believes that
the reason why Bill doesn't beat his cat is that he loves the cat,
i.8. the reading in which the hik~U~~ clause is not negated.
Sentence (50) does not have this reading: that is, the Qft~~U~~ clause
in (60) is obligatorily negated. This is not only another argument
against syntact;c 'neg-raising': it also creates problems for the
'neg-lowering' rule, which is of course neg-raising in reverse. There
is no way to explain why s~ntenc8 (50) does not have this reading in
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which the ~i~AU~i clause is not negated, since presumably (49) and
(50) have the form (49) when the neg scope rule applies. Thus the
'neg-lowering' rule must be abandoned.
There is, as a result, no way to account for the unacceplability
of sentences like (46) with the revised scope rU.8.
The problem created by (46), then, is that if the negative starts
out in a position higher in the tree than the NPI in the VP there is
no way to explain the unacceptability of the sentence. The same
problem arises in connection with sentences with a negative in sUbject
position:
(51)*Nobody contributed a red cent because there was any coercion.
Since the negative does not occur in the VP and the Qg~~Yi~ clause is
S-attached rather than S'-attached (as it must be in order to ~9
negated in this account), there is no node which dominates the NPI a
£~~ ,§n1 but not the h~,AY~~ clause: only if there were such a node
could the NPI prevent the negative from leaving and thereby prevent
the negation of the ~~&AY~~ clause. Sentence (51) should therefore be
acceptable, since nothing prevents the NPJ in the ~~~AYi~ clause from
being in the scope of negation. But of course (51) is unac~eptable.
T.IIRD PROBLEM: The problem discussed above arises in connection
with operators other than negation. For instance, polarity items may
occur in questions. Let us assume for the purposes of the discussion
that the question operator triggers NPIs analogously to negation: that
is, an NPI in the scope of a question operator will be acceptable.
The acceptability of ADX!hing in the D~~AU~~ clause of (52)
demonstrates that hi~AU~i clauses can be in the scope of this question
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operator:
(52) Did he beat his cat because it did anything wrong?
he hates it?
The problem arises once again of NPIs preceding the b§k~U~~ clause in
such environments:
(53)(a)*Oid he bat an eyelash when she wal~ed 1n because he
was expecting anybody else?
(b).Oid he lift a finger to help Frank in order to
impress anyone?
There is no way to deal with this problem with our revised scope
rule. If we propose that there is a question morpheme which 'climbs'
J I !., 'I
h
up the tree in the same fashion as Jackendoff's rule has the negative
climb up the tree, then we are faced with the same problems that were
found to be insuperable in the case of the tneg-raising' sentences.
FOURTH PROBLEM: This rule is also unable to account for the
acceptability of positive polarity items fo1 lowing the negative in the
matrix 5 of sentences with Q~~AU~~ clauses:
(54)(a) He's not still hanging around here because he has
any affection for the place.
(b) I didn't bUy you several martinis because I had any
desire to listen to your hard luck story.
In (64)(a), the ~nx in the D§'AY~~ clause shows that the negative has
S scope, and thus everything in the S should be marked as negated,
resulting (in the theories under discussion) in unacceptability if a
positive polarity item (such as ~lill or ~!XiLAl) is ~o marked: so why
is (64)(b) accoptable?
It appears, therefore, that there is no way to account for the
unacceptability of sentences like (27)(b)
occurence in the (surface structure defined)
sufficient to guarantee N~I acceptability.
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if it is claimed that
scope of negation is
. f .
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 1
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that it is not a
sufficient condition on the acceptability of an NPI that it occur to
the right of and in the same clause with a commanding negative in
surface structure,
In the following chapters it is argued that accurence in the
scope of negation--however the scope of negation is determined--is not
sufficient to guarantee NPI acceptability, and furthermore that the
statement of a sufficient condition on NPI acceptability must make
reference to a relationship betweon the MPI and the negation operator
that cannot be defined on surface syn~actic structure .
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FOOTNOTES
1. There may be an acceptable reading of an~ gL~in ~~g~l~Yli~ in
which it is i~terpreted as 'any green vegetables that there may have
been', or 'whatever green vegetables there were'. This occurrence of
ADX is not conditioned by the negative in imR2~~inl§, as (i)
demonstrates:
(i) Any green vegetables that there were up there
were impossible to locate.
fairly easy
2. See Chapter 3 concerning the interaction of 'nonreferentiality' ·of
quantifiers and the scope of negation.
3. Note that ~lll and §~~L, unlike other NPIs, seem to be acceptable
in the matrix S of such sentences:
(i) I didn't cut any of those lectures because I had
anything against you.
(11) I don't think that he ever wore that suit in order
to impress anyone.
This will be discussed in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 2: BAKER'S CONJECTURE
In the preceding chapter the surface structure accounts of
Jackendoff and lasnik were seen to be inadequate to the task of
defining a sufficient conditi'on on NPI acceptability.
I will argue in the following chapters that a sufficient
condition on NPI acceptability can in fact be formulated as a part of
sentence grammar. However, it must be recalled at this point that a
restriction of NPIs to some relation with a negative can never be a
necessary condition on NPJ acceptability, since NPIs are acceptable
following if. 19Q, ~ULnLij§d thAt. etc. (See sentences (3)-(7) in the
Introduction.) So if a fufficient condition is formulated in terms of
the relationship (whatever it turns out to be) of the NPJ to a
negative, the relationship between MPI acceptability by virtue of this
condition and HPI acceptability in sentences like (3)-(7) in the
Introduction still remains to be determined.
The first proposals concerning this relation were made in Baker
(1970a,b).
Baker (1970a) observes sentences such as the following: .
(l)(=Bater's (18»
There isn't anyone in this camp who wouldn't rather be in
in Montpelier.
(2)(=8aker's (29»)
You can't convince me that someone isn't still holed up in
this cave.
Since .gU~_ LAlh§£ and ~ill are positive polarity items, as
demonstrated by their unacceptability in (3) and (4) below, why are
they acceptable in the same clause with a negative?
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(3)(=8aker's (22)
*He wouldn't rather be in Montpelier.
(4)(=8aker's (24))
.Someone isn't still holed up in this cave.
He first attempts to deal with sentences (1) and (2) by modifying
Jackendoff's 1969 negative scope rule in the following manner: All
nodes of the tree are marked '-negative' at the beginning of ~h8
derivation. Negative polarity items are of course inherently
'+negative', and positive polarity items are inherently '-negative'.
Jackendoff's scope rule applies as usual, but it is written as an
alpha rule capable of undoing the results of previous applications:
(5)(=8aker's (30) Neg x tt.negative y
1 2 3 4 ---->
1 2 - d.negat i o:e 4
Thus if an item is in the scope of an odd number of negatives, its
derivational feature will be '+negative', but if it is in the scope of
an even number of negatives, its derivational feature will be
'-negative' if the rule (which is optional) applies.
In addition to the basically insuperable problems which Baker
goes on to ascribe to this rule, note that it is of no use with
respect to sentences like (27)(b) in Chapter 1. This sentence,
repeated below, contains only one negative and everything in the
sentence should therefore be marked '+negative'.
(27)(b).John didn't lift a finger to help us because he had (any)
altruistic sentiments--he just didn't have anything els8
to do.
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Baker then proposes an entirely different approach to the
problems raised by sentences like (1) and (2), based upon his
observation that (1) and (2) entail (6) and (7) below, in which the
PPIs are acceptable.
(6)(=Baker's (60»)
EVAryone in this camp would rath~r be in Montpelier.
(7)(=8aker's (62»
I firmly believe that someone ;5 still holed up in this cave.
He proposes the following rule.
(8)(=8aker's (47»
a. Negative-polarity items are appropriate in structures within
the scope of negations, whereas affirmative-polarity items
are appropriate elsewhere. [This part of his rule is to be
'virtually identical with the original unidirectional rules
of Klilna and Jackendoff.' That is, by par t (a) an NPI is
apprcpriate if it is in the scope of negation as defined on
surface structure.]
b. Given semantic representations PI and P2 satisfying the
following conditions:
CA) PI = Xl V Zl and P2 = X2 Y Z2, where Y is itself
a well-formed semantic representation;
(8) PI entails P2~
then the lexical representation appropriate to Y in P2
(by(a) is also appropriate to Y in Pl.
The acceptability of (1), that is, is accounted for on the basis of
its entailment of (6), the semantic representations of the two
sentences being roughly as in (9):
(9)(8) SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION PI OF (1)
neg Ex neg (x would rather be in Montpelier)
(b) SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION P2 OF (6)
Ax (x would rather be in Montpelier)
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Since the PPI WQUl~ £j!bi! is obviously not acceptable in (1) by parL
(a) of the rule, part (b) must be utilized. The Y in common between
the semantic representations of (1) and (6) is the logical subformula
~ w2ul~ tA!hit b~ in MQn1agli~[, however it is represented
semantically. Since PI entails P2. the lexical representation
appropriate to ~ wgul~ £~!biL D§ in M2ll!QiliiL in (6) is also
appropr;ate to it in (1).
The acceptability of NPIs after ~urnri~§~ 1h~1 is accounted for
similarly. Baker claims that the semantic representation (lO)(b) of
(10)(a) entails the semantic representation (ll)(b) of (11)(a), and
hence the lexical representation appropriate to their common subpart
f!(SA1(J2hn,~» in (11)(a) will also be appropriate in (10)(a). TI.e
lexical representation of this subpart is 'John said anything'. It is
clear, however, that ~u£Rri~~g ih~1 S (:oes not entail ~!R~~! !h~1 ~QI
S: one might be surprised at S without ever having thought about the
possibility of S. So logical entailment does not appear to be the
relation between PI and P2.
(10)(a) We are surprised that John said anything.
(b) SURPRISED (we, (Ex(SAY(John,x»»
(11)(a) We expected that John wouldn't say anything.
(b) EXPECT (we. (NEG (Ex (SAY (John, x»»)
Baker's proposal is thus as follows. An NPI must be marked
'+negated' in order to be acceptable. Everything to the right of and
commanded by the lex;cal representation of negation in surface
structure is marked as '+negated'; NPIs so marked are acceptable by
virtue of part (a) of Baker's rule in (8) above. Part (a) therefore
is meant to state the sufficient condition: the paradigm case, that
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is, of NPI acceptability. Part (b) of the rule describes the
circumstances under which an NPI which is not marked as '+negated' by
part (a) may still be marked as '+negated' and hence be acceptabl~.
Part (b) relies not on surface structure but on the relation between
the semantic representations of sentences. If the semantic
representation of what we will call the 'host sentence' entails the
semantic representation or what we will call the 'implied sentence',
then any NPIs that are acceptable in the 'implied sentence' will also
be acceptable in the 'host sentence t •
It was demonstrated in Chapter 1 that surface structure rules
like Baker's part (a) are inadequate to define a paradigm case of NPI
acceptability. Similarly it is demonstrated in Chapter 4 below that
part (b), as Daker (1970b) acknowledges, cannot be formulated in terms
of logical entailment alone. Nevertheless, the theory of NPIs ~or
which I argue has exactly the structure proposed by Baker: there is a
sufficient condition on HPI acceptability stated on some level of
linguistic representation, and sentences with NPIs which do not meet
this condition may still be acceptable by virtue of their meaning
(rather than their structure) if they 'allude' in some as yet
unspecified way to a semantic re~resentation whose structure does meet
this condition. The distinction between part (a) and part (b), then,
is the distinction between a structural (though not necessarily
surface structural) condition and a semantic condition; between 8
paradigm case and a machinery for alluding to that paradigm case. In
the following chapters I propose reformulations of parts (a) and (b)
while maintaining the structure of Baker's account.
It should be pointed out that this is not the only plausible
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stru~ture of a theory of NPIs. For example, Ladusaw (1979) argues
against this 'derivative generation' analysis in which the primary
trigger is ne3ation. He argues that all triggers are equally basic by
virtue of a shared semantic property of 'downward entailment', and
attempts to formulate a necessary rather than a sufficient condition
on NPI acceptability. His proposals are discussed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 3: PART (A) - THE PARADIGM CASE
In this chapter 'part (a)' will be reformulated. That is, I will
attempt to formulate a sufficient condition on NPI acceptability to
replace the surface structure condition rejected in thu preceding"
chapter.
In section 3.1 sentences like (1)(a) below will be reconsidered;
their unacceptability, it ;,as been showntis raca 1c i trant to
explanation in terms of the surface structure configuration of llQt and
NPIs. (The continuation (l)(b) forces the unacceptable reading of
(1)(a).)
(I)(a)-John's paper didn't hold a candle to Mary's because
he had (any) help.
(b) ... but because he worked hard.
A reformulation of part (a) will be proposed in the light of sentence
(1)(a), and in section 3.2 this reformulation, the 'Immediate Scope
Constraint', will be worked out in detail. In section 3.3 I will
examine the mechanics of the proposed rule; in section 3~4t possible
counterexamples to it.
3.1 SENTENCE (1)(a) AND THE PREDICATE 'CAUSE'
Contrast the unacceptability of sentence (1)(a) with the
acceptability of sentence (2)(a), with an appropriate continuation
(2)(b).
(2)(a) John's paper didn't hold a candle to Mary's
because he got drunk the night before.
(b) ... not because 'he's dumb.
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The obvious difference between (1)(a) and (2)(a) is that the
bi~AU~§ clause is negated in (1)(a) but not in (2)(a), in the readings
forced by their respective continuations. That is, treating ~~~aY~§
as a predicate with two arguments, viz. the complement S of h~CaY}i
(hereafter, '51') and the matrix S (hereafter, '52'), we can represent
the logical skeleton of (1)(a) and (2)(a) as in (3) below.
(3)(a) NOT CAUSE (SI, 52)
(b) CAUSE (51. NOT 52)
=(1)(a)
=(2)(a)
The u~.Jcceptability of the NPJ in 52 of sentence (1)(a) becomes
somewhat clearer now. The predicate CAUSE intervenes between NOT and
52. with the result that the NPI in 52 is semantically 'distanced'
from NOT in some way, despite the surface structure adjacency of nQ!
and hQl~ ~ &An~l§ 12. 52 of (2)(a), on the other hand, is immediately
in the scope of NOT; thus the NPI in 52 is not 'distanced' from the
~egative by the predicate CAUSE.
There is some evidence that such adverbials must be assigned
scope in this way, along with negation. quantifiers, etc. This comes
from tag questions. As observed by Jackendoff (1972), Carden (1973)
and others. a positive tag question is unacceptable if NOT ~s not the
operator with widest scope. Thus (4)(a) below is unacceptable since
1
~l~~r~l must take wide scope with respect to NOT.
(4)(a).Several students didn't laugh, did they?
(b) [SEVERAlx: x ;s a student] NOT (x laughed)
What is relevant is that non-negated ~§'jU~ft clauses also
positive tags; if we assign scope to such adverbials
sabotage
in the
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representation of its logical structure, then (5)(a) can be said to be
unacceptable for the same reason as (4)(a), given its logical
structure (5)(b); in contrast, (5)(c) with logical structure (5)(d) is
acceptable since NOT is the operator with widest scope. (Consider
only the most natural readings of (5)(a) and (e), as represented in
(b) and (d).
(5)(a)*John didn't call because he was too busy, did he?
(b) CAUSE (S1, NOT 52)
(c) John didn't call because he wanted anything, did he?
(d) NOT CAUSE (51, 52)
Perhaps it is this semantic 'distancing' of the NPI from the
negative that renders (1)(a) but not (2)(a) unacceptable. That is,
perhaps part (a) should be stated not ~n surface structure but on some
representation of logical structure··-hereafter, 'logical form'; as a
first approximation to part (a), to be refined in the following
sections, consider (6):
(6) An NPI is acceptable in a sentence S only if in the logical
form of S the representation of the NPI occurs only in the
proposition over which NOT mos t ilnmediately has scope.
In the following section, 3.2, the notion of 'immediate scope' will be
cons i dered in mor-e deta i 1. The term 'logical form' is ambiguous,
having various logical and linguistic usages; this ambiguity will be
left unresolved for the moment. That is, I will leave open until
section 3.3 the question of what linguistic level the constraint
sketched in (6) applies to. I will also ignore until section 3.3 the
question of how sentences ~re associated with logical forms.
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3.2 THE IMMEDIATE SCOPE CONSTRAINT
In section 3.1 I examined sentences like (l)(a) in which the
predicate CAUSE seemed to separate the NPI from NOT in logical form
despite the surface structure adjacancy of the NPI and the negative
morpheme. In this section the tentative formulation of part (a) given
in (6) will be worked out in more detail.
Consider the fullowing sentences:
(7)(a).She doesn't budge for everybody.
(b) NOT [Ax: x is a person] (she budges for x)
(c) [Ax: xis a person] NOT (she budges for x)
(8)(a).She doesn't budge for just anybody.
(b) NOT [Ax: x is a person] (she budges for x)
(c) [Ax: x is a person] NOT (she budges for x)
(9)(a) That doesn't hold a candle to most of Frank's idoas.
(b) NOT [MOSTx: x is an idea of Frank's] (that holds a candle to x)
(e) [MOSTx: x is an idea of Frank's] NOT (that holds a candle to x)
In the above sentences, it appears that in some cases a
quantifier is capable of 'robbing' the NPIs nU~g~ and hQlg ~ ~~ngl~ 12
2
of the negative. That is, the above sentences do not have readings
in which. a quantifier intervenes between NOT and the NPI. Consider
first sentence (7)(a). It is noted in Carden (1973), Kroch (1974),
and elsewhere that sentences like (7)(a) lack the reading (7)(c) for
most speakers. That is, the configuration A NOT. at least when A is
represented by ~~~X or iA'h, is unacceptable. This leaves the
reading (7)(b): but it is clear that this is not a possible reading of
3
(7)(8). Thus (7)(a) is unacceptable, as is (8)(a) for the same
48
4
reasons.
Contrast (7) and (8) with (9): since there is no MOST NOT filter,
(9)(a) has an acceptable reading (9){c) with the order MOST NOT. In
the reading with this order, MOST does not intervene between NOT and
the NPI. (9)(b), the reading with the order NOT MOST, is unavailable,
since MOST intervenes between the NPI and NOT. Sentence (9)(a) is
acceptable, in contrast to (7)(a) and (8)(a), because it has this one
acceptable reading. Notice that, if there are no NPIs, NOT and MOST
can have either order with respect to one another:
(10) He didn't answer most of the questions.
(11)(a) [MOSTx: x is a question] NOT (he answered x)
(b) NOT [MOSTx: x is a question] (he answered x)
Sentence (10) is clearly ambiguous, having either of the readings in
(II). Thus it is the presence of the NPI that sabotages the NOT MOST
reading, rather than any inherent scope preference of MOST.
An exception to this generalization is that other NPIs seem
generally to be able to intervene between each other and NOT, as
demonstrated by (12) below. This will be discussed in section 3.4.1.
(12)(a) That doesn't hold a candle to any of Frank's ideas.
(b) NOT [Ex: x is an idea of Frank's] (that holds a candle to x)
(c) [Ex: x is an idea of Frank's] NOT (that holds a candle to x)
Thus ;t appears that the tentative hypothesis in (6), that part
(a) requires simply that the NPI occur only in the largest proposition
over which NOT has scope, will have to be revised: we will have to say
that there must be no logical elements intervening between NOT and the
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NPI in logical form, with the possible excoption of other NPIs. By
'logical elements' I mean items which enter into scope ambiguities
with one another, disambiguatable at the level of logical form. The
class of logical elements which render NPIs unacceptable by
intervening between NOT and NPIs includes quantifiers, adverbials, and
other operators to be discussed in the following section; it does not
include, fOI' r easons to be discussed below, indefinite ~Ps, the plural
marker, or proper names. Thus (6) may be revised as follows:
(13) PART (A): THE IMMEDIATE SCOPE CONSTRAINT elSe)
A negative polarity item is acceptable in a sentence S if in
the logical form of S the subformula representing the NPI is
in the immediate scope of the operator NOT. An item is in
the immediate scope of NOT if (1) it occurs only in the
proposition which is the entire scope of NOT. and (2) within
this proposition there are no logical e l ement s intervening
between it and NOT. 'Logical elements' are defined here as
elements capable of entering into scope ambiguities; that
is, the occurence of the surface realization of n logical
elements in a sentence S results in the association of S
with up to nl logical forms expressing the possible and
acceptable orderings of these elements.
In the following section I will examine some additional examples
of NPIs rendered unacceptable by intervening elements in logical form.
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3.2.1 ADDITIONAL VIOLATIONS OF THE ISC
In the preceding section I examined some cases of NPIs which were
in the scope of negation in logical form but were unacceptable by
virtue of some intervening lo~ical element which seemed to 'distance'
the NPI from NOT. In this section I will examine some additional
intervening elements: (1) non-motivational adverbials, (2) focus
operator, (3) the predicate TRUE (in sentences with 'external
negation'), and (4) AND and OR.
(1) OTHER NEGATED ADVER8IALS: In the preceding sections it was
demonstrated that motivational and causal adverbials like ~~~~U~§ may
render NPIs unacceptable by intervening between NOT and the
representation of the NPI in logical form. Other types of adverbial
expressions can also intervene in this way to cause a violation of the
ISC. I will examine some frequency and manner adverbials that have
this effect.
Consider the following sentences:
(14).H9 didn't budge an inch any more often than he stood his
ground.
(16) His papers weren't as good as Frank's as often as they were
inferior to them. (AMBIGUOUS)
(16) His papers didn't hold a candle to Frank's as often
as they were inferior to them. (NOT AMBIGUOUS)
In (14) note that the adv~rbial clause An~ m2£i Qfl~n thAD D§
~gd bll I[gund seems to deprive the NPJ hu~g§ An in~h of the
negative. I have put the HPI ADl in the adverbial only to force the
reading in which the adverbial is negated, as will be seen from
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looking at the next two sentences. (15) is ambiguous depending upon
whether or not the adverbial is negated: the following two readings
are possible. (Of course, (17) is not very informative.)
(17) (ADVERBIAL NOT NEGATED)
The occasions of his papers' not being as good
as Frank's were as numerous as the occasions of
their being inferior to Frank's.
(18) (ADVERBIAL NEGATED)
The occasions of his papers' being as good as
Frank's were not as numerous as the occasions
of their being inferior to Frank's.
In contrast, sentence (16) has only the reading in which the adverbial
is not negated; that is, there is the reading paraphrased in (19)
below but not that in (20):
(19) (ADVERBIAL NOT NEGATED)
The occasions on which his paper~ didn't hold a
candle to Frank's were as numerous as those on
which they were inferior to Frank's.
(20) (ADVERBIAL NEGATED)
The occasions on which his papers were as good
as/*held a candle to Frank's were not as
numerous as those on which they were inferior
to Frank's.
This suggests that such adverbials (perhaps all adverbials?) may be
represented in logical form as function terms taking propositions as
arguments; they can the.~efore intervene between NOT and any NPIs that
may be in one of thase proposition-arguments, rendering the NPIs
unacceptable by part (a).
Manner adverbials create similar obstacles for NPIs.
the following sentences:
(21) John didn't help us p~litely.
Consider
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(22) John didn't yield enthusiastically.
The adverbs Dglil~l~ and ~nlhu~ia~li~~ll~ ara most naturally construed
as within the scope of negation. However, they can have wide scope
with respect to NOT. For instance, if John is spoiling for a fight·
and has in fact been ordered not to yield to his opponent, he might
enthusiastically not yield, and this would be captured by the reading
of (22) in which ~n!hu~i~~li&All~ has wide scope with respect to NOT.
NPIs in sentences with such adverbials are acceptable only if the
adverbial is not construed as being in the scope of NOT. Consider the
following sentences with the reading in which the adverbial is
negated:
(23).John didn't bUdge enthusiastically.
(24).John didn't lift a finger to help us politely.
Not;ce that if the adverbial ;s not in the scope of negation then the
NPI is acceptable. For instance, if it would be construed as
insulting for John to help, then (24) can describe his .inactivity.
This reading is facilitated by the presence of an intonational break
or by preposing:
(2~)(a) John didn't lift a finger to help us, politely.
(b) Politely, John didn't lift a finger to help us.
let us assume, then, that a sentence such as (26) below can be
6
assigned any of the lFs in (27), depending upon the relative sc~pes
of NOT. ENTHUSIASTIC, and the existential quantifier representing anx:
(26) John didn't do any of the tasks enthusiastically.
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(27)(a) NOT ENTHUSIASTIC (John, ([Ex: x is a task] (John do x),)
(b) [Ex: x is a task] ENTHUSIASTIC (John, NOT (John do x))
(e) NOT [Ex: x is a task] ENTHUSIASTIC (John, (John do x»)
The unacceptability of (27)(a) was discussed above. (27)(b) is
clearly unacceptable since the representation of ADX is not in the
scope of NOT, much less its immediate scope. (27)(c), however,
appears to be 1 possible reading of (26), especially if anx is heavily
stressed. It can be paraphrased as in (28):
(28) 'There wasn't one task that he did enthusiastically; he
complained about them all.'
Inth i s readin g, .a.n~ i s ass i 9ned widesc 0 pew; t h I'espee t tothe
predicate ENT.'USIASTIC: thus the IS~ is not violated. Note that NPIs
which are not themselves quantifiers or do not contain 'detachable'
6
quantifiers will not allow for such a reading; thus the ISC will
always be violated for them when the manner adverbial is negated.
We have seen here that other adverbials besides hg,~y~~ can cause
violations of the ISC by intervening between NPIs and NOT in logical
form. This suggests that any adverbial which can enter into scope
ambiguities with NOT is to be treated like RikA,UiJl: the acceptable
cases of such an advorbial coming between NOT and the HPJ in logical
form, such as (32)-(36) in Chapter 1, are to be dealt with by part
(b) •
(2) SENTENCES WITH ATTRACTION TO FOCUS (AtF): NPIs are generally
7
unacceptable if the negative is attracted to focus. (The cases in
wh;ch NPIs are still acceptable are to be covered by part (b), and
will be discussed in Chapter 4.) Consider the following sentences.
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(29) JOHN didn't lift a finger to help louise.
(30) JOHN doesn't hold a candle to Bill.
In these sentences the NPIs are acceptable only if the negative is not
8
attracted to focus.
The proper representation of sentences with AtF seems quite
problematic. but I will make a sketchy proposal here along lines that
have been suggested elsewhere. (31) seems to be paraphraseable as in
(32), when there is AtF, or (33), when there isn't. These paraphrases
are given rough formalization in (34) and (36):
(31) JOHN didn't go.
(32) It wasn't John who went.
(33) It was John who didn't go.
(34) NOT (the x such that (x went) = J~hn)
(35) the x such that«NOT (x went» = John
Thus I am following the paraphrases fairly literally and representing
the focus in such sentences as den i ed or asserted (depend i ng upon
whether or not there is AtF) to be the referent of the definite noun
phrase lh§ ! 1Y~h iha! ... The non-focussed part of the sentence is
thus represented in logical form analogously to a relative clause.
The negative. when there is AtF, negates the proposition that the x
described by the expression lhi! iu~h lhA!... is to be identified
with the focussed element. Any NPJs in the non-focussed part of the
sentence are thus not in the imm&diate scope of the negative, any more
than HPls 1n relative clauses are. Thus:
(36)(=log1cal form of (30) .with AtF)
, I
;
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NOT (the x such that (x holds a candle to Bill) = John)
(37)(=logical form of (30) without AtF)
the x such that (NOT(x holds a candle to Bill» = John
Only in (37) is the NPI bQl~ ~ ~~n~li !2 in the immediate scope of
NOT, although in both (36) and (37) it is in the scope of NOT.
This method of representing sentences with focus also allows us
to predict the unaccepta~bility of sentences in which the focus to
which the negative is attracted is itself an NPI:
(38)(a) I didn't YIElD--I stood my ground. (AtF)
(b).I didn't BUDGE--I stood my ground. (AtF)
(40)(a) I don't have SOME interest in the project--I have
a LOT of interest in it. (AtF)
(b).I don't have ANY interest in the project--I have
a LOT of interest in it. (AtF)
In the (b) sentenc&s above, the NPIs hy~g~ and anx are unacceptable
despite the fact that they are the direct focus of the negative. The
(a) sentences, which contain non-NPI lexical items roughly synonymous
with the NPls, show that there is nothing wrong with the (b) sentences
apart from the separation of the NPIs from the negative.
The representation of (39) is roughly as in (41):
(41)(a) NOT (the x such that (~ x-ad) = YIELD)
(b) NOT (the x SUL~ that (I x-ad) = BUDGE)
The representation of the meaning of BUDGE is, in (41)(b).
9
separated from NOT by the focussed NP !hI ~ iu~h lhAl I X-ide
Chomsky (1975) provides an argument for this representation of
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sentences with focus. He demonstrates that anaphora is sensitive not
merely to syntactic structure but to 'partially developed logical
form.' The structures to which he demonstrates that the rules of
anaphora apply are identical to those proposed above: (42) below he
represents as (43).
(42)(=Chomsky (97)
The woman he loved betrayed JOHN.
(43) The x such that the woman he loved betrayed x--is John.
Chomsky demonstrates that hi can be coreferential with Jghn only if
JQhn is not the focus: the representation (43) allows this to fallout
of the crossover principle.
Thus there is independent evidence for the logical forms upon
which I am basing my explanation of the unacceptability of NPIs in
sentences with AtF.
I will now examine the third class of unacceptable sentences with
NPIs in which an overt negative precedes and commands the NPI in
surface structure.
(3) 'EXTERNAL NEGATION': Consider the sentences below.
(44).She DID NOT lift a finge~- to help.
(45)*We DID NOT get up until 12:00.
(46).H8 DOES NOT hold a candle to Frank.
Sentences (44)-(46) are unacceptable when spoken with a rising
intonation on di~ D21, i.e. when they are construed as denials.
This use of NOT seems to correspond to the notion of 'external
negation', which Krach (1974) describes as
01
(47) ... a 'metalingListic' usage in which the negative se~~ence
NOI S do~s not dirnctly comment on the state of affairs but
instead denies the truth of the statement S previously
uttered or implied. Sentence external negation can be
paraphrased as 'the sentence S is not true.'
In such sentences the negative clearly has w"ide scope with respect to
other operators in t~.e sentence; thus it is indisputable that the NPIs
are in the scope of negation. The wide scope of negatien in such
sentences is demonstrated by the fact that in (48)la) below MANY can
be interpreted as in the scope of negation only if (48)(a) is
construed as a denial. (As will be discussed in section 3.3.2 below,
in the correspondin~ non-denial (48)(b) MANY must have wide scope with
respect to NOT.)
(48)(a) Many people HAVE NOT signed up for the course.
(b) Many peoplo haven't signed up for the course.
This SUg~9StS that this is another case of NPIs in the scope of NOl
but not in its immft~i~!~ scope; the unacceptability of NPls in
sentences with denial suggests th~t (if the I~'= is correct) there is
something intervening between NOT aflJ the NPIs. This sense that there
is something 'between' NOT and the NPI in (44)-(46) seems to me to
argue for the ISC despite the fact that there is ~o independently
motivated candidate for a logical element which may be represented as
actually occuring between NOT and the rest of the ~ogical f0rm of such
sente~ces. Let us represent the intervening element as TRUE.
(49)(a)H8 DID NOT leave.
(b)NOT TRUE (he left)
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Thus the logical forms of (44)-(46) are:
(50)(a) NOT TRUE (she lifted a finger to help)
(b) NOT TRUE (we got up until 12:00)
(e) NOT TRUE (he holds a candle to Frank)
Clearly these logical forms do not satisfy the ISC.
Consider sentence (61) below.
(51) The king of France didn't contribute (*ooe red cent),
because there is no king of France.
If the judgment marked above is correct, then we can explain it on the
basis of the intervening predicate TRUE in the external negation
reading, which is forced by the Q~~~U~~ clause.
The terms 'external negation', 'AtF', and 'denial' have been used
in this discussion without much attention to their precise meanings or
collapsibility. It seems reasonable to treat sentences like
(44)-(46), in which there is the rising intonation found with AtF and
also the strong implication of previous discourse on the .subjact of
the non-focussed part of the sentence, as cases of AtF with the
predicate TRUE as the focussed element. Sentences like (51) do not
seem like AtF, since they do not have the marked intonation or
implication of previous discussion. Perhaps in these cases NOT has
wide scope with respect to TRUE but there is simply no marked focus,
TRUE or anything e1s8.
Note on intonation: Ona as yet unexplained aspect of all these
examples is that many of them are associated with some sort of rising
intonation. It should be pointed out here that not all of the
examples of violations of the ISC are associated with a rising
intonation.
question,
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For instance, consider (62) as a response to the
'Why was he taken off the 1 ist of major Alnerican
philanthropists?'
(52) He didn't contribute (.ooe red cent) to enough charities.
'.' marks the reading in which §nQugh is in the scope of NOT, and in
which ~QnlriDY1§ 2ni ri~ ~inl is taken as an idiom chunk.
(4) OS VERSUS AND. As demonstrated below by the ambiguity of
(53)--which can have the reading (54) or (55) depending upon the
relative scopes of AND/OR and TWO--the operators OR and AND qualify as
'logical elements' as defined in (13). Without making any pretense of
explicating their semantics, I will represent them as below. What is
needed is an explanation of why OR but not AND usually permits NPIs in
its conjuncts following NOT, as demonstrated by (56) and (57).
(53) Two students saw John la~~lMary.
(54) [TWOx: x is a stUdent] (x saw JOhn)f~:D1(X saw Mary»
'There were two students who saw ~oth John and Mary.'
(55) ([TWQx: x is a stUdent] (x saw John»
{~:01
([TWOx: x is a stUdent] «x saw Mary»
'John and Mary were each seen by two students.'
(66) I didn't buy any apples or any bagels.
(51).1 didn't buy any apples and any bagels.
(58) NOT «([Ex: x is an apple] (I bought x»
f~:Dl
([Ex: x is a bagel] (I bought x»))
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If, as in (58), the existential quantifier represented by an~ is
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assigned scope only over the lower conjunct, the ISC will be
violated since the representation of ~n~ will not be in the immediate
scope of NOT. If this existential quantifier could be assigned scope
over the entire proposition in the scope of NOT, i.e. over both
conjuncts, then the ISC would not be violated. However, this is
impossible, perhaps because of the coordinate structure constraint: as
(59) demonstrates, no quantifier can be assigned scope over both
co~juncts.
(59) I bought five books and three magazines.
(60) Not a possible reading:
[FIVEx: x is a book] [THREEy: y is a magazine]
«I bought x) AND (I bought y»
'There were five books, the purchase of each
of which was accompanied by the p"rchase of
three magaz\nes.' (POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF 15 MAGAZINES)
(61) Not a possibl~ reading:
[THREEy: y is a ~agazine] [FIVEx: ~ is a book]
«I bought x) AND (~ bought y»
'There were three magaz~nes, the purchase of
each of which was accompanied by the purchase of
five books.' (POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF 15 BOOKS)
(62) «[FIVEx: x is a book] (I bought x») AND «([THREEy:
y is a magazine] (I bought y»
'I made a purchase which consisted of five books
and three magazines.' (PURCHASE OF 8 ITEMS TOTAL)
Neither (60) nor (61) is a possible reading of (59); either of these
readings would of course be consistent with a purchase of 15 rather
than 8 items. So the only possible reading of (66) or (67) is as in
(58), which violates the ISC.
Why, then, is (66) bu~ not (E7) acceptable? It seems reasonable
61
to suppose that as required by part (b) there is an 'implied sentence'
(64) for (66) by DeMorgan's Law; in this 'implied sentence' (i.e. in
its logical form) the HPI is in the immed t ate scope of NOT. Out of
course (57) should have an 'implied sentence' (65) in the same way.
(64) (NOT [Ex: x is an apple] (I bought x» AND
(NOT [Ey: y is a bagel] (I bought y»
(65) (NOT [Ex: x is an apple] (I bought x» OR
(NOT [Ey: y is a bagel] (I bought y»
What is the difference between (64) and (65)? Clearly this is a
question about part (b), to be explored in Chapter 4. But it should
at least be noted here that (65) does not have to fufill the ISC for
both of its conjuncts: that is, only one of the conjuncts of the form
NOT Ex ... has to be true in order for (65) to be true. In contrast,
both negated conjucts of (64) must be true in order for (64) to be
true. So (05) can be seen to be a much weaker 'i mp 1i ed sentence t than
(64). Also note that OR can sometimes sabotage NPIs, as in (66); thus
we see the squishiness that is characteristic of part (b):
(66) ??I didn't contribute any clothes to the Salvation
Army or a red cent to the United Way.
This concludes the survey of NPIs which are unacceptable despite
their occurence in the scope of negation; that is, of additional
violations of the ISe.
As I have noted throughout, sentences with logical forms i~ which
there is an intervening logical element are sometimes acceptable:
these cases, I have argued, belong to part (b). I should note here
that included in these cases are sentences like (.67):
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(67) He doesn't believe that she knows any of his friends.
(68) NOT (he believes ([Ex: x his friends] (she knows x»)
(69) NOT ([Ex: ~}~iS friend~ (he believes (she knows x»)
Sentence (67) is ambiguous between the readings (68) and (69),
i.e. the opaque and the transparent senses of aD~ Qf ni~ fri~n~~.
Anx is acceptable on either reading of (67). Since (68) violates the
ISC, I will treat it as a part (b) case. (The varying acceptability
of NPIs in such structures, as demonstrated by sentences (22)-(26) in
Chapter 1, argues for treating these as part (b) cases.)
In the following section the notion of 'immediate scope' will be
examined in more detail.
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3.2.2 IMMEDIATE SCOPE IN KROCH (1974)
In the preceding section I have examined additional evidence that
the distribution of NPIs requires reference not simply to the scope of
negation in logical form, but to the immg~ig!~ scope of negation. In
this and the following two sections I will examine evidence in that it
is not only NPIs that are sensitive to relations of ttmne d i a t.e scope
with respect to other operators. The evidence to be examined in this
section is furnished by Krach (1974). who argues that
.. the major differences between scope in English and in
formal logic are: l)that the English language sentences are
quite generally ambi quous as to the scope order of their
operators and 2)that English ope r ator words often allow or
prefer only certain other operators ioonediately inside or
outside their scope.
I will briefly examine his arguments concerning unme d t a t e scope
preferences between (1) the universal quantifier and NOT, and (2) NOT
and the existential quantifier whose lexical representation is 12m~.
(1) THE UNIVERSAL QUANTIFIER AND NOT: As noted above, for many
speakers (70) below cannot have the (b) reading in (71): that is, NOT
may not ba in the immediate scope of the universal quantifier.
(70) Everybody didn't leave.
(71)(a) NOT [Ax: x is a person] (x left)
(b) [Ax: x is a person] NOT (x left)
(Most if not all speakers can get the reading (71)(a): the ability of
universal but not existential quantifiers to be in the scope of NOT
even when preceding it in surface structure is discussed later in this
chapter.) Krach argues that sentences like (12) below suggest that it
is necessary to stat~ this restriction so as to prevent NOT from
b4
occuring in the immi~i~!i scope of the universal quantifier rather
than simply to prevent it from occuring anywhere in its scope.
(72) Every student didn't answer se~eral questions.
(73)(a) [SEVERAlx: x is a question] [Ay: y is a student]
NOT (y answered x)
'There were several questions that were left
unanswered by every single student.'
(b) [Ay: y is a student] [SEVERALx: x is a question]
NOT (y answered x)
'For every student there were several questions
which that student failed to answer.'
(72) with the reading (73)(a) is unacceptable for those speakers
who find A NOT unacceptable, while it is acceptable for them with the
reading (73)(b). Thus the prohibition seems to be on A having NOT in
its immediate scope, rather than simpl~ in its scope.
(2) NOT AND SOME: Krach also suggests that the notion of
immediate scope must be invoked in order to state the scope
preferences with respect to NOT of ~Qm§ and ~§~~L~l, two quantifiers
which have generally been represented as inherently '-neg' in the
Lasnik/Jackendoff featur& analysis and which are s ome t imes classed
with the positive polarity items. Consider the following sentences:
(74) John didn't participate in some of the battles.
(76)(a) [Ex: x are battles] NOT (John participated in x)
(b) NOT [Ex: x are battles] (John participated in x)
(76)(Kroch(24»
Not every soldier in the unit participated in some
of the battles.
(77)(a) [Ex: x are battles] NOT [Ay: y is a soldier] (y
part ici pated 1n x).
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(b) NOT [Ex: x are battles] [Ay: y is a soldier] (y
participated in x)
(e) NOT [Ay: y is a soldier] [Ex: x are battles] (y
participated in x)
Note that (74) does not allow the reading (15)(b) in which ~Qm~ is·
immediately in the scope of DQ1. It does, of course, have the reading
(75)(a) in which ~gm~ has wide scope with respect to the negative.
(76) also has this wide scope reading for ~Qm~, represented in
(77)(a). (77)(b) is the unacceptable reading (analogous to (75)(b»
in which ~Qmi is in the immediate scope of negation. This is
unacceptable not only because of the proximity of ~m~ to NOT, but
also because the expression llQ! ~X~L~ does not seem to allow any
logical element to intervene between NOT and EVERY. However, Krach
observes that the reading (77)(c) is acceptable: he suggests that this
is because the existential quantifier representing ~m~ is not in the
immediate scope of NOT.
If this is a constraint on ~2m~t it differs from the Immediate
Scope Constraint proposed for NPls in this chapter in that the latter
is a sufficient but not necessary condition on NPIs, while the former
may be a necessary condition on ~Qm~ but cannot be a sufficient one.
This is demonstrated by (78)-(80) below.
(78).Not many freshmen have some friends.
(79) Not many freshmen have any friends.
(80) NOT [MANYx: x is a freshman] [Ey: yare friends]
(x has y)
1 will assume that 12m! and ADX are truth-conditionally identical and
that both represent the existential quantifier (see Chapter 6). In
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the reading in which this quantifier is in the scope of NOT, i.e. in
(80), it is not in the immediate scope of NOT. (This means that (79).
with NPI An~, f a i l s the ISC and mus t be "r escue d ' by part (b); I will
discuss such cases in Chapter 4.) If the restriction on ~mg in
particular or on PPIs in general could be stated by an ISC that simply
barred them from the immediate scope of NOT,(78) should be acceptable.
But it isn't. Stmi l ar l y , ~Qmil is unacceptable embedded under an
adversative without any overt nQl:
(81)*1 doubt that some students have arrived.
Although I have restricted this inquiry to NPIs, it seems worthwhile
to at least venture some guesses about PPIs. They seem, as Baker
demonstrated, to have the same sort of inference-governed distribution
as NPIs; that is,'there seems to be a part(b) for PPIs. But what is
their part (a)? That is, what is the par ad i qm env i r-onrnen t for a PPI,
in which it is always acceptable? It has been demonstrated t~at this
environment cannot be stated simply as 'not in the immediate scope of
NOT.' If the paradigm environment for PPIs is something like 'not in
the scope of negation', as has frequently been suggested, then the
acceptability of (76). where ~Qm,g is separated f'r-om NOT in LF by the
universal quantifier, can be treated as a part (b) case, by virtue of
an 'implied sentence' such as (82).
(82) Some soldiers DID participate in some of the battles.
That is (76) violates part (a) of the PPI rule, since ~m§ 1s in the
scope of NOT; the intervening i~~ seems to allow part (b) to save
the sentence by virtue of (82). It's interesting that when part (a)
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for NPIs, the ISC, is violated by an intervening ~~~L~ it is almost
impossible for part (b) to come to the rescue. Thus NOT EVERY seems
to have fairly strong positive rather than negative implications. (To
be discussed in Chapter 4.) However, sentences like (81) above, where
a PPI is unacceptable embedded under an adversative, suggest that the
paradigm case for PPIs cannot be stated so ~imply.
I have noted in this section that there is additional evidence
(from Krach (1974» that the notion of immediate scope plays a role in
the scope preferences of English non-NPI quantifiers. It is not
exactly clear what this role is, since the relationship between ~gm~
and figl does not seem to be as he suggests, but his observations about
iQmi support the idea that if two logical operators resist a certain
scope order with respect to one another, that order will result in the
most unacceptable readings when the"e are no intervening logical
operators. i.e. when the scope relation is immediate.
Krach also demonstrates that the notion of immediate scope is
recalcitrant to any reasonable representation by means of features
associated with surface structure nodes; that is, he argues that the
need to capture not only whether one element X is in the scope of
another element V, but whether it is in V's immg~i~l~ scope, is
evidence of the necessity of representing logical structure if I an
unambiguous formal language rather than on surface structures. The
evidence noted in th;s chapter that NPIs are sensitive to the
immediate scope of negation provides considerable sUilPort to this
position.
In the following two sections additional evidence will be
presented that the notion t immediately in the scope of' plays a
significant role in the scope component of English.
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3.2.3 IMMEDIATE SCOPE AND FREE CHOrCE ANY
Interestingly, it appears that free choice anx has a similar
'immediate scope constraint': it seams to be unaccept~ble if it does
not have its trigger in its lmmediate scope. I will assume that Fe
Anl is a universal quantifier; see Chapter 5 below for further
discussion of the two An~S. Since it is not always clear what the
trigger is for Fe anx, this cannot be established with certainty;
however, when the trigger is WQU1~ or ~An the facts seem clear.
Consider the follow~ng sentences.
marked.)
(For s tmp l i c t ty , tense is not
(82) She would have married EVERY ONE of those boys.
(83)(a) [Ax: x is a bay] WOULD (she marry x)
'Everyone of those boys she would have married
pt one point or another, though she wouldn't
necessarily have been willing to engage in
po lyandry . '
(b) WOULD [Ax: x is a boy] (she marry x)
'She would have engaged in polyandry.'
(84) She would have married ANY of those boys.
(85) Several girls would have married EVERY ONE of those
boys.
(86)(a) [SEVERAlx: x is a girl] [Ay: y is a boy] WOULD (x
marry y)
'There are several girls who at one point
or another would have married each of
those boys, but would not necessarily have
engaged in polyandry.'
(b) [Ay: y is a boy] [SEVERAlx: x is a girl] WOULD (x
marry y)
'For every boy there were several girls who would
have married him.'
(c) [SEVERAlx: x is a girl] WOULD [Ay: y is a boy] (x
marry y)
IU
'There are several girls who would have engaged in
polyandry. '
(87) Several girls would have married ANY of those boys.
As is widely observed, (82) has an ambiguity (betweAn (83)(a) and
(b)) which is a~sent from (84): one hypothesis is that Fe all~ must
have wide scope with respect to its trigger. Thus (84) does not have
the reading (83)(b), although in (82) WOULD and A can havs either'
scope order.
Consider (85), which contains an additional quantifier ~~~fL~l.
The possible readings of (85) seem to be the three readings in (86):
since there seems to be no reading possible in ~hich ~ygLal is in the
scope of WOULD (when WOULD has the sense o~ 'be willing'), the task of
disentangling readings is somewhat simplified.
Now consider the same sentence wi~h an! instead of ~Y~L~. Of the
three readings for (85) with iY~r~, only tha (a) reading is possible
for (87) with An~: this is the reading (86)(a) with the order SEVERAL
A WOULD. The order SEVERAL WOULD A is ruled out because ~nx doesn't
have wide scope at all. The order A SEVERAL WOULD, however, is also
not possible although ADX has wide scope with respect to the
triggering modal.
Notice that if we replace WOULD with a modal which a110ws the
sUbject to be in its sco,e, then ADX can have widest scope in the
sentence. That is. consider COULD. As the widely noted ambiguity of
(88) below demonstrates. scope ambiguities are possible between it and
A.
(88) Two atudents could have been elected.
(89)(8) COULD [TWOx: x is a student] (x be elected)
(b) [TWOx: x ~s a student] COULD (x be elected)
Contrast (9~) below, which is similar to (87) but contains COULD
instead of WOULD. Since SEVERAL can occur to the right of COULG in
lc~ical form. there is a an additional ~eading, in which A has wide
scope with respect to SEVERAL.
intervene between A and COULD.
lhis is because SEVERAL does not
I-
\ : c.' ' ':.-~ .
(90) Several girls could have won ANY of those elections.
(91)(a) [SEVERALx: x i~ a girl] [Ay: y is an election] COULD (x win y)
'Th9r~ Dre sev9ral girls who each na~ the capacity
to win any of thrse elections.'
(b) [Ay: y t s an s l e c t ton ] COULD [SEVERAL;,~ x i s a girl] (x win y)
'For each election it could have happened
that several girls won that election.'
I have demons t r ated in this section that the notion of "unne d i a t e
scope' is relevant to the dt s t r tbut i on of free choice il!1~; thus we
have further evidence tb at it plays a significant role in the qr ammar .
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3.2.4 IMMEDiATE SCOPE AND 'NONREFERENTIALITY'
In this section I will take brief note of a source of confusion
about the scope of NOT which may also bear on the question of
immediate scope. Jackendoff (1972) suggests that a quantifier in the
scope of negat~on must have 'ro identifiable refer6nt' (which must be
distinguished from 'unrealized' referents associated with modals,
etc. ) . Similarly, Lasnik (1975) suggests that a quantifier in the
scope of negation must be 'nonreferential'; he describes three
consequences of such 'nonreferentialily'. "fhey ar e the inability of
an indefinite NP or quantifier to (1) be the artecedent of an
appositive relative, (2) be the antecedent of a ~ronoun later in the
discourse, or (3) be expanded by 'namely ... ' In the following
sentences, indefinite NPs and quantifiers are seen to be
"nonr-efer-en t i a l ' in this sense when they are in the (immediate) scopo
of NOT. In the (a) and .(e) sentences, the indefinite NPs and
quantifiers are not in the scope of negation and can be 'referential'
in the sense described above; in the (b) and (d) sentences, the
indefinite NPs and quantifiers are in the scope of negation and must
be 'nonreferential' in this sense. (The judgments marked on the (b)
and (d) sentences are only for the scope order noted.)
(92) APPOSITIVE RELA~IVE:
(a) I saw a linguist thel'e, who (it turned out) was Turkish.
(b).I didn't see a linguist there, who (it turned out) was
was Turkish. (NOT Ex)
(c) I saw nlany linguists there, who (it turned out) were all
Turkish.
(d).I didn't see many linguists there, who (it turned out)
were all Turkish. (NOT MANYx)
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(93) ANTECEDENT TO PRONOUN:
(a) I saw a linguist there. It turned out that he was Turkish.
(b) I didn't see a linguist there .•... It turned out that he
was Turkish. (NOT Ex)
(c) I saw many linguists there. They turned out to know you.
(d).I didn't see many linguists there. They turned out to
know you. (NOT MANYx)
(94) ~8MELY...
(a) I saw a linguist there, namely Smith.
(b).I didn't see a linguist there, namely Smith.
(NOT Ex)
(e) I saw many linguists there, namely Smith and Jones and
(d).I didn't see many linguists there, namely Smith and
Jones and ... (NOT MANYx)
It seems worthwhile to note that quantifiers in the scope of
negation can, in fact, be 'referential' in the sense of Lasnik (1975):
thus these- three tests cannot b~ used to establish the scope of
negation. This is demonstrated by the following'sentences_
(95) He didn't buy a book about Philadelphia, which
incidentally cost thirty dollars, just because
he needed something to read on the train.
(APPOSITIVE RELATIVE)
(96) He didn't bUy a book about Philadelphia just because
ha needed something to reed on the train. It cost
at least thirty dollars. (ANTECEDENT TO PRONOUN)
(97) He didn't bUy a book about Philadelphia (namely,
D£u~~~~ QD ib~ S~hY~Kill) just because
he needed something to read on the train.
(98) NOT CAUSE ( (He neaded ~omething to read on the train),
([Ex: x 15 a book about Philadelphia] (he bought x» )
Sentences (96)-(97) all seem to have roughly the logical
structure (98), but the indefinite A hQQK ~bQUl fhilgg~lQhi~ can be
'referential' ~ith respect'to these three linguistic phenomena despite
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the fact that it is in the scope of negation.
It has been suggested to me that A QQQK ~QQYi fhil~~~lRhia in
(95)-(97) is referential because it does in fact have wide scope with
respect to NOT, as in (99) below:
(99) [Ex: x is a book] NOT CAUSE (John bought x, John
needed something to read on the train)
'There is a book about Philadelphia that John
bought for reasons other than his need to have
something to read lI •• the train.'
It seems to me that despite the similarity of the two proposed
representations of ~entences likA (95)-(97), there is a definitive
argument that the representation (98) rather than (99) is correct;
that is, that a RQQK has to be represented as in the scope of
negation. The argument is this: recall from section 3.1 that a
positive tag question is unacceptable following a sentence wit~ a
quantifier or indefinite NP interpreted as having wide scope with
respect to NOT. This is demonstrated by (IOQ).
(lOO)*John didn't answer saveral questions, did he?
(100) with i~~iL~l is unacceptable because ~~~r~l requires wide scope
with respect to NOT, but NOT must have wide scope in order for there
to be a tag question.
Tha relevant fact is that the two proposed readings for
(96)-(97), i.e. (98) and (99), behave differently with respect to tag
questions. If the speaker of (101) below means 'There was a certain
book that he bought for other reasons' (1.e. (99» then a tag
question isn't possible. If he means 'It wasn't out of interest that
he bnught a book' (i.e. (98», then a tag question is possible.
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(101) John didn't buy a book about Philadelphia because
he was interested in the place, did he?
Thus it cannot be said that in sentences like (95)-(97) the indefinite
NP is not in the scope of negation; the tag question test shows that
it is.
Thus it is clear that 'nonreferentiality', t .e . the inability to
establish a discourse referent or to be followed by a nonrestrictive
relative or nAm~l~... , is not an automatic consequence of occurence in
the scope of negation. despite suggestions to the contrary. After
all, the truth of (98) is certainly comp a t tb l e with the existence of
books about Philadelphia. even particular books that can be referred
to in the discourse: all that (98) asserts is the absence of a certain
causal connection.
But it seems relevant to the matter ~f NPIs to note here that
quantifiers in the immediate scope of NOT seem to be unab~e to be
'referential' in the sense described above; that is. the (b) and (d)
sentences of (92)-(94) seem to be absolutely unacceptable as a r esu l t
of the occurence in the immediate scope of NOT of the representation
of ~ and mAnx. That is, it may be that occurence in the tmmad t at e
scope of NOT forces the 'nonreferen t i al' r ead i og def i ned by Lasn i k 's
three tests.
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SUMMARY OF SECTION 3.2
In this section I have r e f ormul a t ed part (a) of the NPI rule:
NPIs are restricted by it not to a surface structure relationship to
D2! but to the immediate scope of the negation operator in logic~l·
form. The notion of 'immediate scope', as expre~sed in (13) above,
.1 .
'l.· ,
was seen in this section to be independently motivated. That is, the
scope preferences of ~ll and i~~h and of free choice ~n~ were seen to
make reference to 'immediate scope' although they differ in other
respects.
It also appears that in the tmme d i at e scope of NOT (but not
elsewhere) indefinites and quantifiers mu~! be 'nonreferential' (in
the sense that they cannot be antecedent to pronouns later in the
discourse, or followed by appositive relatives or ngmgl~ tags); this
seems likely to be a matter of pragmatics. (In Chapter 8 below, tne
notion 'immediate scope of NOT' is seen to playa role in another
pragmatic process related to NPIs.)
Finally, the notion of 'immediate scope' as defined on predicate
cal cu1us - 1ike log i cal for;n 5 i side ntic a1 tothen a t ion 0 f 'In i n i Ina1
11
c-command' which is central to the notion of government, a
connection which cannot be explored here .
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3.3 MECHANICS OF THE PROPOSAL
In this section I will consider the implementation of the
Immediate Scope Constraint (stated in (13) above) in more detail.
Section 3.3.1 concerns the level of 'logical form' upon which the ISC
is stated; section 3.3.2, the relevant mapping rules f r om sur r aca
structure to logical form; and section 3.3.3, the application of the
Ise.
3.3.1 LOGICAL FORM
In the pret;eding sections it has been established that the
Immediate Scope Constraint can be stated strictly in terms of soma
representation of logical structure. What is the relation of the ISC
to the ~rammar? Specifically, does it apply to representations
generated by rules of sentence grammar?
A level of semantic representation of the sort which seems to be
relevant to the statement of part (a) of the NPI rule is proposed in
Chomsky (1975):
One may ask, in the fir3t place, whether there is a system
of semantic representation analogous to phonetic
representation, and if so, what its propertie3 may be ...
Let us say that the grammar contains a system of rules
[51-1] that associate a derivation with a representation in
a system of representation LF ... I will take LF to
tncorporate whatever features of sentence structure (1)
enter directly into semantic interpretation of sentences
and (2) are strictly determined by properties of
(sentence-)grammar ... Assume further that there is a system
of rules [51-2] that associates logical form and the
products of other cognitive faculties with another system of
representation SR (read 'semantic representation').
Representations in SR, which may involve beliefs,
expectations, and so on in addition tc properties of LF
determined by grammatical rule, should suffice to determine
role in inference, conditions of appropriate use, etc.
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Since not only focus but quantifier scope is demonstrated by Chomsky
to interact with sentence-grammal' rules of anaphora, it seems that the
information required for the statement of part (a) of the NPI rule is
s tated at t his 1e"e1, i. e . 0 n rep res en tat ion s whie h are the i n t e r f ace
between grammar and semantics.
The existence of a class of lexical items sensitive to the
immediate scope of NOT is thus additional evidence that 'LF' shares
soma of the properties of 'logical form': the ISC, that is, sheds
light on the syntax of IF.
I~
3.3.2 MAPPING RULES FROM SURFACE STRUCTURE TO LF
In this section I will briefly note tha surface structure-->LF
12
mapping rules that are relevant to NPI acceptability.
Let us assume that all 'logical elements' (as defined in section'
3.2.1) are assigned scope in LF. Although both surface order and
13
scope preferences of specific lexical items determine the preferred
mapping from surface structure to LF, let us--for the purposes of the
discussion--assume that any scope ordering is possible for the logical
elements in a given clause. The relevant exception is the interaction
of negation with other elements: Krach (1974) observes that an
existential quantifier which precedes NOT in surface structure has
obligatorily wide scope with respect to NOT in IF, while a universal
quantifier in the same position in surface structure may have narrow
swcope with respect to NOT in LF.
(102) Everybody didn't answer question 5.
(103)(a) NOT [Ax: x is a person] (x answered question 5)
(b) Not acceptable to all speakers:
[Ax: x is a person] NOT (x answered question 5)
\104) Many people didn't answer question 5.
(105)(a) N~t a possible reading of (104):
NOT [MANYx: x is a person] (x answered question 5)
(b) [MANYx: x is a person] NOT (x answered question 5)
In (102), i~i[~h2d~ precedes ll21 but (102) can still be associated
with LF (103)(a) 1n which the universal quantifier represented by
iX§!JR~dl is in the scope of negation. In contrast, the quantif;er
represented by mADl in (104) cannot be in the scope of NOT in LF.
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Krach proposes a scope component in which the surface order is the
interpreted order, subject to readjustment rules which alter this
basic order. There is, he argues, a readjustment rule which changes
A NOT to NOT A, but not a rule which changes E NOT to NOT E (treating
manx, 12IDi, NPI anx, etc. as existential quantifiers). Of course, as
noted above, denial and AtF may extend the scope of negation in a
sentence like (104), but with the result that TRUE or the focus
operator intervenes. Sentence (102), in contrast, seems to be subject
to this switch without any special intonation.
In this discussion I will consider only quantifiers which are not
embedded in NPs: that is, MANY may precede NOT in LF (106)(b) of
(106)(a), although (106)(a) also has a reading in which MANY has wide
14
scope with respect to NOT.
(106)(a) Pictures of man1 linguists were not available.
(b) NOT [MANYx: x is a linyuist] [Ey: y is a picture of xj
(y was available)
Obviously, relative scope in IF is much more constrained by surface
order tnan this rough account reflects. But for the purposes of this
discussion it is sufficient to say that all interpreted orders are
possible for logical elements in the same clause except that there is
no readjustment rule to change E NOT to NOT E. The lack of such a
readjustment rule may be invoked to explain the unacceptability of
(107):
(I07).Anybody didn't arrive early.
(108)(a) [Ex: x is a person] NOT (x arrived early)
'lhere is a person who didnJt arrive early.'
(b) Not a possible IF of (107):.
NOT [Ex: x is a person] (x arrived early)
01
'There are no people who arrived early.'
Since .a.nXJ!Q~~ precedes ncr. a readj us tment rule would be necessary to
derive an LF of the form of (108)(b); but, as noted above, there is no
such readjustment rule for existential quantifiers and NOT. AtF or
denial would put the entire sentence in the scope of NOT, but we have
seen in the preceding sections that this is at the cost of distancing
th~ HPI from NOT.
Sentence (107) is therefor·e unacceptable. since its only possible
LF. (108)(a). is unlikely to qansr a te an appropriate 'implied
sentence' in part (b), as is clear from the paraphrase.
It appears. then, that the ISC together with the fact that an~ is
au existential quantifier is sufficient to predict the unacceptability
of AnxD.Q!lX in (107) above: no special me nt i on need be made of the
surface structure configuration of NPIs and lexical items
repres~nting the negation operator. The only specific mention of NPIs
in the grammar, that is, is the ISC. In Chapter 7 I will examine some
of the problems related to this attempt to eliminate specific surface
structure constraints on NPIs.
Throughout the above discussion it has been assumed that logical
elements occuring in the same surface structure clause are all
assigned scope over that clause and only that clause. I have, of
course, been greatly oversimplifying the matter.
First, it has often been noted that quantifiers (unlike llQ!) may
be assigned wider scope than the clause in which they occur: (109) has
the reading paraphrased in (110)(b) as well as that paraphrased in
(110)(a).
82
(109) At one time or another he has claimed that all
those theories are wrong.
(110)(a)'At one time or another he has c l a imed : "All those
theories are wrong."'
(b)'It's true of every theory that at ene time or
another I1e has claimed of it: "It is wrong.'"
Second, all the logical elements in a given clause may not have
full S scope. The question of whether it is necessary to distinguish
VP negation from S negation, for example, is not resolved: in the
preceding discussion of external negation the predicate TRUE was used
to make the same distinction, thus representing NOT with S scope
whether or not the negation is 'external'. (Since there seems to be
both an external and an internal negation reading of 'Everybody
doesn't like the king of France'--in which g~~L~nQg~ is negated and
thus ll2! must have S-scope--the S/VP negation distinction does nct
seem adequate to distinguish between internal and external negation
anyway. )
But apart from the question of whether NOT can take less than
full S scope over the (smallest) clause in which it occurs, it has
been widely ob~erved that other logical elements such as quantifiers
may be ass i gnad such narrower scope. For axamp 18:
(111) He predicted three earthquakes.
(112)(a) [THREEx: x is an earthquake] (he predicted x)
(b) He predicted ([THREEx: x is an earthquake] (x would occur»
(113) I dislike a lot of spices on my eggs.
(114)(a) [A-LOT-OFx: x is a spice] (I dislike x on my eggs)
(b) I dislike ([A-lOT-OFx: x 1s a spice] (x occurs on my eggs»
(116) I want three tickets.
(116)(a) [THREEx: x is a ticket] (I want x)
(b) 1 want ([THREEx: x is a ticket] (I have x»
In the three sentences above, there are op3que readings of the
quantifiers which are most easily represented by expanding the NP into
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a proposition. Whether such derived propositional structure
(dependent upon the meanings of lexical items rather than simply
sentence structure) is to be represented at the level of LF is an open
question. It is clear. however, that NPI acceptability is affected by
derived propositional structure. As sentence~ like the following
demo~strate, NPIs are sensitive to propositions that are not reflected
in the syntax.
(117)(a) It didn't rain until 6:00.
'!t's not the case that it rained continuously up
until 6:00.' (NON-NPI U~II~)
OR
'It didn't rain before 6:00.' (NPJ llNIlL)
(118)(a) He predicted (rain until 6:00).
'He said: "It will rain continuously until 6.'"
(NON-HPI UNIIL)
(b) He predicted rain (until 6:00).
'Continuously until 6:00, he predicted: "It will
rain.'" (NON-NPI UNIIL)
(119)(a) He didn't predict (rain until 6:00).
'Ha did not predict: nIt will rain rontinuously
until 6:00.'" (NON-HPI UNII].)
NOT ~ POSSIBLE READING:
'He did not ,lrlJdict "It will rain at some point
before 6:00".' (NPI UNIIJ.)
(b) He didn't predict rain (until 6:00).
'It's not true that continuously until 6:00 he
predicted: "It will rain.'" .(NON-NPI UNllL)
OR
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'At no point before 6:00 did he predict:
"It will rain.'" (NPi UNII.L)
As (117) demonstrates, until has an NPJ usage roughly as
'before't and a non-HPJ usage roughly dS 'continuously up to'.
(118)(a) and (119)(a) with their paraphrases demonstrate that the
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object of 2Lg~ikl can receive a propositional interpretation. The
impossibility of getting this NPI sense of until as 'before· when
until occurs in the propositionally interpreted NP and llQt occurs in
the aux follows from the Immediate Scope Constraint, as formulated in
(13): the proposition in which the NPI until occurs is not the entire
scope of NOT: so .until is not j n the i mmad i c.:. te scope of NOT. Thatis.
(119)(a) cannot receive the interpretation of un1il Q~~D as 'beforo
6:00'. If, however, the negative is part of this NP proposition, the
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NPI sense of until is available; in (l~O)(a) until means 'before'.
(120)(a) He predicted (no rain until 6:00).
'He predictsd: "It WOll't rain before 6:00."'
(NPI UNIIJ.)
(b) He predicted no rain (until 6:00).
'Continuously until 6:00, he predicted: "it will
rain.'" (NON-NPI UNIIl)
Note also that sentences like these provide additiona1 evidence that
the paradigm case cannot be stated in terms of syntactic structure
alone: unlil is preceded and commanded by a negative in the same
surface structure clause in both (119)(a) and (119)(b), but only if
(119)(b) can it receive the NPI interpretation.
Similarly, derived propositional structure seems to ~ccount for
the differences 1n acceptahility in the following sentences. The (a)
sentences demonstrate that adversatives such as ~i~lik~ and ~QUDl
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usually con t t trigger c l aus emat e NPIs; howevar , as the (b) sentences
demonstrate, they do trigger NPIs in embedded clauses. The (c)
sentences demonstrate that a synonymous expression wi th !lQ.t does
trigger c i aus emate NPIs. In the (d) ~entences an NPI c l au s ama t e of
ths trigger· is acceptablo if the NP in which it occurs r sce tves a
propositional interpretation: that it does receive sach a
propositional inter~retation is shown by the availability of a
paraphrase (e). A similar paraphrasp involving the 'untriggered' NPI
in (~) is shown, in (f). to be unavailable.
{12~)(a).I dislike any of his friends~
(b) I dislike having to put up with any uf his friends.
(c) I don't like any or' his friends.
(d) I dislike any food on the counter.
( e) 1 di~like ther~ being any food on the counter.
(f).I dislike there being any of his friends.
(122)(a).I doub t el anybody's c 1a i ms•
(b ) I doubted +hat. anybody would show up.
( c) I di dn vt believe anybody's c 1ai Ins.
,d) ! doubtetJ a.lY t nvo Ivamen t on his part.
(e) I doub t s. that there was any i nvc l veman t on
his part.
(f).1 doubted that there Lere anybody's claims.
Why do such advsr s a t tve s (unlike nsv) f a i l to trigger c l aus ema t e
NPls un193s thes~ NPIs occur in an NP which receives a propositional
~nterpretal.iQn? Co~sidef their LFs.
(123)(=LF of .(121}i~»
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(a) [Ex: x is his friend] (I dislike x)
(L) 'There is a friend of his that I dislike.'
(124)(=LF of (l?l)(b)
(a) I dislike ([Ex: x is his friend] (I have to put up with x))
(b)'I dis"like t~e situation in which I have to put up with his
friends.'
Since ~iiliti is a verb and is not assigned scope, the
existential quantifier representing illlX will autornatically be assigned
scope over the entire LF (123) of (121)(a); in (123), however, the
existential quantifier representing ~nx will have scope only over the
clause embedded under ~i~lik~. These LFs, it is clear, both fail the
ISC (since in neither case is there an overt NOT): but only (124)
seems likely to proQuce, for part (b) of the NPI rule, an a~propriate
tmp l t ad ':entence. - This is ev i den t from the respective paraphrases
(123)(b) and (124)(b): in (123)(b), saying that there is a friend of
his whom I d i s l t ke does not nnpl y that I don't like any of his
friends; while in (124)(b), stating that I dislike the situation of
having to put up with his friends implies that there aren't any
friends of his that I do care to put up wit~.
To return to the sentences in (121) and (122), note that the
unacceptable (a) sentences do ~ot d;ffer syntactically from the
acceptable (d) sentences: t"e11 d t f f e r ance lies in the fact that a
prolJositional interpretation is much mL d available for the NP object
of the adversative in the (d) sentences. If there is a propositional
interpretation. AD~ will not be assigned scope over the clause
containing the adversative: as a result, the LFs of the (d) sentences
will be more likely to be associated with an approp.'iate 'implied
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sentence' by part (b).
In contrast to these adversative verbs, NOT is assigned scope in
LF and therefore can take wide scope with respect to clausemate NPIs.
Thus the acceptable (121)(c) has LF (125):
(125)(=LF of (121)(c))
NOT [Ex: x is his friend] (I like x)
SUMMARY. The following is assumed about the mapping from surface
structure to IF as it relates to NPls.
(1) The surface order (within a clause or propositionally
interpreted NP) of logical elements does not determine the interpreted
order, i!~~Ui lh~i if the lexical representation of an existential
quant t r ter precedes the negative in surface structure then E mus t take
wide scope with respect to the NOT in LF. This accounts for the
unacceptability of sentences like *8nxhQdl dido:! ~r~ix~ ~a£lv, given
the ISC, with no need for explicit surface structure restrictions on
NPIs.
(2) Quantifiers, unlike NOT, can sometimes be assigned scope
wider than the clause in which they occur. NOT is clausebound.
(3) NPs can, when semantically appropriate, be assigned
pr op s t t t ona l interpretations: thus logical eloments occuring in these
NPs can have scope narrower than the proposition represented by the
entire syntactic sentence in ~hich these elements occur. This affects
NPJ acceptability: On the one hand, an NPI can be rendered
unacceptable (as we saw with until), since it is not, in such an NP.
in the immediate scope of a negative occuring in the aux. On the
other hand, NPI clausemates of adversatives such as gi~liKi can be
rendered 11k,ely candidates' for acceptability by part (b) as a rasult
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3.3.3 THE APPLICATION OF THE NPI RULE
In this section I will consider the question of how the NFl rule
actually applies.
THE APPLICATION OF PART (A)
There seem to be two obvious ways in which the ISC--our
reformulation of Baker's part (a)--cQuld apply.
First, it could be a filter on logical forms. That is. we could
say that a sentence S containing an WPI is assotiated with an LF
without regard for the r~esence of the NPI; then the Immediate Scope
Constraint applies, ruling out lFs in which the representation of an
NPJ is not in the immediate scope of NOT. In this account, (126) is
mapped onto possible LFs (127) or (128); (129) ;s not a possiblb
output of the mapping rules, as discussed in the preceding sections.
LFs ( 127) and (128) are marked as i l1-fo'rlned because the E
representing the NPI an~hQ!t~ is not in the imme d t a t e scope of NOT.
(126).Anybody didn't laugh.
(127) [Ex: x is a person] NOT (x laughed)
(128) NOT Tk~E [Ex: x is a person] (x laughed)
(129) NOT [Ex: x is a rqrson] (l< laughed)
CleJrly this proposal requires that N~Is be recognizable as such
at the level of logical form: that is, that anx and ~Qmg not be
represented i~entically in IF, Anx still being recognizable as an NPJ.
This is quite an implausible idea: that ~Qmft and anx are mapped onto
two different representations, truth conditionally identical but
aistinct from one another only by virtue of AnX'S status as an NPI.
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An alternative proposal also has the SS-->LF rules apply blindly
to sentences containing NPIs. without regard for their status as NPIs;
however, in this account NPls are not recognizable as such in LF.
SQmi and An~. for example. are both mapped onto E. Then the Immediate
Scope Constraint marks as unacceptable <SS.LF> pairs in which the LF
representation of an NPJ occuring in surface structure fails to be in
the immqdiate score of NOT. That is, the ISC does not mark LFs as
una cCeptab 1e. but <SS , LF> Pa i I' S •
The widely noted accoptability of discourses such as (130) is
easy to explain in this bCCQUnt. because (130)(b) has no surface
structure containing an NPJ. Thus the Immediate Scope Constraint does
not mark its <SS,LF> pair as unacceptable.
(130)(a) He didn't eat any peas.
(b) I did, though.
In contrast, the explanation in ter-ms of filters on LFs must explain
why the filter does not apply to the post-VPD LF of (130)(b), since it
will contain an identifiable NPI which is not in the immediate scope
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of NOT.
THE APPLICAT!ON OF PART (8)
Sentences with <SS,LF> pairs marked as unacc~ptable by the ISC
may still be acceptable by virtue of part (b). Part (b), which will
be examined in the following chapter, involves (in this account) an
'allusion' to a proposition in whose logical form the r&presentation
of tile HPI 1sin the immadi ate scope of negat ion.
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3.4 POSSIBLE COUNTEREXAMPLES
I nth issec t ion I will con sid e r' pas s i h 1e co Un t ere xamp 1est 0 t h9
pr opo se d Irnmediate Scope Cons t r a t n t . The first set of possible
coun t ar e xamp l e s consists of logical elements which are able to
interveng between NOT and NPls in LF without rendering the sentence
unacc ep t ab l e : the second possible counterexample is furnished b.y
sentences with negated n~~aY~~ clauses in which certain NPIs are able
to occur in the matrix S.
3.4.1 ACCEPTABLE INTERVENERS
In this sectio, I will examine certaln expressions which are able
to intervene between NOT and NPIs in LF, without rendering the
sentence r:nacceptable. These exp s s i ons are (1) other NPls and (2)
indefinite NP marker~.
(1) OT:~ER N?Is. Consider sentence (131) below, in which there
are three NPIs:
(131) He hasn't lifted a finger' to help anybody yet.
(132) NOT [Ex: x is a person] [Et: t is a time < present]
(he has lifted a f t nqe r to help x at t)
(133) NvT [Et: t is a time < present] [Ex: x is a person]
(he has lifted a finger to help x at t)
(I will represent Y~l as an existential quantifier over time.) 80th
possible LFs (132) and (133) viola~e the ISC as stated in (13),
although for different NPIs.
Three explanations of the acceptability of (131) come to mind.
First, it might be that NPIs themselves function as negatives.
'triggering' others.
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This explanation recalls the suggestion in
Jespersen (1917) that the function of NPIs is to "s tr enq tnen ' the
negative. He cites numer-ous cases in wh i ch NPIs be come nega t i ves
tnems e l ve s : for instance, the French negative n~ ... R~.s. is de r i ve d t r om
£j\~, which was originally an NPI
acceptable only wit~ verbs of motion (in line with its Qriginal
maam nq ) , became first a more general NPI and then an actual negative
in its own right which can appear in the absence of n~. Thus NPIs
might simply be represented as themselves part of the negative:
any.. hing to the right of an NPI, in this case, will meet the ISC.
This cannot be, however, as (134) and (135) show:
(134)(a) I didn't realize that anybody was hurt.
(b) NOT (I realized that ([Ex: x is a pqrson] (x was hurt)))
(135)(a)*1 didn't realize that anybody had gotten up until noon.
(b) NOT(I realized that ([Ex: x is a person]" [Et: t is
a time " I) oon] (x go t Lip at t)))
In (134) and (135), it is clear that the ISC is violated for ho th
NPIs, A.n~!!Qg~ and .un.til, since they do not OCCUI' only in the
~roposition which is the entire s~ope of NOT. Part (b) of the rule
will have to ren1er t hem acceptable. Since (134)(b) does imp l i ca te
something like (136) below, it is not surprising that it is
acceptable.
(136) I thought that (NOT ([Ex: x is a person] (x was hurl»)
But what about (136)7 If NPIs can themselves function as negatives,
the existential quantifier corr~sponding to un!il, being adjacent to
the quantifier representin~ NrI ADX, should actually be triggered by
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it. NOT would not be required. Part (b) would be needed only to
satisfy the ISC for ~n~, so that the sentence would not be marked as
unacceptable on i ts account: and the acceptabi 1 i ty of (134)
demonstrates that part (b) does license finxbQ~X in the context I
But neverthele$S (135) is unacceptable, and
the unacceptability clearly arises from the presence of NPI until
(since (134) is acceptable).
It's not surprising that part (b) licenses anxhQ~X but not until.
NPIs vary among themselves on the basis of 'strength' or 'liberali~y·.
Some NPIs can only OClur in the immediate scope of NOT, while others
seem to be triggered much more easily. Unlj.l is unquestionably one of
the 'stronger' NPJs, i.e. one that is seldom acceptable when the ISC
is violated; und so it :3 not surprising that part (b) fails to save
sentence (135).
Thus we cannot say that NPIs trigger each other; and t he r-e f or e
the acceptability or unac cep t ib i l t ty of both NPIs in (135) mus t be
determined by part (b) rather than by part (a).
A second explanation for the frequent acceptability of multiple
NPIs is that while they do not themselves function as negativ~s they
are extensions of a negative to the extent that they are allowed by
the ISC to intervene between NOT and an NPI. That is, they might bA
explicit exceptions to th~ ISC. and thus sentences with NPIs are
acceptable by part (a) of the rule.
The difficulty with this proposal is that not fill NPIs can
intervene with impunity. Consider ~ll 1h~! manx.
(131)(8)771 didn't contribute one red cent to all that many
winos.
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(b) NOT [ALL-THAT-MANYx: x is a wino] (I contributed
one red cent to x)
I nthe abo ve sen ten ce the i nt e r ven i ngNP I see Ins to' depr i ve ' the NPI
'Qll!ribulj Qll@ £§~ ~~n! of the negative, although not as dramatically
as in some other sentences. If in fact NPIs may intervene between NOT
and other NPIs, (137) should be acceptable: hence it doesn't seem
pos s 'ib1e toe harae t e r i ze all NPIs asexp1 i cit e xcop t ion s tothe ISC.
A third possible explanation of the acceptabla cases of NPIs
intervening between NOT and other NPIs is simply to invoke part (b).
Sentence (131) above, which contains mu l t i pl e NPIs, can be said to
'allude' to propositions with the following LFs:
(138)(a) ISC SATISFIED FOR LIE! A fl~GfB:
[Ax: x is a pe r son ] [At: t is a time < present]
NOT (he has lifted a finger to help x at t)
(b) ISC SATISfIED FOR Y£I:
[Ax: x is a person] NOT [Et: t is a time < present]
(he has lifted a finger to help x at t)
(c) ISC SATISFIED FOR A~YBQQY:
[At: t is a time < present] NOT [Ex: x is a par son ]
(he has lifted a finger to help x at t)
The appropriate 'allusions' are derived for (131) above by virtue of
the equivalence of A NOT and NOT E. When the NPI is gll 1ng! m~n~,
the appr-onr i a t e allusion will pr esumabl y have to be somet ninq like
MOST NOT; the failure of part (b) to save (137) cannot be explored
here.
Note, incidently, that all 'th~ NPIs in a given sentence will not
be licensed by the same im,li~ature.
So it appears that the acceptability of multiple NPIs is amenable
to a part (b) explanation, and thus no reformulation of the ISC is
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necessary.
(2) INDEFINITE NP MARKERS. A second possible counterexample to
the ISC is furnished by indefinite NPs. Sentence (130) could 09
mapped onto either (140) or (141), to consider only the possible
LFs in which the quantifiers represented by a and an~lhing are
both negated. In (140) the r ep resent at i on of ~.n~lhing is not in the
immediate scope of NOT, so the pair «139),(140» is marked as
unacceptable by the ISe.
{139} I didn't give a wino anything.
(140) NOT [Ex: x is a wino] Ey (I gave y to x)
'There was no wino who received a gift from me.'
(141) NOT Ey [Ex: x is a wino] (I gave y to x)
'There was nothing that I gave to a wino.'
(Let us as~ume that the inrlefinite marker is represented as an
existential quantifier in LF.) We can t&11 the same story about
intorvening existential quantifiers lexically r ep r-es en t e d by the
indefinite article that we told about intervening NPIs above: (140)
entails (142) below, which satisfies the ISC: thus (139) is likely to
be acceptable by part (b), if (140) is its LF.
(142) [Ax: x is a wino] NOT Ey (I gave y to x)
3.4.2 NPI QUANTIFIERS WITH WIOE SCOPE
A second sort of possible counterexamples to the ISC will be
dis c uS S 9 din t his sec t f on, Anx t ~Jli£ (whie h I will t rea t , a1on 9 with
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similar adverbs, as a quantifier), and other NPI quantifiers are
sometimes acceptable in 52 (i.e. the matrix S) of sentences with
negated motivational adverbials, as ('43) and (144) demonstrate:
(143) I didn't cut any of his classes because I disagreed with him.
(I ~id cut some of his classes because 1 found him boring.)
(144) I haven't ever cut a class because I disagreed with the
lecturer.
(I have on nccasion cut a class because I found him boring.)
CAUSE in (143) may be negated, as in (145)(a) below, or it may have
wide scope with respect to NOT, as in (145)(b).
(145)(a) NOT CAUSE (I disagreed with him , I cut any of his classes)
(b) CAUSE (I disagreed with him, NOT (I cut any of his classes))
In the above I have not yet rerresented an~ as a quantifier. In the
reading of (143) in which CAUSE is negated, represented by (145)(a),
does the quantifier represented by an~ have scope only over 52 or also
over CAUSE? It seems to me that the only possible reading of (143) is,
'There wasn't a single one of his classes that I cut becau~e I
disagreed with him (though I may have cut some classes because he was
boring)' .. This reading can bA represented as in (146) below. ( 143)
with the reading in which CAUSE is negated does not seem to be
paraphraseable as 'It wasn't because I disagreed with him that I cut
classes.' This unavailable reading can be represented as in (141)
below: ADX has scope only over 52.
(146) NOT [Ex: x is a class] CAUSE «I disagreed with him), (I cut x )
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(147) NOT CAUSE ((I disagreed with him), ([Ex: x is a class] I cut x))
It appears that the only reading of (143) in which CAUSE is
negated is represented by (146) and not by (147}. Thus the suggestion
that an NPI may not be separated Tram the n&gative in logical form
does not seeln to be contradicted by sentences like (143). Only if the
HPI in the matrix S is a quantifier that can be assigned scope over
the prediccte CAUSE, and hence be in the immediate scope of NOT, will
it be acceptable. (Recall that the same wide-scope explanation was
suggested in connection with a possible reading of (26) above, with a
negated manner adverbial.)
Cont r as t (143) wit h (148): i nthe 1a t t e r, the NPlis ani d i om
chunk with no subpart that could be 'detached' to act like a
quantifier and~ by taking wide scope with respect to CAUSE, occur in
the immediate scope of NOT. Thus it is sapar at.ed f r om NOT by CAUSE in
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its LF (149), and is unacceptable.
(148)*His paper doesn't hold a candle to mine because he had help ...
(he just worked hard)
(149) NOT CAUSE ( (his paper holds a candle to mine), (he had help))
Sentences like (143), therefore, do not represent counterexamples to
the 15C.
This concludes our brief survey of possible counterexamples to
20
the ISe.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3
In this chapter part (a) of the NPI rule has been r ef ormul a t e d ,
as the Immediate Scope Constraint. The ISC is a structural condition,
stated upon representations at the level of logical f orm: a sufficient
condi t i on on the acceptabi 1i ty at an NPI is that ; t occur in the
tmmed t ete scope of NOT. Examples of logical e l ement s whose
intervention results in a violation of the ISC are the predicate
CAUSE, the focus operator, other quantifiers, AND, and TRUE (which
encodes 'external negation'). We have also seen that analogous
'i,nlnediate scope constraints' apply to other quan t i f i e r s .
I n the fa 11owi og chapter I wi 11 exami ne par t (b), the IOUs for
which have been piling up in the courSE; of this discussion.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The restriction of ~ft~~r~l is not so simple, as will be discussed
in section 3.2.2; but this is irrelevant to the argument from tag
questions.
2. Carden (1973) also observed the unacceptability of NPIs in
senten::es like (7). His explanation within the f r arnawor k of
generative semantics quantifier lowering is, I believe, a lmo s t
identical in effect to the Imrnediato Scope Constraint.
3. For the purposes of the discussion I will represent free choice
~nJ and gX~[l identically, as the universal quantifier. NPI Bnx will
be represented as the existential quantifier, a move that will be
discussed in Chapter 5.
4. For dial~cts in which the configuration A NOT is acceptable, i.e.
in which (i) below can have the (11)(a) reading, sentences «(7), (9),
and (10» are predicted to be acceptable although unambiguous, lacking
the reading in which the universal quantifier intervenes between NOT
and the NPI.
(i) Everybody didn't answer the question.
(ii)(a) [Ax: x a person] NOT (x answered the question)
(b) NOT [Ax: x a person] (x answered the question)
From now on I will discuss only the dialect in which (ii)(a) is not
acceptable.
6. I am following Jackendoff (1972) in representing sentences like
(26) as in (27).
100
6. Note that some NPIs contain semi-detachable subparts: lift a
fing~L' for example, almost allows a reading (ii) of (i); this reading
is paraphrased in (iii).
(i) I didn't lift a FINGER to help because I was coerced.
(ii) NOT [Ex: x is an amount of effort]
CAUSE (I was coerced), (I made x amount of effort)}
(iii)'NONE of my efforts were the result of coercion.'
7. Jackend~~f (1972) distinguishes two intonational contours for
sen ten c es wit h f 0 Cus: the A- i n ton at ion, i n whie h the rei s a h i 9h pi t ch
on the focussed item, and the sentence has a falling pitch; and the
B-intonation, in which there is also a high pitch on the focussed item
but the sentence has a rising rather than a falling pitch.
associated with the 8-intonation.
AtF is
8. There is another (non-AtF) use of the rising intonation with
sentences like (29) and (30) which allows NPIs: this may be t e rmed the
'counterexample intonation'. If someone has suggested that everyone
on the team is as good as Bill, (30) might be said with a rising
intonation to furnish a counterexample to this claim. (30) seems
acceptable in this case. Obviously. (30) in this case will not have
the IF (36) so it 10es not represent a counterexample to the
explanation of why (30) is unacceptable with AtF.
9. It is noted in Jackendoff (1972) and elsewhere that the focussed
item does not even have to be a single lexical item, 85 demonstrated
by (i). Thus the logical forms of such sentences look rather odd.
(i) It didn't IMplode~-it EXploded.
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10. This is clearly a gross oversimplification of conjunction. Amon q
other things, note that in (i) both quantifiers in the conjoined
object may have scope over gygrY~Qd~ in the subject, although they may
not be assigned scope over each other.
(1) Every student read five books and three articles.
However conjunction is to be represented,
justifiable to cite AND as an ISC violator.
11. Chomsky (1979) and elsewhere
however, it seems
12. The subject of English quantification is treated in detail in May
(1977), Krach (1974).
13. See also Iaup (1975) concerning scope p r e f e r anc es of different
quantifiers.
14. NPIs occuring within larger NPs can be
(when they are acceptable) by part (b),
occuring in relative clauses; see Chapter 4.
treated as acceptable
in the same way as NPs
15. Quine (1960) makes this proposal. This is not indisputably the
best move; Jackendoff (1972) presents objections to it.
16. See Liberman (1974)
17. I do not know why this sentence lacks the following reading 'He
predicted: "It won't rain continuously up until 6:00.'"
18. I must point out that VPD is sometimes odd when there is an NPI
in the antecedent.
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{i)?Tom doesn't hold a candle to Bill. but I do.
(ii)?Sam didn't budge an inch. although he normally
would when confronted by an authority fig~re.
(iii)?! don't believe how many books she's read, but the
admissions officer does.
(iv)?He doesn't have a hope in hell of winning, but most
people do.
~any speakers find (i)-(iv) a~ceptable; they are marginal to me.
However, they 'bother' me in much the same way that sloppy identity
does, so it may have nothing to do with the presence of NPIs.
19. The failure of part (b) to redeem sentences like (14B) will be
discussed in section 4.5.4 below.
20. What about sentences like (i) below?
(i) John didn't give anything to Mary.
It seems clear that expressions like JQhn and Mgr~ do not represent
'logical elements' in the sense of (13) above: that is, they do not
induce scope ambiguities with each other or' with negation and
quantifiers. Thus they do not cause violations of the 15C.
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CHAPTER 4: PART (8) - 'ALLUSIONS'
In the preceding chapter I argued that the Imme d i a t e Scope
Constraint marks as unacceptable <SS,LF> pairs if the representation
of an NPI in LF is not in the tmme d i at e scope of NOT. A great number"
of ultimately acceptable sentences, therefor-e, are mar ked as
unacceptab1e by the ISC. In this chapter I will examine the
conditions under which such sentences are determined to be acceptable.
The basic theory of part (b) which I will argue for (roughly
following Baker (1970)) is that these sentences are acceptable because
they in some way allude to the paradigm case. That is, a <SS,LF> pair
which fails the 15C--i.e., which contains an 'untriggered' NPI--may be
deemed acceptable by virtue of a pair < <SS,LF>, I>, where 'I' denotes
Saine implicature of the form X NOT NPI V, an environment in which the
representation of the NPI is in the tmme d i at e scope of NOT. (This
pair will hereafter be written '<S,I>'.)
The observations to be made in this chapter do not begin to
approach a predictive account of part (b }. I hope, however, that they
way at least clarify the nature of the problem.
Section 4.1 is a rough data set of part (b) cases, intended
primarily to demonstrate the great variation in acceptability among
different NPIs and triggers, and to characterize informally the sorts
of implicatures by which I claim that NPIs are licensed in part (b).
In section 4.2, I argue for the insufficiency of a purely
semantic account of part (b): that is, an account based entirely on
inferences (whether logical or otherwise) from the literal meanings of
sentences without reference to real world beliefs or conversational
intent. In section 4.3. I argue for the insufficiency of a purely
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conversational account: that is, an account based entirely on speaker
meaning as distinct from sentence me an i nq . In section 4.4 a rough
proposal is made coric e r n i nq part (b) which a t t empt s to t ncor por at e
both the seman t i c and the ccnv e r s a t i or.a l constraints on NPIs; the
conversational constraints are e xam i ne d in more detail in section 4.5.
Section 4.6 concerns the consequences of part (b) for the theory of
grammar.
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4.1 A DATA SET
In this section I will list some representative part (b) cases.
For each 'trigger' (i.e. context licensing NPIs) I will demonstrate
that t her e is an 'NPI squish' in that environment (i.e. that not all
NPIs are acceptable there) and that there is also a 'trigger squish'
(i.e. that not all semantically similar CJntexts license NPIs). The
term 'squish' is used somewhat loosely here; the question of whether
any real hierarchies can be established is left open. I assume, in
the absence of any other explanation, that this squishiness is caused
1
by the varying 'strength' or 'liberality' of different NPIs and by
the varying availability of the appropriate imp l i ca tur e . (The
question of availability will be discussed in the following sections.)
I n the 1i s t of t rig 9e r S t the f 0 11ow i ngin for Inat; on will be 9 i ven
for each trigger T:
8. T: The .tJ:i,g,gg.c in an acceptable sentence with an NPI (NPI-l)
b. NON-I: A syntactically comparable expression which does not permit
NPIs
c. T-SQUISH: A semantically similar expression which does not license
NPI-l
d. NPI SQUISH: an NPI (NPI-2) which is not licensed by T
e. IMPLIC: The implicature in which the representation of the NPI is
in the immediate scope of NOT. For clarity, an English sentence
is given, although strictly speaking it isn't sentences that are
relevant to part (b), but rather semantic representations. Both
NPI-l and NPI-2 are acceptable in this sentence, although only
NPI-l is licensed by T.
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LISl" OF REPRESENTATIVE PART (B) CASES
1. SUBfHlSE
&. T: I was surprised that she contributed a red cent.
b. NON-T: *1 was informed that she contributed a red cent.
c. T-SQUISH:.I was pleasantly surprised that she contributed a
red cent.
d. NPI-SQUISH: *1 was surprised that she had too many friends.
[IQQ in its NPI usage: see footnote 4, Introduction.]
e. IMPLIC:
I had expeLted her not to contribute a red cent.(NPI-l)
I had expected her not to have too many friends.(NPI-2)
2. HARD
8. T: He made me so angry that it was hard to lift a finger when
he asked for help.
b. NON-T: *He made me so angry that it was easy to 1i ft a fi nger
when she asked me to hit him.
c. T-SQUISH: *The wind was blowing and it was rather hard to lift
a finger.
d. NPI-SQUISH: ?He made me so mad that it was hard to contribute
8 thin dime to his campaign.
e . IMPLIC:
He made me so mad that I almost couldn't lift a finger when he
asked for help. (NPI-l)
He made me so mad that I almost couldn't contribute a thin dime to
his campaign. (NPI-2)
3. If CLAUSES 1
a. T: If you give a damn about the whales, you'll contribute.
b. NON-I: $If you contribute, you give a damn about the whales.
c. T-SQUISH: 111f you give a damn about the whales, you must be
George Smith.
d. NPI-SQUISH: ??If you can help
contribute.
being selfish, you'll
e. IMPLIC:
Either you contribute or you don't give a damn about the whales.
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(NPI-l)
Either you contribute or you can't help being selfish. (NPI-2)
4. If-CLAUSES 2: THREATS vs. PROMISES
a. T: If you contribute a r ac cent to the Moonies, I'll hit you.
(THREAT)
b. NON-T: *If you contribute to the Moonies, you'll have any
regrets.
c. T-SQUISH: *If you contribute a red cent to the Moonies. I'll
kiss you. (PROMISE)
d. NPI-SQUISH: *If you get up until noon, you'll regret it.
[See footnote 5 in the Introduction concerning NPI until.]
e. IMPLIC:
Either you don't contribute a red cent to the Moonies or I'll hit
you. (HPI-I)
Either you don't get up until noon or you'll regret it. (NPI-2)
5. RELATIVE CLAUSES HEADED BY UNIVERSAL QUANTIFIER
8. T: Every restaurant that charges so much as a dime for i cebe r q
lettuce ought to be closed down.
b. NON-T: .Solne restaurants that charge so much as a dime for
iceberg lettuce ought to be closed down.
c. T-SQUISH:
??Every restaurant that charges so much as a dime for iceberg
lettuce actually has four stars in the handbook.
OR
??Not everyone who budged was pushed.
d. NPI-SQUISH:??Everything that she eats anymore makes Albert
sick.
[Ignore 'positive ~n~mQ(~' dialects or any wide scope reading of
.an~!D2.r:.@: the only relevant reading is the one in which Albert's
nausea is evoked by her continuing to eat foods that she ate in
the past.]
e. IMPlIC:
Ax«x is a restaurant and x charges so much as a dime for iceberg
lettuce)--> x ought to be shut down.) (NPI-l)
Ax(1 eat x anymore--> x makes Albert sick) (NPI-2)
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[Given this representation rf relative clauses headed by universal
quantifiers~ we can employ the same part (b) strategy as for
antecedents of conditionals: see 3. and 4. above.]
6. COMPARATIVES
a. T: Cows fly more often than he lifts a finger to help.
b. NON-T: .Cows fly because he lifts a finyer to help.
c. T-SQUISH:
.Cows fly about 32% more often than he lifts a finger to help.
OR
*The sun rises more often than he lifts a finger to help.
d. NPI-SQUISH: .Cows fly more often than he gets up until noon.
e. IMPLIC:
If aeronautical events involving cows are rare, then he almost
never lifts a finger to help. (NPI-l)
If aeronautical events involving cows are rare, then he almost
never gets up until noon. (NPI-2)
7. SUPERLATIVES
a. T: The last per~on to give a flying fuck about the whales was
George Smith.
b. NON-T:
*The most recent person to give a flying fuck about the whales was
Mary Jones.
OR
[In a context in which a total of 115 people and no more are known
to have demonstrated concern for whales]
*The 115th person to give a flying fuck about the whales was Mary
Jones.
c. T-SQUISH: ??The third-fram-last person to give a flying fuck
about the whales was Mary Smith.
d. NPI-SQUISH: ??The last person to bat an eyelash wt~en he walked
in was Aliea.
9. IMPLIC:
After George Smith, no one gave a flying fuck about th~ whales.
(NPI-l)
After Alice, no one batted an eyelash when he walked in. (NPI-2)
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8. BffQR.E
a. T: He left before Mary showed any interest in flying us all to
Rio.
b. NON-T: .He left after Mary showed fny interest in flying us
all to Rio.
c. T-SQUISH: *He left a few mi nut es before Mary showed any
interest in flying us all to Rio.
d. NPI-SQUISH: .He left before I could believe how clever he was.
e. IMPLIC:
When he left, Mary hadn't showed any interest in flying us all to
Rio. (NPI-l)
When he 1eft, I couldn't believe how clever he was. (NPI-2)
9. QN1Y 1: NPIs OUTSIDE OF FOCUS
a. T: Only John has any interest in playing soccer.
b. NON-T: *Even John has any interest in playing soccer.
c. T-SQUISII:
*Of the three of us, it's John who has any interest in playing
soccer.
BUT COt.1PARE:
It's the pushy people who accomplish anything.
d. NPI-SQUISH: -On Iy John cont .."ibut'3d a thin dime.
e. IMPLIC:
Anyone who isn't John doesn't have any interest in playing soccer.
(NPI-l)
Anyone who isn't john didn't contribute a thin dime. (NPI-2)
10. Q~~Y 2: NPIs IN FOCUS
8. T: Only people who have ever studied Walbiri will be able to
decipher that remark.
b. NON-T: *Even people who have ever studied Walbiri will be able
to decipher that remark.
C. T-SQUISH:.I have only ever met her, I don't know her well.
[The focus of Qnl~ is iX~£ mil.]
d. NPI-SQUISH: .Only pictures worth a red cent will be on
display,
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e. IMPLIC:
If anyone hdsn't studie~ Walbiri, he won't be able to decipher
that remark. (NPI-l)
If a picture isn't worth a fad cent, it won't be on display.
(NPI-2)
2
11. RELATIVE CLAUSES HEADED BY NONSPECIFIC NPs
a. T: A doctor who knows anything about acupuncture is worth his
weight in gold.
b. NON-T:
*A doctor who knows anything about acupuncture is easy to find.
OR
*A certain doctor ~;)O knew anything about acupuncture was not
available.
OR
*A doctor who knaw anything about acupuncture wasn't available,
because he was sick.
c. T-SQUISH:?
d. NPI-SQUISH:.A doctor who c~uld believe the size of that wound
was not available.
e. IMPLIC:
All the doctors there (if any) didn't know anything about
acupuncture. (NPI-l)
All the doctors there (if any) couldn't believe the size of that
wound. (NPI-2)
12. NEGATED Bf~AUSf CLAUSE
a. T: I didn't buy the ticket because I had a hope in hell of
winning.
b. NON-I:.I didn't buy the ticket since I had a hope in hell of
winning.
c. T-SQUISH:.I didn't buy the ticket just because I had a hope
in hell of winning.
d. NPI-SQUISH:.I didn't buy the ticket because I had seen the
horse's ears budge.
e. IMPLIC:
I didn't have a hope in hell of winning. (NPI-I)
I hadn't seen the horse's ears budge. (NPI-2)
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13. MQl M8.NY
a. T:! don't give a damn about that many people.
WITH THE READING:
NOT [MANYx: x is a person] (I give a damn about x)
'There aren't many people I care about.'
b. NON-T: *1 don't give a damn about just anybody:
WITH THE READING:
NOT [Ax: x is a person] (I give a damn about x)
'It isn't just anybody I care about.'
c. T-SQUISH:?
d. NPI-SQUiSH:.I couldn't believe how tall that many people
were.
WITH THE READING:
NOT [MANYx: x is a person] (I could believe how tall x was)
'There weren't that many people whose height didn't inspire
incredulity in me.'
e. IMPLIC:
It's true of many/most people that I don't give a damn about t hem ,
(NPJ-1)
It's true of most/many people that I couldn't believe how tall
they were.(NPI-2)
14. ~QI ftJQU!iH
[Consider only the readings in which ENOUGH is negated.]
a. T: He doesn't give a damn about enough people to qualify h im
as a membAr of the human race.
b. NON-T:?
c. T-SQUISH: *He doesn't give a damn about enough people to
qualify him for sainthood. (NPI-l)
d. NPI-SQUISH: 11He didn't contribute a red cent to enough
charittes to qualify him as a member of the human race.
e. IMPlIC:
There are enough people who he doesn't give
disqualify him as a member of the human race.
a damn
(NPI-l)
about to
There are enough charities that he didn't give a red cent to to
disqualify him as a member of human race. (NPI-2)
..
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15. NOI SAY
a. T: I didn't say that we had a hope in hell of winning.
b. NON-T:
.1 didn't yell/add that we had a hope in hell of winning.
OR
-The ticket doesn't state that the purchaser ha~ a hope in hell of
winning.
c. T-SQUISH:
.1 didn't say that we had a hope in hell of winning, because 1
knew that WP had already won.
d. NPI-SQUISH: ??I didn't say that Smith's work holds a candle to
Jones·s.
e. IMPLIC:
I entertained, or at least did not rule out, the possibility that
we didn't have a hope in hell of winning. (NPI-l)
1 entertained, or at least did not rule out, the possibility that
Smith's work doesn't hold a candle to Jones's. (NPI-2)
16. ~QI + INSIRUMfNIA~ 8Q~fBB
8. T: I didn't earn a red cent with any of the tactics that you
showed InQ. 3
b. NON-T:.I didn't earn a red cent with any enthusiasm. (MANNER
ADVERB)
c. T-SQUISH: ??I didn't earn a red cent with any particularly
admirable tactics.
d. NPI-SQUISH:.I couldn't help thinking about it with any of the
mind control tactics that you showed me.
e. IMPlIC:
Using.the tactics that you showed me, I (still) didn't earn a red
cent. (NPI-l)
Using the mind control tactics that you showed me, I (still)
couldn't help thinking about it. (NPI-2)
17. QUESTIONS 1: YES/NO, NONQUECLARATIVE
[NOTE: '.' marks sentences which are unacceptable as true
questions rather than as queclaratives]
8. T: Did you eat any peas?
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b. NON-T: Did you eat any peas! (EXClAM. )
c. T-SQUISH:
*You have eaten any peas?
OR
.Would you like any peas? (OFFER)
d. NPJ-SQUISH:
.00 you give a flying fuck about the whales?
qU9clarative.)
(Must be
But compare:
Do you think it's possible that he really DOES give a flying fuck
about the whales? (Non-queclarativ~.)
e. IMPLIC:
It's possible that you didn't eat any peas. (NPI-l)
It's possible that you don't give a flying fuck about the whales.
(NPI-2)
18. QUESTIONS 2: YES/NO, QUECLARATIVE
a. T: So you actually think he'll help XQy--did he lift a finger
to h~lp his ow~ family?
b. NON-T: see above
c. T-SQUISH: .Maybe he will help you--did he lift a finger to
help his family?
d. NPI-SQUISH: 1150 you actually think you're as strong as
Mary--do you hold a candle to ~er little brother?
e. IMPlIC:
He didn't lift a finger to help his own family. (NPI-l)
You don't hold a candle to her little brother. (NPI-2)
19. QUESTIONS 3: WH, QUECLARATIVE
[NOTE: '.' marks the following questions as unacceptable as true
questions rather than queclaratives]
a. T: Who bats an eyelash when she walks into the room? No on9.
(from Barkin (1971)
b. NON-T: .Who bats an eyelash when she walks into the room? I
do.
c. T-SQUISH: ??At what percentage of the board meetings does
Alice bat an eyelash when he walks into the room? At none of them.
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d. NPI-SQUISH: .Who left until the bell rang? No one.
e. IMPLIC:
No one bats an eyelash when sh& walks into the room. (NPI-l)
No one left until the bell rang. (NPI-2)
4
20. QUESTIONS 4: WH, NONQUECLARATIVE
a. T: Which books have any students complained about? MQYi! Qi~Js.
and Ih~ S~~rl~l L§!!i[.
b. NON-T: ·MQ~~ Qi~K and In~ S&~Ll~l lJ~.t..tj!r are two books tllat
any students have complained about.
c. T-SQUISH:
*Who gives a flying fuck about the whales? John and Mary.
(Perfectly acceptable as a queclarative, but can't be taken as a
request for information.
Compare:
Who actually DOES give a flying fuck about the whales? John and
Mary.
d. NPI-SQUISH: ??Which books hold a candle to the Bible?
e. IMPLIC:
It's possible that there are no books that any students complained
about.
It's possible that no books hold a candle to the Bible.
This concludes the list of representative triggers; it is, of
course, far from exhaustive.
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4.2 INSUFFICIENCY OF A PURELY SEMANTIC ACCOUNT OF PART (8)
I have suggested that sentences whose <SS,LF> pairs are marked as
unacceptable by the ISC (nay still be acceptable if the
semantics--i.e., the component that determines the literal meanings of
5
sentences, along with entailments and imp1icatures that arise soley
out of these literal meanings--generates a pair <5.1> where I is some
implicature of the form X NOT NPI Y generated from the literal meaning
of the sentence.
Is the existence of an <S,I> pair sufficient to guarantee NPI
acceptability by part (b)? Clearly not: the NPI squish established in
the previous section shows that the existence of somp implicature of
the form X NOT NPI Y from the literal meaning of the sentence is
insufficient to guarantee acceptability for all NPIs.
Furthermore, as Baker (1970b) and others have observed, there are
many unacceptable sentences which logically entail X NOT NPI Y.
Consider double negation: since P entails NOT (NOT P)), NPIs would be
predicted to be acceptable in all affirmative sentences. And the
interdefinability of the logical connectives represented by if, ~ng,
gr, and llQl creates the same problem. A sentence of the form P AND Q
should tolerate NPIs since it entails NOT ( NOT P)OR(NOT Q)); a
sentence of the form P OR Q should tolerate NPIs because it entails
NOT«NOT P)AND(NOT Q»; sentences of the form P-->Q should tolerate
NPls in Q as well as P since they entail NOT Q-->NOT P. Similarly, a
sentence of the form Ax 0(x) should toleratA NPIs in 0, since it
entails NOT Ex NOT 0(x).
6
Or consider iXiB. Let us suppose that (1) below asserts (2) and
implicates (3): why )sn't (4) acceptable by virtue of a corresponding
.f
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implicature (6)1
(1) Even John helped.
(2) John helped.
(3) It was most likely that John wouldn't help .
(4)*Even John lifted a finger to help.
(6) It was most likely that John wouldn't lift a finger to help.
Similarly, we might expect wi~h or n£~t~ng to license NPIs, since
they have counterfactive implicature.
they seldom if ever do license NPIs.
As (6) and (7) demonstrate,
(6).He pretended that he had ever been there.
(7).1 wish I had a red cent.
Another example of the insufficie~cy of purely semantic account
of part (b) is furnished by examples 6 and 14 on the list of triggers.
The relevant sentences arA repeated below.
(8)(a) Cows fly more often than he lifts a finger to help.
(b).The sun rises more often than he lifts a finger to
help.
(e) 'P more often than Q' has the implicature
'if P very seldom, then almost never Q'
(9)(a) He doesn't give a damn about enough people to quaiiiy
him as a member of the human race.
(b).He doesn't give a damn about enough people to qua1ify
him for sainthood.
(c) 'Not enough X to yt has the implicature 'Enough NOT X
so that NOT Y'
These sentences will be discussed further in section 4.4 and 4.6;
simply note here that without information about real world beliefs
II
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there is no way to predict the acceptability of the (a) sentences but
the unacceptability of the (b) sentences. Both the (a) and the (b)
sentences seem to be part of an <S,I> pair by virtue of the strategy
noted (quite informally) in (e): but there doesn't seem to be anything
about the literal rneanings of the (a) sentences that expl a i ns why they
are acceptable while the (b) se~tences are unacceptable. Clearly in a
world where cow flight is known to be an everyday occurence and
sunrise is known to be infrequent, we would expect (8)(a) to be
unacceptable and (B)(b) to be acceptable. The relative acceptability
of (9)(a) and (9)(b) is similarly affected by real world beliefs.
In Chapter 3, we saw that NPIs are not uniforml.) acceptable when
some logical element intervenes beLween the representation of the NPI
and NOT in LF. If we examine some of these unacceptable cases of NPIs
in the non-immediate scope of NOT, a possible strategy af'ises fc~
capturing part (b) strictly in terms of the literal meanings of
sentences.
(10).H15 paper doesn't hold a candle to mine because
he had any help. (NOT CAUSE)
(11).He didn't give just anybody a red cent. (NOT Ax)
(12).He didn't lift a finger enthusiastically.
(NOT MANNER ADVERBIAL)
(13).JOHN doesn't hold a candle to Bill.
(NOT FOCUS OPERATOR)
(14).H9 DID NOT contribute a red cent. (NOT TRUE)
The above sentences seem to be associated
implicature, respectively (16)-(19):
(15) His paper 'holds a candle to' mine.
with positive
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(16) He gives some people 'a red cent'.
(17) He did 'lift a finger'.
(18) Someone does 'hold a candle to' Bill.
(19) It has been suggested that he did contribute 'a red cent.'
So perhaps we can say that a sentence S with an NPI is acceptable
iff S has no positive implicature involving the NPI. Such a
suggestion would require a precise specification of 'positive
implicature'; however, the counterexamples are so straightforward that
this theory can be abandoned in its unelaborated state.
First, consider the factive triggers: L~g£gl, ~ULQ£i~~~, llQl
L~~lizi, etc. Here are expressions which license NPIs but have
7
~ositive implicature. For instance, (20) implicates (21) and (22)
implicates (23):
(20) I regret that I lifted a finger to help him.
(21) I did 'lift a finger to help' him.
(23) I didn't realize that there was anybody in the kitchen.
(24) There was 'anybody' in the kitchen.
Second, consider NPls like ~nxmQ£~ and x~!: (25) implicates (26)
and (27) implicate~ (28).
(25) He doesn't 11ft a finger around the house anymore.
(26) He used to 'lift a finger around the house'.
(27) He hasn't contributed a red cent yet.
(28) He may 'contribute a red cent' in the future.
So although it may be that positive implicature plays a role in
part (b). the distribution of NPIs cannot be predicted on the basis of
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it.
Thus membership in an <S,I> pair, where 'I' denotes an
tmp l i c a tur e of the form X NOT NPI Y generated f r om the 'l t t e r a l me an i nq
of the sentence, is insufficient to guarantee the acceptability of a
sentence which fails the Imme d i at e Scope Constraint.
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4.3 INSUFFICIENCY OF A PURELY CONVERSATIONAL ACCOUNT
OF PART (8)
Our theory of part (b) will have to take into account the fact
that NPIs do not ever seem to be acceptable by virtue of
conversational implicature alone. That is, NPls in a sentence Swill
not be licensed soley by virtue of the pair <5,I> if this I is some
implicature arising not out of the literal meaning of S but soley out
of the utterance of S in the context of the conversation.
Consider sarcasm, with or without special intonation. No matter
how clearly the ~peaker conveys, by the utterance of (29), that he
believes (30), gllX is still unacceptable in (29).
(29).I'm sure that Mary has ever considAred anybody except herself.
(30) Mary has never considered anybody but herself.
Recall the following case from tt.e list of triggers {ax amp l e 7)'
(31) The last/*115th person to give a flying fuck about
the whales was Mary Jones.
Consider a context in which, the whales having become extin~t, it is
known that in all of history only 115 people have demonstrated concern
for whales. In that case 115th person to demonstrate concern would
also be known to be the last person to do so; however , only .li\~.t and
and not l!~!h triggers an NPI.
Finally, consider the following discourse among three people in
the event that it is known that one, and only one, of the three knows
Greek.
(32) A: Who knows Greek?
(33) B: .1 know any Gre8k~
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(~4) B: I'm the only one who knows any Greek.
(35) C doesn't know any Greek.
We can conceive of a context in which B intentionally conveys (35) by
the utterance of (33). Nevertheless, this does not license NPIs in
(33), although NPIs may occur in (34), which has almost the same force
as (33) in this conversation.
Thus our theory of part (b) will have to provide some explanation
for the fact that NPIs in a sentence S are not licensed merely by the
U~g of S to convey X NOT NPI.
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4.4 A TENTATIVE PROPOSAL
The analysis of part (b) that I have argued for is that sentences
wit h ' unt rig9ered ' r~PIs ( i . e , NPIs VI hie h a I"e not i nth e i nuned i ate
scope of NOT in LF) are acceptable only by v~rtue of their 'alluding'
to some other proposition in whose logical structure the conditions
for triggering this NPI are met. This notion, of the acceptability of
a sentence depending upon some sort of 'allusion', sounds misleadingly
exotic. One way to look at part (b) cases is to say that they lack a
'trigger' and must therefore be related to some LF with the trigger
analogously to the way that a sentenc~ with an empty VP must be
related to some antecedent. (Of course, in the case of the mi s s i nq
trigger the 'antecedent' (i.e. the implicature) is not to be taken as
identical in the relevant respect to the trigger1ess sentence, but
only as similar.)
This comparison may be helpful in maki nq : some sense of the
semantic and conversational constraints on part (b) of the NPI rula.
(38)(a) 1 expected NOT Ex (he eat x)
(b) I'm surprised that he ate anything.
(39)(a) Susy enjoyed the movie.
(b) I didn't.
(40)(a) NOT Ex (x saw John)
(b).Anybody didn't see John.
IF: Ex NOT (x saw John)
(41)(a) It's twelve o'clock.
(b) No, I didn't.
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Clearly the well-formettness of (38)1~b) and (39)(b) cannot be
determined in isolation; we can only speak of the well-formedness of
<b,a> pairs such as (38) and (39) above. (In contrast, the pair (40)
and (41) are ill-formed. The ~air «40)(b), (40)(a» is ill-formed
because (40)(b) simply d.re s not have the tmp l i catur-e (40)(a).
Well-formedness constraints on discourses with VP anaphora are treated
in Williams (1977) and elsewtere. (Treating VP anaphora as a copying
rule and spec i f y i nq cons t r ci nt s on the output I as sums to be
equivalent to specifying constraints on the pair.)
But the appropriateness of uttering (39)(b) hinges not only upon
the well-formed~ess of th& <5, 6ntecedent> pair--actually, of the pair
of LFs rather than of sentences-··but also upon the ~Y~il~Qilil~ of the
antecedent sentence. That t s , (39)(b) may not be appropriately
uttered twenty years after the utt~rance of (39)(a)--or by someone w~o
is not part of the d i scour-se-c- el thouqh (39)(b) is a member of a
well-formed discourse.
The parallel between such <S, antecedent> pairs and <S,I> pairs
is clear. The semantic wel1-formedness of a sentence S with an
untriggered NPJ cannot be determined in isolation, any mor-e thai, the
semantic well-formedness of (39)(b) can be determined outside of a
givnn discourse. We must look at the <5,1> pair, where the relation
betwgen S and I parallels the anaphoric relation between the sentences
with empty nodes and their antecedents. If an implicature of the form
X NOT NPI Y can be generated by the semantic component from the
literal meaning of a sentence S, then the r~lation <5,1> is
well-formed. However, the the availability of this implicature
affects the appropriateness of uttering S, just as the availability of
124
(39)(a) affects the approprlateness of uttering (39)(b), regardless of
the wel1-formedness of the discourse (39).
Obviously the availability of an appropriate implicature does not
hinge upon its having been uttered previously in some discourse.
Rather, I will argue (as a first step toward a theory of part (b»
that this implicature is available if and only if it is part of what
the speaker is using S to convey.
To illustrate this distinction between semantic well-formedness
of the <5,1> pair and the availability of 5 for utterance, let us
consider sentences (8)(a) and (b), repeated below as (42)(a) and
(43)(a), with their implicatures (42)(b) and (43){b) generated by the
semantic component.
(42)(a) Cows fly more often than he lifts a finger to help.
(b) If it's rare for cows to fly, then he almost never
lifts a finger to help.
(43)(a)*The sun rises more often than he lifts a finger
to help.
(b) If it's rare for the sun to rise, then he almost
nevar lifts a finger to help.
Both (42)(a) and (43)(a) are members of a well-formed <5,1> pair, but
(43)(a) sounds unacceptable. (I will mark 'unavailable' sentences
with '.' as well as semantically ill-formed sentences.) Perhaps th~s
is because, given the non-rarity of sunrises, (43)(b) is YninfQLm~!i~~
as a result of the falseness of the antecedent clause. That is, it is
uninformative in the way that it would be uninformative to say 'If
pianos are bread and the White House is bacon, we can make a BLI out
of two pianos and the White House.' P-->Q is trivially true when the
8
antecedent is false, and it is th~ consequent that is the licensing
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implicature. In contrast, the implicature a~sociated with (42)(a) is
informative since the antecedent clause is true. Thus (42){a) ;s
appropriately uttered because the implicdture which licenses the NPI
is informative enough that we m~ght expect (42)(a) to be used to
convey it. Inc0 nt r as t , the 1ice nsin 9 i Inp1 i cat ur e (43) ( b) iss0
uninformative that it is unlikely that (43)(a) would be used to convey
such an empty message.
Of course. what is relevant is whether the implicatures (42)(b)
and (43)(b) are likely to be regarded as informative (and hence worth
conveying) by the .s.J2~.ak.!!r:: so if the speaker is known to think that
cows fly often and that the sun alenost never rises, the judqmen t s of
acceptability should be reversed.
Thus--to repeat--the appropriateness of uttering (42)(a) or
(43)(a) is not fixed for onC6 and for all.
Note that in this account there are many semantically well-formed
<S.I> pairs containing sentenc~s which will never be Jppl'opriately
uttered. Thus the <S.I> pair generated for (43)(a) is wall-formod.
but (43)(a) is unlikely ever to be appropriately uttered as a member
of the <S,I> pair with the implicature as in (43){c). Every sentence
with an HPJ is a member of at least one semantically well-formed <5,1>
pair, since every propositio~ entails its double negation. Similarly.
every sentence wi th a VP of the form !Ii!! .122 is a member of a
semantically well-formed discourse with (44) below as an antecedent
although such a discourse is unlikely to occur.
(44) I saw a unicorn wearing a jumpsuit.
So we must speak of semantic well-formedness of <S,I> pairs rather
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than of the sentences themselves. (Or alternatively we can speak of
the well-formedness of certain occurences of a sentence S, as
distinguished from the well-formedness of S itself (the type) and from
the appropriateness of certain utterances of S (tokens). Otherwise we
would have to say that every sentence with an NPI is semantically
well-formed, since there is such a <S,I> pair where the implicature is
its double nsqat ton (the 'unava t Iab t l t ty ' of which will be discussed
in the following section).
Recall from section 4.2 that the C'ppropriate implicature must be
in some way generab1e from the literal meaning of a sentence S. 'his
falls out of the theory jus~ proposed. The semantic well-formedness
a f acceptab 1epa r t (b) sen ten ce s wit h NPIs i s we11- for Ine dne s s as a
member of a pair <S,I> generated by the semantic component. If the
semantic component can generate no implicature of the form X NOT NP' Y
(ignoring implicatures such as NOT NOT S since they never turn out to
be available) then the <5,1> pair will be ill-formed, just as a
discourse consisting of (39)(b) and no antecedent is ill-formed.
This is exactly parallel to the widely noted unacceptability of a
non-linguistic antecedent for VP anaphora; that is. one cannot
appropriately point to a pile of broken dishes and say 'No. I didn 9 t ' .
In the following section the question of the "ava t f ab t l t ty ' of
appropriate implicat~res (and hence the availability of S for
utterance) will be explored further.
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4.6 'AVAILABILITY'
Sinca, as noted in the preceding section, every sentence with an
NPI belongs to at least one semantically well-formed <S,I> pair where
the licensing implicature is the double negation of S (just as every
sentence of the form NP.t!l! A. 122 belongs to a semantically
well-formed discourse with 'I saw a unicorn wearing a jumpsuit' as
antecedent), it is clear that the 'availability' of the implicature
plays a major role in part (b). That is, every sentence with an NPI
has at least one well-formed Q&~Ur~n&~ (in the <S,I> pair where the
implicature is the double negation of S) but there are many such
slntences which will never be appropriately uttered (i.e., which have
no acceptable tokens). In this section I will consider four ways in
which a sentence S sounds unacceptable (i.e. appears, in isolation,
to be unlike~y ever to be appropriately uttered) because although it
is a member of a semantically well-formed pair <S,I> this implicature
is not available.
Recall that '.' is used here to mark not only syntactically or
semantically ill-formed sentences but also sentences which appear
unlikely ever to be appropriately uttered.
In section 4.5.1 I will consider cases whero the implicature is
unavailable because it is not likely to be believed by the speaker to
be true (whether it is explicitly denied by the speaker or so widely
believed to be false that the speaker is assumed to share in this
general belief); in section 4.6.2, cases where the implicature is
unavailable because it is a presupposition of S or otherwise too much
'background' to be part of what the speaker is using S to convey; in
section 4.6.3, cases (such as the one discussed above) where the
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implicature is unavailable because it is uninformative and therefore
an unlikely message for a speaker to be using S to convey; and in
section 4.5.4, other cases where the appropriate implicature is
generated by the semantics but is insufficiently 'avallable' for S to
be appropriately uttered.
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4.6.1 IMPLICATURE UNAVAILABLE BECAUSE DENIED BY SPEAKER
Consider the following sentences.
(46)(a) I'm not going to Texas because I have any friends there.
(b) I don't have any frionds there.
(e) I'm not going to Texas because I have friends there
(although I do) but because I like the weather.
(d)*I'm not going to Texas because I have any friends
there, although I have lots of friends in Tex~s: I'm
going for the weather.
(46)(a) She was surprised that there were any buffaloes in
the dining room.
(b) She had expected that thera wouldn't be any buffaloes
in the dining room.
(e) She was surprised that t har e were buffaloes in the
dining room, a1though she had never considered the
possibility of such an infestation.
(d).S~e was surprised that there were any buffaloes in
the dining room, although she had never considered
the possibility of such an infestation.
(47)(a) I didn't say that I would lift a finger to help you.
(b) I left open the possibility that I wouldn't lift a
finger to help you.
(c) I didn't say that I would help you, because it just
goes without saying that I always help you.
(d).I didn't say that I would lift a finger to help
you, because it just goes without saying that I
always help you.
The (a) sentences above, in which NPIs are acceptable, have, I
claim, the implicatures (b). That these implicatures are not entailed
by the (a) sentences is demonstrated by the (c) sentences, which are
not contradictory although they contain explicit denials of the
1mplicatures (b). Finally, the unacceptable Cd) sentences demonstrate
that it is by virtue of these optional implicatures (b) that the (a)
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sentences are acceptable.
So one circumstance under which the implicature may fail to be
available is if the speaker denies it: because how, in this event, can
it be part of what he is using S to convey?
Similarly, if the licensing implicature is widely believed to be
false, and the speaker assumed to share in this general belief, then
it is unavailable. Thus consider (48), cited in Williams (1975):
(48)?7Gr3ss isn't green becau~e it contains any chlorophyl.
Its unacceptability is not, I think, related to the fact that the
b!kAY~§ clause is nonmotivational (the explanation suggested by
Williams) but has to do with the widespread belief that grass does
contain chlorophyl. (48) is appropriately uttered only if the speaker
intends to convey (49). But if the s~eakar shares in the general
belief that grass contains chlorophyl, then how can he be using (48)
as a vehicle to convey (49)1 But if the speaker does have the mistaken
belief that there is no chlorophyl in grass. and if he is using (48)
to convey (49). then (48) sounds acceptable.
(49) Grass doesn't contain any chlorophyl.
Contrast (48) with (60); the licensing implicature (61) is much more
available.
(50) Grass isn't green because it contains any green paint.
(61) Grass doesn't contain any green paint.
(60) is somewhat odd, due to the
needing to convey (51),. 1.8.
unlikeliness of a speaker ever
to the unlikeliness of anyone ever
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suggesting that grass does contain green paint. But it is much better
than (48) given the much greater unlikeliness that anybody would
believe and intend to convey (49). (Again. recall that '.' and terms
like 'unacceptable' are used in this discussion only to indicate the
unlikeliness that a given utterance of S will ever be appropriate.)
So the implicature of the form X NOT NPI Y to which a sentence
containing an NPJ must allude will be unavailable if there is reason
to believe that the speaker does not believe it to be true.
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4.5.2 IMPLICATURE UNAVAILABLE BECAUSE 'BACKGROUND'
In this section I will consider unacceptable sentences for which
the only plausible licensing implicature is too much 'background' to
be available as a member of the <S,I> pair.
Consider first sentences whose implicatures of the form
X NOT NPI Yare presuppositions (either logical or pragmatic). If the
implicature is a presupposition of S, it is unlikely to be part of
what the speaker is using S to convey: that is because it will be
inappropriate (speaking quite loosely here) to utter S in the first
place if this presupposition is not believed by speaker and hearer to
be true. So presuppositions of S tend not to be available to license
NPIs. Consider (52)-(56) below.
(52) (a) [':en John has been there.
(b) ASSERTION:
John has been there.
(e) PRESUPPOSITION:
John is the person who is most likely not to have
been there.
~d).Even John has ever been there.
(63)(a) Only John has been there.
(b) ASSERTION:
Anyone who is not John has not been there.
(c) PRESUPPOSITION:
John has been there.
(d) Only John has ever been there.
(54)(8) He accused me of contributing to the Moonies.
(b) ASSERTION:
He claimed that I contributed to the Moonies.
(c) PRESUPPOSITION:
Appropriate behavior for me was to not contribute to
the Moonies.
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(d).He accused me of contributing anything to the Moonies.
(66)(a) He criticized me for contributing to the Moonies.
(b) ASSERTION:
He said that I ought to have not contributed to the
Moonies.
(c) PRESUPPOSITION:
I contributed to the Moonies.
(d) He criticized me for contributing anything to the
Moonies.
Let us follow Horn (1969) and Fillmore (1971) respectively and
say that the distinction between ~~~n and Qnl~, alld between a~~u~§ and
~£i1ikili. is that i~in and A~~U~~ have presuppositions the form
X NOT NPI Y while it is the assertions involving Qnl~ and &Lili&i~i
that are of the form X NOT HPI V. Since Qnl~ and ~£ili~i~~ license
NPls, and ~~~n and A~&U~! do not, they confirm our hypothesis that the
I of an <5,1> pair will not be available if it is a presupposition
(taking presupposition to include shared assumptions, etc.) of S.
Of course. it is possible to introduce new information into a
discourse by treating it as presupposition. 'He has stopped
embezzling company funds' can be said as a way of introducing into the
discourse the fact that he was embezzling in the past. Sentences
whose NPls are to be licensed by a presupposition are improved if
there ;s some device that calls attention to the presupposition
itself, making it more available. Thus At l§~~! in (66)(b) below
calls attention to the negative presupposition. {The difference 1n
acceptability between (66)(b) and (c)--i.e. the lesser likelihood
that (66)(c) will ever be appropriately uttered--is perhaps beLaUse
people are less likely to accuse one another of never having been to
Istanbul than of having been remiss in lovs. Given a context in which
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accusations of never having been to Istanbul were flying fast and
thick, (66)(c) might be expected to sound more acceptable.)
(56)(a).Vou should prAtend that you have ever loved me.
(b) You should at least PRETEND that you have ever loved me.
(c).Vou should at least PRETEND that you have ever been
to Istanbul.
Next consider sentences which entail the only plausible! for an
<S,I> pair but do not seem to be likely vehicles for conveying it:
(57)(a)-He DID NOT lift a finger to help.
(b) LF: NOT TRUE (he lifted a finger to help)
(c) I: NOT (he lifted a finger to help)
Here, the I of the <5,1> pa i r is entailed by the maani nq of the LF,
but the purpose of uttering (57) is not so much to convey that 'he did
not lift a finger to help' as to convey that some previous statement
was false. One would be unlikely to introduce the information that
'he did not lift a finger to help' by means of such a m~ta11nguistic
denial. That is, one would be unlikely to introduce the fact that a
panda bear had mysteriously appeared on Mass. Ave. by uttering (68):
(58) A panda bear IS NOT walking down Mass. Ave.
Similarly, consider (69).
(69)(a).Everybody didn't budge.
(b) NOT [Ax: x is a person] (x bUdged)
(c) I: There was someone who didn't budge.
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Again, this I of the <5,1> pair can be inferred from the literal
meaning of (59)(a) with LF (59)(b) but does not seem available: that
is. (59)(a) seems like an odd way to introduce (59)(c). Perhaps this
has to do with the flavor of denial associated with A NOT-->NOT A
readjusted sentences. Cont~ast (59)(a) with (60). which ha~ not
undergone this readjustment rule since NOT A is the surface order: it
seems more plausible as a way of introducing (59)(c), with the result
that the NPI sounds better in it.
(60)?Not everybody budged.
So we have seen in this section that for a sentence S to be
construed as the member of an <5.1> pair licensing NPIs in S, the
implicature must be part of what the speaker is using S to convey_
Presuppos~tions ana certain entailments may therefore be unavailable
as Is of such <5,1> pairs.
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4.6.3 CASES WHERE THE IMPLICATURE IS 'UNINFORMATIVE'
As discussed in connection with (42) and (43) above, sometimes
the licensing implicature may be unavailable because it is
uninformative. Consider also the following sentences, in the reading"
in which ENOUGH is in the scope of negation (and thus causes the ISC
to be violated): this reading is paraphrased in (61)(b) and (62)(b).
(The readings of (61)(a) and (62)(a) in which ENOUGH has wide scope
with respect to NOT are of course acceptable, as discussed in Chapter
3. )
(61)(a) He doesn't give a damn about enough people to
qua 1 i fy him as a member of the human race.
(b) 'There aren't enough people whom he cares about
to qualify him as a member of the human race.'
(c) I: There are enough people whom he doesn't give a
damn about to disqualify him as a member of the
race.
(62)(a).He doesn't give a damn about enough people to
qualify him for s a tn thood .
(b) 'There aren't enough people whom he cares about
to qualify him for sainthood.'
(c) I: There are enough people whom he doesn't give a
damn about to disqualify him from sainthood.
As with (42) and (43), the licensing implicature of the unacceptable
sentence turns out to be uninformative. One might have to feel
concern for the whole human race in order to be a saint, so the
implicature (62)(c) associated with (62)(a) doesn't indicate whether
he cares about many people or about few people. The implicature
. ,
, '
associated with (61), by contrast, is more informative since one can
care about almost nobody and still be regarded as properly socialized:
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so if one cares about less than this minimal set, one has to care
about very few people.
Thus we have another example of two sentences both of which have
well-formed occurences as members of <5,1> pairs. but only ana of
which is likely ever to be appropriately uttered; the unacceptable
(62)(a) is associated with an 1 that is too uninformative to be
available, i.e. to be part of what (62)(8) is being used to convey.
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4.5.4 OTHER CASES WHERE THE IMPLICATURE IS UNAVAILABLE
In this section I will take note of two other cases where the
acceptability of a sentence depends not upon the ability of the
semantics to g&nerate an appropriate <S,I> pair but upon the
'availability' of this I.
Consider (64) and (65) below. As noted by Lakoff (1969), NPIs
tend to be unacceptable in promises but acceptable in threats.
(64)(a) If you contribute a red cent to the Moonies, I'll
hit you. (THREAT)
(b) I: Don't contribute a red cent to th~ Moonies.
(e) I: .Contribute a red cent to the Moonies.
(65)(a).lf you contribute a red cent to the Moonies, I'll
reward you. (PROMISE)
(b) I: .Contribute a red cent to the Naonies.
(e) I: Don't contribute a red cent to the Maahias.
Statements of the form 'P-->Q' can be construed as either promises or
threats on the basis of their structure as conditionals. If Q is
something desirable to the addressee, then it may ba that 'P-->Q' can
be construed as a promise; if Q is something undesirable to the
addresses, then it may be that 'P-->Q' can be construed as a threat.
A promise can be seen as an imperative 'PI', a threat as an imperative
'NOT PI' Thus NPIs are acceptable in threats, since they have the
implicature 'NOT PI' but not in promises, since they have the
implicature 'PI' All of this, it seems to me, can be determined
without reference to real world beliefs; that is. the semantics
generates for (64) and (66) both the (b) and the (e) implicatures.
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What does hinge on the real world is the beliefs of the speaker about
the desirability of Q to the addressee. In sentence (65), Q ('I'll
reward you') is something generally desirable, so (65)(a) is hard to
construe as a threat, i.e. the implicature (65)(c) is hdrd to
l~sociate with (65)(a). The implicature (65)(b) is more available.
I .
By contrast, the negative implicature (64)(b) is much more availAble
for (64)(a), since Q ('I'll hit you') is undesirable to most people.
Lakoff observes that sentences like (65)(a) would be acceptable if
spoken by someone who believed that being rewarded was undesirable to
the addressee--in that case, the speaker would in fact be using
(65)(a) to convey (65)(c).
What about if clauses in general? Although they usually tolerate
most NPIs, NPI acceptability is somewllat squishy and seems to
correlate, for reasons that are not clear to me, with the naturalne~s
of a paraphrase of the form 'NOT-P OR Q'. That is, although P-->Q
entails NOT-P-->NOT-Q and thus we might expect NPIs in both the
antecedent and the consequ~nt clauses of sentences with if, it appears
that NOT-P OR Q is the relevant implicature. When it is available--as
evidenced by the naturalness of the paraphrase--then NPIs seem to be
acceptable in the antecedent clause.
(66)(a) If you give a flying fuck about the whales, you'll
contribute.
(b) Either you don't give a flying fuck about the whales
or you will contribute.
(67)(a)71If you give a flying fuck about the whales, you
must be George Smith.
(b) Either you don't give a flying fuck about the
whales or you are George Smith.
Finally, considAr negated h~~~u~~ clauses.
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A sent~nce of the
; "
form 'NOT CAUSE (P,Q)' can fail to be true for many reasons: P and Q
can both be true but the assertion of the causal relatlon false; or
either P or Q can be false. When the causal relation is expressed by
~i'AYi~, i.e. when the sentence is of the form 'NOT (Q because P)', Q
tends to be (not necessarily logically) presupposed: that is, the
sentence tends to be taken as a denial that it was P that caused Q.
The possibility of an implicature NOT-P is therefore stronger in such
sentences than the possibility of an implicature NOT-Q. Thus NPIs are
much more frequently acceptable in the lexical representation of P
9
when the causal connection is expressed by h~&~Y~~.
(68)(a) I aidn"t help her because she's ever lifted a
finger to help me.
W~TH READING: NOT CAUSE (P, Q) and with the
emphasis 'Q not because P'
'It wasn't because she's ever lifted a finger
to help Ina that I helped her.'
(b) I: She has neVAr lifted a fin~er to help me. (NOr P)
(69}(a)*I didn't lift a finger to help her because she's
helped me.
wITH READING: NOT CAUSE {P, Q), and with the
emphasis 'P had no result Q'
(~) I: I didn't lift a finger to help her. (NOT Q)
Notice, however, that a sentence of the form 'NOT (Q because P)'
can sometimes have the emphasis 'P has no result Q': consider the
sentencos in (70) below: the NOT Q implicature licenses an NPI in
10
(70)(a) but not in (70)(c). The lesser availability of such a
readings makes NPIs l~ss likely to be acceptable in Q.
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(70)(a) I haven't won any awards because I'm careful.
(b) 'My carefulness has won me no awards.'
(c)*I didn't budy~ when they evacuated because I'm
careful.
(d) 'My carefulness didn't lead me to join in the
evacuation. '
If the causal relation is expressed by L~~Yl! in, for example,
the relative availability of the implicatures NOT P and NOT Q are
reversed.
(71)(a) All that flattery didn~t result in my contrihuting
one red cent to hi~ campaign. NOT CAUSE (P,Q)
(b) I: I didn't contribute one red cent to his
camp~lgn. (NOT Q)
(C).:liS flattering me any did not result in my
contrlbuting to his campaign. NOT CAUSE (P,Q)
(d) I: He didn't flatter me any. (NOT P)
(71)(a) and (c) both have the structure NOT CAUSE(P,Q), where
P=flattery and Q=contribution. In th-is case, the implicature NOT Q is
quite available and NPIs are acceptable in Q, as demon s t r et ed by
(71)(a). By contrast, the implicature NOT P is unavailable and, as
(71)(c) demonstrates, NPls are not generally acceptable in P. Thus
the 'availability' of a given implicature is affected by the
particular lexical it9ms which express the causal relation.
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SUMMARY OF SECTION 4.6
I have suggested in this section that the acceptability of a
sentence S which fails the ISC cannot be determined in isolation: that
is, we cannot speak of the well-formedness of S considered as a tlQ~.·
Rather, we can only speak of the well-formedness of given Q~&UL~n~~ of
S in an <S,I> pair, where I is an implicature of the form X NOT NPI Y
generated from the literal meaning of S by the semantics. The
acceptability of a given 12k~n, i.e. a particular utterance of S,
depends not only on the well-formedness of S in an <5,1> pair but also
on the avaii~bility of this 1. Thus, for example, any sentence of the
form P-->Q has the possibility of being construed as a t~reat, i.e.
as a command 'NOT-PI' Thus any sentence of the form 'P-->Q' is a
member of an <5,1> pair generated by the somantics, in which the
representation of any NPI in P is in the immediate scope of NOT. But
the appropriateness of a given utterance of S depends upon whether or
not S can be construed as a member of an <5,1> pair; unless toe
speaker believes that Q is undesirable, allowing S to be construed as
a threat, this I will simply be unavailable and the utterance of S
will be inappropriate.
In this section we have seen that the licensing implicature may
fail to be available for a number of reasons: (1) the speaker
explicitly denies its truth or can be expected not to believe that it
is true; (2) it is a presupposition of S or otherwise too
'background'; (3) it is simply 'uninformative' and therefore unlikely
to be what the speaker is using S to convey; (4) it is un~vailable due
to real world factors such as the expected belief of the speaker 1n
the desirability of 0 in sentences of the form 'P-->Q', which makes
them unlikely vehicles for threats.
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4.6 PART (8) AND SENTENCE GRAMMAR
In the preceding sections I have suggested that the
appropriateness of uttering a sentence containing NPIs is determined
not only by structural properties such as 'immediate scope' but by
inference and by beliefs about the real world. This inability of the
part (b) cases to be captured by 11nguistic rule has sometimes been
cited as evid&nce that the line between linguistic knowledge and other
systems of knowledge has been drawn too narrowly. and that linguistic
knowledge cannot even be characterized without refel~ence to other
kinds of knowledge. Lakoff (1972), for example, makes the following
observations about Baker's conjecture:
For linguistics. its consequences are remarkable, since it
claims that the ~i~!riRU!iQn Qf mQLQhgmg~ (e.g., 'would
rather') is determined not simply by which other elements
and structures are present in the same sentence, or even in
a transformational derivation of that sentence, but in
addition by logical equivalences. . .. Baker's conjecture
would, if correct ... show that there was a relation between
gralnmat;cality and logical equ i va l ence .
NPIs have thus been used as arguments that grammatical rules require
reference to logical
11
presupposition.
equivalence; or, in lakoff (1969), to
Similarly, Hintikka (1977) examines the behavior of an~ and
concludes that it represents a counterexample to the thesis of the
autonomy of syntax (not to mention to generative gralnmar itself).
In the any-thesis [his proposed rule for the occurence of
Inx]. the syntactic acceptability or unacceptability of
certain (putative) sentences is explained by reference to
their semantical properties. This is in sharp contrast to
all approaches to grammar in which the syntactical component
is independent of the semantical one.
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(His any-thesis is a variant of the analysis of anx as a
universal quantifier whose distribution can be predicted on the basis
of its interaction with g~~L~. In the following chapter I will
present arguments against such an analysis.)
This expectation that the distribution of specific words be
syntactic and predicted by linguistic rule has been expressed in the
linguistic literature not only in connection with NPIs but also in
connection with selection restrictions. Initially, it was proposed
that selection restrictions block insertion of words into
inappropriate contexts; in (72), iQm~1Q~~ would simply not be
insertable into the environment 'John translated the
(72) John translated the tomatoes.
(73) John ate the tomatoes.
Jackendoff (1972) demonstrates the difficulties associated with this;
in particulur, sentences like (74) would be (incorrectly) blocked.
(14) It's nonsense to say that John translated the tomatoes.
He proposed instead that a violation of selection restrictions simply
results in a sentence's being marked as anomalous.
As has often been noted, sentences in which such violations occur
can frequently have reasonable interpretations; (72), for example,
might be appropriate in the event that the tomatoes were carved with
elaborate inscriptions; or perhaps John came home to find his living
room knee deep in tomatoes: when he finally determined the reason for
this he might be said to have 'translated the tomatoes', especially if
they were the work of some friend given to operating in mysterious and
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symbolic ways. (Of course, this kind of interpretation may be
necessary even when selection restrictions aren't violated: 'John
tripped on the tomatoes' might be used to convey the fact that John
finally came to grief in some situation involving tomatoes.)
But surely it is not part of a speaker's linguistic competence to
'fit' each sentence to the real world; his linguistic competence
simply p~ovides him with a literal meaning whose relevancG to the
world he must determine non-linguistically.
Bolinger (1960) suggested that the constraints on NPIs should be
classed along with selection restrictions in the 'idiom grammar', in
contrast to the syntactic rules of the 'transform grammar'; that is,
that the unacceptability of sentences like (75) and (76) is a function
of 'idiom' grammar, while the unacceptability of (77) is a function of
'transform grammar':
(76).John ate any peas.
(76) John disproved the peas.
(77).John were eaten the peas.·
The parallel between the NPI rule and selection 1'9strictions is
suggestive. Selection restrictions might be thought of as analogous
to part (a), specifying the 'pdradigm' case of the occurenC9 of a
~ord. (Thus the 'paradigm case' of the environment in which l!~n~lA!i
occurs is with seme sort of linguistic entity as object.) When the
literal meaning of a sentence does not satisfy the selection
restrictions of all of its components. then it must be construed in
some way that leads these select ton restrictions to be met. Thus
sentence (72), which d08S~'t meet the selection restrictions for
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1[~n~lAl~, can be construed in various ways: the object of l!~n~l~i~
can be taken to be not the entire fruit, but writing on the surface of
the fruit: or lQmA1Q~~ can be taken to rarer to the situation of
tomatoes in the living room which can itself be seen as analogous to
sorne t h i ngin a for e i 9n 1an 9uage, i Ii need 0 f t ran 5 1at ion. Thus from
the literal meaning of (72) we can in some way that is surely not a
part of our strictly linguistic competence derive some additional
interpretations of (72) in which the selection restrictions on
'translate' are met. This is of course parallel to part (b) of
Baker's rule for NPIs.
Part (a) of the NPJ rule and selection restrictions, then, may be
thought of as representing the paradigm case; when these restrictions
are not met it is necessary to recast the sentence 50 as to furnish
this paradgmatic environment.
NPIs are not the only expressions which occur outside of a
paradigm environment defined upon some level of linguistic
representation (IF in the case of NPIs) and by their presence force
the sentence in which they occur to 'allude to' another sentence.
In (78) below the presence of Qll gA£ih forces one to take the
sentence as insinuating (79), a direct question. If other aspects of
the sentence are incompatable with such an insinuation, the expression
2n IA£lh will be unacceptable. In (80), for example, the wh-clause
can't be taken as an indirect question and thus can't allude to a
direct question. (81) suggests that it is not enough for Qn iArih to
occur 1n an indirect question; there must be a direct question implied
by the speaker.
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(78) A descr;ption of what on earth he's doing would sure
come in handy.
(79) What on earth is he doing?
(80)*A description of what on earth he's doing was
published in the GIQ~§ yesterday.
(81)*Everyone knows what on earth the squere of 2 is.
Another 'displaced' expression forces the 'insinuation' of commands:
(82) We'll be more comfortable when we get the hell out
of this place.
(83) let's get the hell out of this placel
(84)??When the cell gets the hell out of the precancerous
stage ...
(82) seems to imply (83), while (84), which is unlikely to have such
an implied command, cannot contain lhi bill. 'Command' is perhaps too
strong: in (B5), the implication seems to be roughly as in (86):
(85) They'll be more comfortable once they get the hell
out of here.
(86) They should get the hell out of here.
Thus NPIs, question 6xpressions such as wh- Qn §ar1h. and command
expressions such as lbi hill all seem to be able to have the effect,
when they occur outside their paradigmatic environment. of forcing one
to see the sentence in which they ~ccur as 'alluding to' some other
sentence which furnishes their paradigm environment. The paradigm
environment in all cases is defined on some level of linguistic
representation. e.g. after NOT 1n IF. in a direct question, in an
imperative. etc.
(1975).
These and similar cases are discussed in Sadock
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I n summary, the reca 1c i trance of the part (b) cases to
grammatical description does not argue for an enlargement of the
grammar to contain, e.g., a theory of entailment or, much worse,
theories of conventional and conversational implicature. Such a move
would be analogous to incorporating into the grammar a theory of
metaphor, since such a theory is necessary to account for the
distribution of lexical items in general.
.. , .
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4
The variety of contexts in which NPIs are acceptable has been of
great interest to linguists. Probably because of the sensitivity of
NPIs to their surface structure relation to negation, it has been'
widely assumed that their distribution must be accounted for within
sentence grammar and perhaps within syntax. Thus the part (b) cases
have been used to argue for the inclusion into sentence grammar of
whatever machinery is required to capture them.
I have argued in this chapter for the analysis of part (b) first
proposed in Baker (1970): that the primary trigger is NOT, in tne
immediate scope of which an NPI is expected to occur; and that all
other sentences containing NPIs are acceptable only if they can be
construed as alluding to a proposition in which whose representation
their NPJ is appropriately triggered. Thus we cannot determine for
once and for all the we11-formedness of a sentence like (87) below,
considered as a 1XRi; we can only determine the well-formedness of
particular Q~kY£in&il of it. If it occurs as a member of an <S,I>
pair with an implicature such as (88)--that is, if it 'alludes' to
(88)--then that occurence of it is semantically well-formed. If this
implicature is part of what the speaker is using S to convey, then the
implicature is 'available' and this utterance (i.e. 12t~n) of S is
appropriate since S can be construed as a member of the well-formed
pair <5.1>.
(87) I didn't stay because I had any friends there.
(88) I didn't haVE any friends there.
151
In a sense there is a parallel between this 'allusion' and
discourse anaphora such as VPD. In both cases, we can speak of a pair
<b,a> and of a relation of similarity or identity between band a. In
the case of NPIs, R is the sentence containing the untf'iggered NPI and
~ is the licensing implicature: in the case of VPD, Q is the sentence
with the 'deletion' and A is the sente~ce in the discourse to whose VP
the VP of h is anaphorically related. The well-formedness of R cannot
be established in isolation; only the well-formedness of particular
occurences of it can be determined. There are several additional
similarities betwoen part (b) and VPD.
First. ~ must be a linguistic entity. In the ca~e of NPIs. this
means that the negative implicature cannot be furnished exclusively by
context: this was demonstrated in section 4.2; in the case of VPD,
this mea~s, for example, that one cannot point to a pile of broken
dishes and say 'No, I didn't.'
Second, there are constraints on what is a well-formed <b,a>
pair. That is, (89) is not an appropriate discourse and (gO)(a) is
~ot generable from the meaning of (90)(b):
(89)(a) It's twelve o'clock.
(b) Yes, it did.
(90)(a) John doesn't have any friends there.
(b)-John said that he has any friends there.
And third, as demonstrated in section 4.6. the 'availability' of
A affects the appropriateness of uttering k quite apart from the
semantic well-formedness of the <b,8> pair.
Needless to say, there are great problems associated with this
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analysis. How are the appropriate implicatures generated by the
semantics? We have seen that the implicatures which license NPIs are
in many cases not logically entailed: for example. ~YrRri~g~ !ha1 S
cannot be said to entail ~~Qg~l tha! NO! S. but it was demonstrated in
section 4.5.1 that this is the implicature which licenses NPIs in the
complement of ~Y£Q£i~~. Also, the characterization of the licensing
implicature as X NOT NPI Y is clearly much too weak. And what are the
implicatures associated with questions? 'Availability' remains to be
characterized: it is unclear whether or not it can be worked out
entirely in terms of Gricean maxims.
A question also arises as to whether part (a) can be treated as a
subcase of part (b). That is, can we say that all acceptable
sentences with NPIs are acceptable by virtue of occurence in an <S,I>
pair and that the <S,I> pairs which the part (a) sentences occur in
have the property that this I is simply the LF of 51
The difficulties associated with this analysis of part (b) as an
allusion to the triggering environment have led to other analyses of
part (b) in which negation is not the primary trigger. One such
analysis, that of Ladusaw (1979), is argued in Chapter 6 to be
untenable. Thus I believe that the 'derivative generation' analysis
proposed here is at least in the r~qht ball park, although it is, so
far, wildly unconstrained. However, as discussed in section 4.6,
determining the appropriateness of an NPJ in a given sentence does not
seem to be any more an obligation of the grammar than determining the
appropriateness of a given metaphor.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Horn (1970) on the varying 'strength' of NPIs.
2. I will assume that NPIs in NPs headed by indefinites are treated
in the same way. Such constructions provide one of the few examples
of NPIs preceding and commanding (although not c-commanding) ftQi in
surface structure:
(i)(a) Tickets to any of the afternoon concerts
were not available.
(b) Tickets were not available to any of the
afternoon concerts.
(ii){a)*Tickets to any of the afternoon concerts
were not green.
(b)*Tickets were not green to any of the afternoon
concerts.
The (a) sentences demonstrate, as far as I can tell, that NPIs in such
NPs are acceptable only in negated 'presentation' sentences (see
Gueron (1978», i.e. in sentences which simply introduce the
existence (or lack thereof) of the subject into the discourse. Only
presentation sentences, Guaron claims, allow the PP extraposition that
(i)(a) but not (ii)(a) may undergo (as demonstrated by the (b)
sentences) so this may be the relevant difference.
3. Perhaps i £~d ~~n! is 'detachable' here, as discussed in Chapter
3. However, there is nothing to be 'detached' in (i) below, so it's
likely that the acceptability of 16.a. cannot be explained in terms
of part (a) with the 'detached' portion of the NPI occuring in the
immediate scope of NOT.
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(i) I couldn't budge the rock with ANY of his tools.
4. This is the last that will be said hero about NPIs in questions;
they deserve fuller and more precise treatment than I can possibly
give thAm here.
5. The term 'implicature' is used here as a non~ommittal term to
include logical entailment, presupposition, conventional implicature,
etc. As will become clear in this chapter, the precise r e l a t i onsh f p
that must hold Let~een the literal mdaning of S and X NOT NPI Y
remains to be determined.
6. See Horn (1969), Fras3r (1971).
7. The 'positive presupposition' hypothesis and this argument a~ainst
it are also noted in LeGrande (1976).
8. T~e 'uninformativeness' of P-->Q where P is false joes not extend
to counterfactuals, of course.
9. I am speaking quite loosely he~e ahout the 'causal connection'.
'P because Q' has at least two quite distinct senses: (1) P actually
results in Q, or (2) the t r ut h of P allows one to conclude that Q is
true.
10. It miQht be suggested that in (70)(a) the existontial quantifier
representing Anl has wide scope with respect to CAUSE; ~uch readinys
are discussed in section 3.4.2. However, this wide scope reading has
the paraphrase (i), which does not seem to express the meaning of
(70)(a).
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(i) There was no award that I won because of my
carefulness.
11. Lakoff characterizes the difference between promises and threats
as presuppositional.
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CHAPTER 6: ON THE REPRESENTATION Of ANY
The English determiner Anx has received considerable attention by
linguists and philosophers, focussing on the question of whether it
can be said to have the same meaning in (1) and (2) below.
(1) John didn't do anything.
(2) John can do anything.
Quine (1960) argued for a univocal analysis of the an~ found in
negative contexts (polarity Anx) and that found with modals
(free-choice ~n~): in both cases An~ is to be represented as a
1
universal quantifier with wide scope over its trigger. Under this
apalysis, (1) and (2) are represented as in (3) and (4).
(3) Ax NOT (John di~ x) =(1)
(~) Ax POSSIBLE (John do x) =(2)
This univocal universal analysis of (hereafter, the
'A-theory') has been supported by Lasnik (1975), LeGrande (1975),
Hintikka (1977), and others. It is not, however, the only possible
analysis of ~ll~. It has also been argued that at least polarity an~
receives an existential interpretation. although it may be that
free-choice Anl is most plausibly represented by the universal
2
quantifier. Under this analysis sentence (1) is represented as in
(5).
(6) NOT Ex (John did x) =(1)
Since Ax NOT 0 (x) is logically equivalent to NOT Ex 0 (x), the
A-theory and the E-theory make truth-conditionally identical
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predictions about sentence (1). Arguments which support this analysis
(hereafter, the 'E-theory') may be found in Carlson (1980), Fauconnier
(1975), Horn (1972), Klima (1964), Ladusaw (1979), and elsewhere.
In this chapter I will argue for the E-theory, surveying some of
the arguments for this position alreauy in the literature and
proposing some additional arguments. The discussion is not intended
as an exhaustive survey of the arsenal of such arguments.
In deciding between the E-theory and the A-theory, we are
confronted by at least four basic types of arguments, each of which
will be examined in this chapter. They are, in what seems to me to be
decreasing order of importance, (1) arguments based upon the inability
of one or the other theory to capture truth conditions of sentences
containing ADl (section 5.1); (2) arguments based upon the conflict
between one or the other theory and so~e otherwise valid grammatical
rule (section 5.2); (~) arguments based upon distributional facts
(section 5.3); and (4) argl.rnents based upon the internal simplicity of
the account of An~ (saction ~.4). Section 6.5 is a discussion of
potential arguments for the E-theor) based upon contexts of the form
'g NOT'.
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5.1 ARGUMENTS BASED UPON TRUTH CONDITIONS
I will first consider arguments based upon the relative abilities
of the A-theory and the [-theory to capture the truth conditions of
sentences containing An!.
In section 6.1.1, I will argue that the A-theory is unable to
capture the truth conditions of sentences containing anx when there is
some operator or predicate 0 which is in the scope of NOT and enters
into scope ambiguities with anx; in section 5.1.2 I will take note of
the argument (widely observed) that the A-theory is unable to give
account of the meanings of sentences with verb phrase deletion.
6.1.1 '~QI I' toNlfXIS
Under the A-theory, anx is always assigned wide scope with
respect to NOT. As a result, this theory predicts that any operator
or predicate 0 that is itself in the scope of NOT will automatically
be in the scope of AnX. Under the [-theory, AnX is assigned narrow
scope with respect to NOT, and scope ambiguity between an~ .and 0 is
at least not ruled out. It will be seen below that the A-theory's
prediction of no ambiguity is incorrect.
Let 0 be a verb of propositional attitude. The A-theory
prQdicts that An~ will have to take wide scope with respect to this
predicate; that is, that only the transparent reading (7) will be
available for a sentence like (6).
(6) John doesn't believe that she knows any felons.
(7) [Ax: x is a felon] NOT (John believes that (she knows x)
'It is true of every felon that John doe~ not believe
that she knows him.'
TRANSPARENT READING. OF (6)
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The [-theory does not rule out scope ambiguity between anx f~12n~
and the belief context: that is, it does not rule out the possibility
that there is both an opaque reading (9) of (6), in which an~ f~lgn~
is in the scope of R~li~x~, and a transparent reading (8), in which
iDl has wide scope with respect to ~iliiYi.
(8) NOT [Ex: x is a felon](John believes that(she knows x»
'There are no felons whom John believes that she knows.'
TRANSPARENT READING OF (6)
(9) NOT (John believes that ([Ex: x is a felon] (she knows x»)
'John does not believe that there are felons whom
she knows.'
OPAQUE READING OF (6)
The transparent reading of (6) is captured under both analyses of
An~; (7) and (8), that is, have identical truth conditions. But only
the E-theory allows (6) to have the opaque reading, which is
represented as in (9). Without question, sentence (6) does have both
the transparent and the opaque readings. That the opaque and
"i r
I
transparent readings have different truth conditions is well-known.
Considering (6), imagine that Smith is a felon and that John believes
that she knows Smith but does not believe that Smith is a felon. In
this case the opaque reading (9) can still be true, since John can
believe both that she knows Smith and that she knows no felons; the
transparent reading «7) or (8» will be false, since there ~actually
1s a felon whom he believes that she knows.
Under the A-theory, then, Bn~ must be extracted out of the belief
context in order to take wide scope over NOT, and there is ~o way to
represent the opaque reading of sentences like (6).
3
Belief contexts are not the only examples of 'NOT 0' contexts
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1n which the A-theory will obligatorily assign aDX wide scope over 0.
4
Adverbs such as ri!il~ or ~il~Qm could also be used as examples of
0.
In a similar vein, consider unliK§l~:
(10) It ;s unlikely that anyone will be struck by lightning.
(11) [Ax: x is a person] UNLIKELY (x will be struck by lightning)
'For each person, the chances of being struck by
lightning are very small.'
(12) UNLIKELY [Ex: x is a per50n] (x will be struck by lightning)
'It is unlikely that there will be 5umeone who is
struck by lightning.'
(13).UN [Ex: x is a person] LIKELY (x will be slruck by lightni~g)
'There is no one who is likely to be struck by
lightning.'
5
Sentence (10) seems to have only the reading (12), in which anx
is in the scope of the entire predicate UNLIKELY. (11) and (12), of
course, are not to be collapsed: (11), but not (12), is compatible
with a situation in which it is certain that there will be someone
struck by lightning, although each person's risk is very smal'l. Not
surprisingly, there is no reading (13), equivalent to (11), in which
ADI has wide scope with respect to li~~l~: YnliKil~ would have to be
decomposed into YD plus lik~l~ in order to get this reading. The
A-theory predicts (falsely) that (11) is the representation of (10),
since AllX must take wide scope with respect to the triggering negative
element un, and hence over any 0 that is itself in the scope of
negat19n: 0 in (10) is the predicate LIKELY. The E-theory predicts
that (10) w111 have only the representation (12), (13) being ruled out
by the impossibility of lexically decomposing unlit~l~. Thus we have
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another example of a 0 over which the A-theory falsely predicts that
jn~ must take wide scope.
As a final example of a 'NOT 0' context in which the A-theory
falsely predicts that All~ has obligatorily wide scope over 0,
consider the interaction of an~ and negated quantifiers.
(14) He didn't give anything to many of his friends.
This sentence appears to be three-ways ambiguous; the three possible
readings are paraphrased in (15)-(17).
(15) 'There were many of his friends to whom he gave nothing.'
(16) 'There was no present which he gave to many friends.'
(17) 'Few of his friends received presents at all.'
The reading paraphrased in (15) is irrelevant here, since MANY h~s
wide scope with respect to NOT and hence we do not have a 'NOT 0'
context. It is the distinction between (16) and (17) that we will
consider: in both cases, MANY is negated and what varies is the
relative scope of MANY and the quantifier whose lexical representation
is ABX.
The A-theory can assign to (14) only one representation in which
MANY is n~gated: (18) below, which is paraphrased above in (16).
(18) [Ax: x ;s a present] NOT [MANYy: y is a friend] (he gave x to y)
The E-theory. since it does not require ADX to be assigned wide
scope with respect to NOT. permits (14) to be represented as in (19),
paraphrased 1n (16) above; or as 1n (20), paraphrased in (17) above).
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(19) NOT [Ex: x is a present] [MANYy: y is a friend] (he gave x to y)
(20) NOT [MANVy: y is a friend] [Ex: x is a present] (he gave x to y)
Obviously (18) and (19) have the same truth conditions. (20) ,
however, has no analogue under the A-theory, since under that analysis
An~ must have scope over NOT and hence cannot be in the scope of a
negated quantifier such as MANY in (20). (The fact that (20) results
in a violation of the Immediate Scope Constraint (which I have stated
in terms of the E-theory) is irrelevant here; as discussed in the
preceding chapter, many N~Is are acceptable ~n the environment
NOT MANY --.) So the A-theory once again fails to account for a scope
ambiguity that is clearly present.
In summary, if polarity AnI is a universal quantifier with wide
scope over NOT in contexts of the form 'NOT 0', then it is predicted
that it will e~hihit no scope ambiguity with respect to 0. This
prediction has been demonstrated to be false in sentences where 0 is
a verb of propositional attitude. a predicate such as LIKELY, or
another quantifier. The [-theory, since it represents polarity dDj as
an existential quantifier in the scope of NOT, allows for scope
ambiguity between An~ and 0.
5.1.2 VERB PHRASE DELETION
It has frequently been noted that discourses like (21) present a
problem for the A-theory:
(21)(a) He didn't see anything.
(b) I did A. though.
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Following the interpretive account of VPD in Williams (1917), let
us assume that VPD is a copying rule which fills in the empty VP node
in (21)(b) with a ~-expression copied from the LF of (21)(a).
Under the A-theory, (21)(a) receives something like the
interpretation (22); under the E-theory, something like (23).
(22) He did Ax Ay NOT (x saw y)
(23) He did ~x NOT Ey (x saw y)
(The precise location of NOT with respect to the ~-expression, and the
question of why it is not copied if it is in fact in the ~-expression,
cannot be considered here.)
The VPD argument is simply that (22), the representation for
(21)(a) provided by the A-theory, gives us no way to characterize the
meaning of (21)(b): (21)(b) clearly doe~ not have the representation
(24) below. (23), however, the representation of (21)(a) provided by
the E-theory, allows us to represent (21)(b) correctly as in (25)
below.
(24) I d;d Ax Ay (x see y)
, I saw everything. t
(26) I did Ax Ey (x see y)
, I saw someth i ng. '
So the E-theory. but not the A-theory, is able to account for the
meanings of sentences with VPD where the antecedent verb phrase
contains polarity ADJ.
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5.2 ARGUMENTS BASED UPON OTHER GRAMMATICAL RULES
In this section I will consider arguments for the E-theol'y which
are based upon the A-theory conflicting with otherwise valid
generalizations in the grammar. In section 5.2.1 I propose an"
argument based upon tag questions. Section 5.2.2 concerns arguments
in the literature that the A-theory forces AnX to be treated as an
exception to certain restrictions on quantifier scope.
5.2.1 TAG QUESTIONS
Another argument in support of the [-theory arises in connection
with tag questions. Recall from the preceding chapters that positive
tags are acceptable only if NOT ;s the operator with widest scope.
This is demonstrated by the unacceptability of a positive tag
following (26), in which ~g~i£~l has obligatorily wide scope with
respect to NOT.
(26) Several students didn't go.
(27).Several students didn't go. did they?
This fact about tag questions can be exploited for another
argument against the A-theory. Under the A-theory, (28) below should
be represented as in (29); under the E-theory, it should be
represented as in (30). Since (28) can be followed by a positive tag,
the A-theory (which assigns widest scope to An~ rather than to NOT)
would force us to abandon this otherwise unblemished generalization
about positive tag questions.
(28) He didn't eat anythfng (did he?)
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(29) Ax NOT (he ate x)
(30) NOT Ex (he ate x)
5.2.2 RULES RESTRICTING QUANTIFIER SCOPE
Ladusaw (1979) and Carlson (1980) note that quantifiers in
post-copular NPs in lD!£i-insertion sentences never take wide scope
with respect to NOT in sentences like (31)(a):
(31)(a) There aren't three unicorns in the garden.
(b) Ha didn't sea three unicorns.
THREE UNICORNS in (31)(a) must take narrow scope with respect to NOT,
although in (31)(b) it can take either wide or narrow scope with
respect to NOT. That is, (31)(a) does not have a reading as in
(32)(a) in which THREE is unnegated, ~lthough (31)(b) does have such a
reading. as in (32)(b).
(32)(a) There are three unicorns which aren't in the garden.
(b) There were three unicorns which he didn't see.
Since in~ can occur in this position, Ladusaw and Carlson
observe, the A-theory would force us to say that it is not subject to
this restriction on the scope of quantifiers occuring in such
post-copular NPs. That is, Anl in (33) has, under tho A-theory, scope
over NOT.
(33) There arGn't any unicorns in the garden.
Under the E-theory, of course, AnX in (33) has narrow scope with
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respect to NOT, so we are not forced to treat gn~ as an exception ~o
this restriction on the scope of quantifiers in sentences with
.thiL§-insertion.
Another argument based upon restrictions on quantifier scope is
found in Kayne (1979), who notes that the difference between sentences
like (34) and (35) .ies in the fact that SEVERAL can take scope over
NOT (and hence be 'extracted' from its clause) only if is not in
subject position. The acceptability of an~ in (36) would require it
to be treated as an exception to this constraint if an~ is represented
as a universal quantifier with wide scope with respect to NOT. Since
it is represented by the E-theory as taking narrow scope with respect
to NOT, the [-theory does not conflict with Ka1ne's (perhaps shaky but
generally correct) generalization.
(34)(a) He doesn't think that she knows several of his friends.
(b) NOT (he thinks that([SEVERALx: X61his friends) (she knows x»)
'He doesn't think "she knows severcl'J of Iny friends".'
(c) [SEVERALx: x~£his friend~ NOT (he thinks that she knows x)
'There are several of his friends whom he doesn't
think she knows.'
(35)(a) He doesn't think that several of his friends
know her.
(b) NOT (he thinks that ([SEVERALx:xE-fhis friends]Hx knows her»)
'He doesn't think "several of my friends know her".'
(e) NOT AVAILABLE?
[SEVERALx: x~ihis friend~ NOT (he thinks that (x knows her»
'There are several of his friends whom ho doesn't
think know her.'
(36) He doesn't think that anyone knows her.
Thus we have seen two cases where the A-theory forces us to treat
AnJ as an exception to re~trictions on quantifier scope.
f
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5.3 DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Horn (1972) and Fauconnier (1975) have observed var~ous
similarities and differences between polarity ~n~ and free-choice any
with respect to the lexical items which can co-occur with them. These
distributional facts have been used to argue for both the A--theory and
the E-theory.
In favor of the A-theory, it has been noted that g! ~ll and
wh~!}gg~§£ can occur with both AllXS, as (37) and (38) demonst:ate.
(37) He can doIanything at all.
lanything whatsoever.
(38) He didn'tfdo anything at all.
~nything whatsoever.
Descrihing the distribution of these two expressions would obviously
be simpler if we could treat the two an~s in a unified way.
But this approach cuts both ways. In favor of the E-theory.
expressions like jY~i, ~y~glY!§ll. and ~lm2~! have been cited: they
occur with free-choice An~ but not with polarity anl.
(39) He can eat absolutely anything.
(40).He didn't eat absolutely any peas.
Another argument against the A-theory based upon dist.'ibutional
facts is proposed by Horn (1972), based upon lh~L~-insertion.
(41)(a) Some people wero in the outer ~ffic8.
(b) There wer6 some people in the outer office.
(42)(a) Everybody was in the outer office.
(b).There was everybody 1n the outer offico.
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(43)(a) I don't think that anybody was in the outer office.
(b) I don't think that there was anybody ~n the outer office.
(44)(a) I think that he can do anything.
(b)*I think that there is anything that he can do.
inappropriate with
universal quantifiar,
Sentences (41) and (42) suggest th~t lb~L§-insertion is
lexical items which lexically represent the
and appro~riate with lexical items whic~
lexically represent the e~istential quantifier. In se~tences (43) and
(44) we see that !h~L~-~nsertion is appropriate only with polarity
.an,X. not with f re e -cho t ce illl~. Under the E-theory this follows f r om
the partiality of l~g£~-insert~on to existential contexts.
Howe'tJer, LeGrande (J975) poirts out that in sante ..ces like (44)
the lh~L~-insertion construction separates anx from its trigg6r, i.e.
the rno da 1 ~.an : t hies i tis not c 1ear t hat the rea son for the
una~ceptability of (44) is the semantic inappropriateness of
ihgri-insertion with universals. This is quite a plausible objection:
recall frum Chapter 3 that there is an Irnmediate SCOp€ Constraint for
fre6 t..:hoice aDX.
LeGrande suggests that ~~n cannot be raise~ into lh~r~ i~
clausos. But in fact there seem to be acceptfiole cases of lli~C~-
insertion with univers~l·~. including free choice ~n~:
(45) There could be ANYBODY in the outer office.
(46) There could be every major entomologist in the country
at that meeting.
So the diilrlhu112nil
.th.iU-1nsertion does not
argument for the E-theory based
seem to go through. although
011
the
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Carlson/ladusaw argument discussed in section 5.2.2 is unaffected by
these facts.
Thus there are distributional arguments for and against the two
theories. It seems to me that it is easier to explain why the two
~n)S share certain expressions like a! all than it is to explain why
they fail to share others. The explanation for their shared
co-occurring expl'essions may lie in the fact that A and E correspond
to 'scalar endpoints', as discussed by Fauconnier (1975): it may be
that the distribution of At jll is to be characterized as 'associated
with expressions denoting scalar endpoints' rather than 'associated
with universals'.
to· . ,";."
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5.4 ARGUMENTS BASED UPON SIMPLICITY
The A--theory, of course, has simplicity to offer. If we say that
~n~ lexically represents two distinct quantifiers A and E, we are left
with the following questions: (1) Why do A and E share this lexical
representation? It is obviously not a coincidence in the way that it
is coincidental that Q~n denotes either a writing instrument or a
fenced area. (2) Why are the <SS,LF> pairs associated with sentences
containing either free choice or NPI all~ unacceptable (in the paradigm
case) if the representation of ~n~ in LF fails to be immediately
adjacent to a 'trigger'? That is, not only do the two anxs share the
requirement that they be imm~~i~l~lJ adjacent to some logical element
in LF, they seem to be the only quantifier(s) that have to be
'triggered' at all.
Navertheless, despite this compelling evidence that the A-theory
is on the side of simplicity, there is evidence that the A-theo.·y does
not always compare favorably with the E-theory even on these g~ounds.
In section 6.4.1, it is argued that the A-theory's
characterization of Anx as the wide scope variant of §~~r~ is
incorrect. In section 5.4.2, it is argued that the existence of the
class of NPIs complicates the A-theory by requiring it to have a
principled reason for distinguishing polarity An~ from NPIs like ~~§[.
Perhaps most serious for the A-theory on the issue of simplicity are
the differing surface structure constraints on the two AllXs: in
section 5.4.3 it is argued that only the E-theory can offer an
indepsndently motivated explanation for these constraints.
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5.4.1 INTERACTION WITH f.~fBY
In the versions of the A-theory presented in Uintikka, Lasnik,
and Quine, ~nx is claimed to be in comp l emen t ar-y d t s t r tbut i on with
§~§L~: anx is taken to be the universal quantifier with wide scope·
over any logical operator which 'is capable of inducing a
~n~ts function is to disambiguate ~~~r~ in
meaning-affecting scope
6
quantifier'. That is,
ambiguity in relation to the universal
cases where ~~i[~ would otherwise have ambiguous scope with respect to
another operator; the use of il!l~ in (47) signals the wide scope
i~terpretation of the universal quantifier:
(47)(a) John didn't do everything.
(b) John didn't do anything.
NOT Ax (John did x)
Ax NOT (John did x)
The first thing to note about this claimed interaction with ~~~L~
is that it is much less simple than this. Recall from Chapter 3 that
free choice ADX must, apparently, have its trigger in its immediate
scope. This means that the distribution of labor between an~ and
§~£l is less elegant: given a trigger T, ~~§r~ occurs if the
universal quantifier which it represents is to the Light of T, or to
the lifl of T if there is any logical element 0 intervening between T
and the universal quantifier; An~ occurs if the universal quantifier
is immediately to the lit! of T with no interve~ing logical elements.
Thus we should find ~Xj£~ in contexts of the form T (0) A or A 0 T;
we should find JDX in contexts of the form A T. This weakens some of
the force of tho A-theory's claim to be the simpler theory.
More ser1o~sly, there seem to be- cases where An~ and g~§£~ are
interchdngeable in a given sentence. and cases where only i~iL~ occurs
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and is ambiguous with respect to its scope relation to a logical
operator.
f~fBY AND ANY INTERCHANGEABLE: An example of an~ and ft~gL~ which
seem to be interchangeable:
(48)(a) Anybody can do that. =7 Ax POSS (x do that)
(b) Everybody can do that. ~? Ax POSS (x do that)
There does not seem to be any scope difference between (48)(a) and
(b). This is not to say that there are not cases where anx and ~y~[~
do disambiguate a scupe difference: the most widely cited sentence is
(49) :
(49)(a) Anybody could be elected.
(b) Everybody could be elected.
Ax POSS (x be elected)
POSS Ax (x be ~1ected)
The difference seems to be that in (48) ,~n expresses ability, whereas
in (49) ~2ul~ expresses possibility. However, this version of the
A-theory requires, in order for All~ to be acceptable in a given
context, that i~~£~ in the same context would result in a d'ifferent
interpretation of the sentence. This does not seem to be the case in
(48), and so there is no reason for an~ to occur.
f~fHY AMBIGUOUS AND A~Y UNACCEPTABLE: There are also santences in
which i~iL~ but not iDl is acceptable, and in which ~~~r~ enters into
scope ambiguities with respect to some logical operator:
(60) I wanted to Inarry (every) one of them,
l*any {
[
but polyandry is il19~al. (NARROW SCOPE OF A)
but I finally settled on Fred. (WIDE SCOPE OF A)
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(50) with iX~£~ can express either a desire to marry a whole group of
people, in which case the universal quantifier has narrow scope with
respect to !~ni, as in (51); or (50) can express the fact that the
matrimonial urge was directed at a number of different individuals,
although there was no question of group marriage: in this case the
universal quantifier has wide scope with respect to w~nl, as in (52).
(51) I wanted (Ax (to marry x»
(52) Ax (I wanted (to marry x)
If anx is in fact simply the wide scope variant of g~~£~, why isn't it
7
acceptable in (50) to force the reading (52)?
Since much of the force of the A-theory hinges upon the alleged
complementary distribution of ~n~ and §~gL~, the fact that this is not
the case represents something of a pro)lem for it.
6.4.2 OTHER NEGATIVE POLARITY ITEMS
The A-theory appears at f tr s t glance to offer s tmp l i c i ty not only
because it provides a unified account of the representation of any (as
A) but also because it provides a unified account of what i~ a
'trigger' ·for aDX: ' ... The distribution of ~n~ has nothing to do with
negation per se ... A 'trigger' for aLX is an operator whether a
negative. modal, or whatever capable of inducing a meaning-affecting
6
scope ambiguity in relation to the universal quantifier.'
Wowever, this argument from simplicity ignores the large class of
negative polarity items which occur only in the so-called NPI
environments; Qud~§ and !~l!t 'for example. are not triggered by ~an:
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(53)(a).H8 can budge an inch, he's just stubborn.
(b).He can ever do the homework; he's just lazy.
f~£ might be expected to be the wide scope varia~t of alw~~~t just as
jn~ is the wide scope variant of ~~~L~ in the unified account; but'
(63)(b) does not furnish a reading like (64).
(64) At POSS (He do the homework at t)
'He is at all times capable of doing the homework.'
Alwa~~ in sentence (53)(b) might be expected to have only the reading
in which alw~~~ has narrow scope with raspect to ~an:
(55) POSS At (He do the homework at t)
'He has the capacity to always do the homework.'
However 'He can always do the homework' allows (depending upon the
context) either of these two interpretations, depending on the
relative scope of ~~n and Alw~~~: thus ~~~L, which is no~ restricted
to NPI environments, does not perform the function that gn~ is claimed
by the unified theory to perform. (Most NPIs, e.g. QU~gi, have no
such counterpart.)
Since there is a class of items for which a negative environment
must be delimited by the grammar (and which often receive an
existential interpretation in this environment), there seems to be a
trade-off with respect to simplicity. If there were a unified rule
for JBX which made no reference to a separate NPI environment but
which correctly described the trigger simpiy as any logical operator
capahle of inducing a scope ambiguity, then it would be possible to
capture the undisputed s1milarity between the two AnXS; but even this
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theory would have the complication of treating dUX quite differently
from the class of NPIs. although the existence of its free-choice
variant does not seem to affect the distribution of polarity ftflX as
compared to ~Y~L or other NPIs.
5.4.3 SURFACE STRUCTURE CONSTRAINTS ON THE TWO ANYS
The ar qumen t for the A-theory on grounds cf s imp l i c i ty runs into
serious trouble in connection with sentences like (56) and (57) below.
(56)*Anybody didn't leave.
(57) Anybody can leave.
These sentences are represented as follows (assuming, as argued
in Chapters 3 and 4, that unacceptable sentences wit~ NPIs are
ass i 9ned !-Fs ) :
UNDER THE A-THEORY:
(68) Ax NOT (x left) =(56)
(59) Ax POSS (x leave) =(57)
UNDER THE E-TH~ORY:
(50) Ex NOT (x left) =(56)
(61 ) Ax POSS (x leave) =(67)
(The E-theory is unspecified with respect to the representation of
free-choice .a.n~: let us aSSURle that it is as in (61).)
As discussed in Chapter 3, we do not need, under the E-theory, to
make specif~c mention of the requirement that polarity ~n¥ follow its
trigger if they are clausemates. A sentence like (56) will
automatically be assigned the LF (60) because of the independently
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motivated principle that the surface order of NOT and existentials is
the order in LF, unless the NOT E-->E NOT readjustment rule applies.
The immediate scope restriction on NPIs marks as unacceptable the
<SS,LF> pair with (60) as LF, since the E representing ant is not even
in the scope of NOT, much less its immediate scope. (The LF (60) is
also an unlikely candidate for redemption via part (b), as discussed
in the preceding chapter.)
Under the A-theory, however. (56) must be ruled out by means of
some surface structure restriction in ~~di!iQn !Q the restriction that
the A representing Anl have wide scope with respect to its trigger in
LF. For surely the rules that derive the LF of (56) under the
A-theory will assign to it the LF (58), since the general principle of
scope assignment in English seems to be to follow the surface ordel,
with numerous optional departures (su~h as assigning quantifiers wider
scope than their surface order allows). If the A-theory assigns to
(56) the LF (58), which is well-formed since the A representing anx
has immediat~ wide scope with respect to NOT, how will it rule out
(56)? It will have to have a special rule fOI' an~ to the effect that
'~nx cannot precede its trigger if they are clausemates'. Thus in
th;~ respect the A-theory is more complicated than the [-theory,
requiring two rules for An~; (1) the requirement of immediate wide
scope with respect to the trigger, stated on IF; and (2) the surface
structure requirement. In contrast. the [-theory requires only one
rule: the requirement of immediate narrow scope with respect to the
trigger, stated on LF.
It might be objected that (58) is not the LF assigned to (66)
under the A-theory, because the readjustment rule which changes
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A NOT into NOT A will apply to (58) since an~ is a universal; the LF
of (66) would then be (62):
(62) NOT Ax (x left)
(62) would then be filtered out by the wide scope requirement of the
A-theory. The problem is that the readjustment rule in question is
optional for many speakers, but these speakers still do not find (56)
acceptable. They should, of course, since they have the option of
assigning to (56) the LF (68) as well as (62). So this objection
fails.
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5.5 ARGUMENTS BASED UPON '0 NOT' CONTEXTS
~NO THE IMMEDIATE SCOPE CONSTRAINT
It is conceivable that a parallel argument to the argument from
'NOT 0' contexts may eventually emerge from '0 NOT' contexts.
Unfortunately, this argument is beset by major problems, set forth
here in hopes that someone else may be able to work it out.
Ladusaw (1979) proposes an argument for the [-theory based npon
£A£~l~, which he analyses as USUALLY NOT. He demonstrates that the
A-theory is unable to predict the correct reading for sentences with
[~[~l~ as trigger unless lexical decomposition is invoked, and that it
also predicts a nonexistent reading.
(63) Ue rarely eats anything.
(64) USUALLY NOT Ex (he eats x)
(65)(a) Ax USUALLY NOT (he eats x)
(b) USUALLY Ax NOT (he eats x)
That is, the E-theory corrActly predicts that (64) is the only reading
of (63). Of the A-theory's two entries, (65)(b)--which is equivalent
to (64)--correctly represents the meaning of (63) hut at the cost of
stating scope relations on lexically decomposed expressions; and
(65)(a) is not a possible reading of (63): that is, (63) cannot mean
that although 're frequently eats, his diet is so varied that each t t am
recurs quite infrequently on his menu. (The judqmen t s are comp1i cated
by the fact that .u~uAll~ verges on being a trigger for free choice
AU· )
This argument seems like quite a strong one for the E-theory; the
question arises of whether there is a general argument for the
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E-theory associated with '0 NOT' contexts. That iS t Ladusaw's
argument has two prongs: (1) most importantly, the A-theory cannot
predict the correct reading, when the trigger consists of a '0 NOT'
context fused into a single word, without lexical decomposition; and
(2) the A-theory predicts an absolutely unavailable reading, (65)(a).
Perhaps all '0 NOT' contexts, not just those contained in a single
word, can be exploited to provide an argumdnt along the lines of prong
(2), i.e. an argument that the A-theory will require additional
machinery to rule out certain readings.
Consider sentence (14), repeated below as (66).
(66) He didn't give anything to many of his friends.
The E-theory allows only one rossible order for the operators in (66)
if MANY is not negated. This is the order in (67). The A-theory rs
formulated by Lasnik and others is compatible with two possible
orders, (68)(al and (b).
(67) MANY NOT E
(68)(a) MANY A NOT
(b) A MANY NOT
(67) and (68)(a) can both be paraphrased 'There were many friends to
whom he gav~ nothing.' But what about (68)(b)? This would have the
paraphrase 'Eac~ present was withheld from many of his friends.'
There does not seem to be any reading such as (68)(b) for (66).
(66) with the order (68)(b) clearly has different truth conditions
than its truth conditions with the order (67)/(68)(a): if there are
100 presents and 100 friends and each friend receives a different
• i
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present, the reading of (66) ~ith the orders (67) and (68)(a) is false
(since everybody gets a presentj but the reading with the order
(68)(b) is true, since every present is denied to 99 people.
Since the order (68)(b) is not a possible crder for (66), the
A-theory (but not the E-theory) has the problem of ruling it out. The
obvious candidate for this task is the Imme d i a t e Scope Constraint. As
demonst r ated in Chapter 3, section 3.2.3, both NPI gn~ and free choice
~n~ must be immediately adjacent to thoir triggers (although in the
E-theory this adjacency is rightward in the first case and leftward in
the second). So perhaps the order (68)(b) is ruled out by the ISC,
which in the A-theory is simpler to stat9: tna representation of ,an~
in LF must be tmmad i ate l y to the left of the 'trigger'. In (68)(b), A
is separated from NOT by MANY, and thus we might ex~~ct (68)(b) to be
ruled out.
A problem with this approach may arise from the existence of
scope ambiguities when MANY is negated, discussed in section 5.1.1.
That is, (66) can have readings with either of the following orders.
(69) NOT MANY E
(70) NOT E MANY
Since MANY can intervene between the representation of an~ and tha
triggering NOT in LFs with the order (69), how can such intervention
be ruled out in LFs with the order (68)(b)?
Fortunately for the A-theory, there is a simple answer. While
the order (69) will result in an LF that is lik~ly to give rise to the
appropriate implicature (71) for part (b), there seems to be
absolutely no such implicature associated with LFs having the order in
,.
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(68) ( b ) .
(71) Ma~y of his friends didntt get anything.
In fact. (6B)(b) is quite compatible with everyone of his friends
getting some present: thus it is most unlikely to give rise to an
implicature containing the subformula 8X~! i~ ~ Qrgl~nl ~Qlt to
reformulate part (b) in terms of the A-theory. As noted in Chapter 3,
triggers other than negation S6em never to be separated from free
choice .an,X by an intervening logical element: so the A-theory can rule
out the order (68}(b) quite consistently. (The prob~em posed for it
by the possible order (69) is of course se/sre, but this is discussed
in s&ction 5.1.1 on tNOT 0 t contexts.)
That is, the fact that the A-theory represents an~ as taking wide
scope with respect to NOT raises the question of why (66) cannot
reccaive an LF with the order (68)(b), and mor-e generally of why a.n~
does not exhibit scope ambiguities with 0 in '0 NOT' contexts.
Unless there is some principled way of ruling out this order! the
A-theory can be claimed to make a false prediction. But in fact the
A-theory does have a principled way of rullng \lut the order in
(68) ( b ) : the I,n,nediate Scope Constraint. So for tl:e mome n t there is
no such argument, although the facts ar& ralher suggestive.
Another version of the '0 NOT' argument which the ISC is Gble to
counter is that of Carlson (1980). based upon pronoun bindin~.
Carlson notes the difference between sentences like (72) and (73)
below: in (~2)t ij~h may bind the pronoun him while in (73) ~n~Qn§
cannot. The reading of (72) in which him may be bound by §~&h is
represented as in (74).
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(72) Mob had a1ready to I d us not t« offend each
man by the t ime we had talked to him.
(73) Bob had already told us not to offend anyone
by the time we had talked to him.
(74) qx (~ob had alr~ady told us (NOT(to offend
x) by the time we ~ad talkad to x.
Carlson argues a~ follcwn:
[The A-thecr"y] seems to predict that any var i ab l e bound by
.an~ [taking such pronouns as bound variables] need not be
within the scope of t hs t r i qqer i nq element, such as a
negative, since the universal quantifier" may lie beyond its
s cops .... lf [the A-theory] is correct. a r ead i aq such as
[(74)] should be a~ailable upon SUb3titution of anx for
iA~h.
(It will be as sume d .n this d i scus s von that a pronoun can be bound by
a quantifier only if it is within the scope of that quau t i f i e r in LF.)
But Carlson's ar qumen t , I think, is yet another casualty of t~1e
A-theory variant of the Immediate Scope Cons t r a- nt . The problern is as
follows.
He as sumas that since i1i'~ is a universal quantifier with wit::e
scope ove r NOT it can, like aacn. be as s i qno d almost indefinitely wide
scope with respect to ~OT. lhat is, in a '0 NOT' context, it s hou ld
( I ike aacn) be·ab 1e i n Inanyc as estabe ass i 9ned s C0iJ e IIve r l, a s well
as ovor NOT. Since gn~ is usually argued to bca the 'wide scope
var i cn t ' of aacn. i t s scope might be axpac t ed to be even mor e
unlimit9d to the left t~Qn ~A~b's. Thus. Carlson seems to ~e arguing,
( 73 ) IVr· t h .aJl~ and (". J \IIi til 2acn s h0 U 1 t1 bot h be ab 1e to havatheLF
(74j as well as the LF (76) below. In (74) but not in (75) the
universal quanlifif~' has SCQp9 over 0, 0 being t~e IF representation
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(75) Bob had already told us (Ax NOT (to offond x))
by the ~ime we had talked to him.
Clearly. in the LF (75) we would not expect the universal quantifier
to bind him, since him is not within its scope.
So Carlson's argument relies upon the possibility. within the
A-theory, that the universal quantifier represented by anx can take
wide scope with respect to 0 in '0 NOT' contexts, as in (74).
Unfortunately. as demonstrated in Chapter 3, the A-theory can
quite plausibly rule out (74) as an LF of (73) on the ba~is of its
variant of the Immediate Scope Constraint. TllUS. sinca (73) mJst have
this LF in order for anlQn~ to bind him, the A-theury does not in fact
predict that the pronoun him in (73) can be bo~nd by gn~Qllg: it rules
out such a poss~bility by the independently motivated Ioonediatu Scope
Constraint.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 5
In thlS chapter I have argued that polarity anx is represented by
an existential quantifier in the scope of NOT. The arguments for this
analysis of Ant (the 'E-theory') against the univocal universal
ana 1ys is of ~n~ (the I A- theol'Y') are of four bas i c types. ( 1) The mast
important arguments, I believe, are those which demonstrate that the
A-theory (but not the E-theory) makes incorrect pr-ed i cti ons about the
t rut h con d i t ion S 0 f sen ten cesc0 nt a i n i n9 An~ • The se inc 0 I' r ec t
predirtions were seen to arise in con~ection with 'NOT 0' contexts
and ssn tance s Wil.~l verb phrase deletion. (2) Next come the ar qumen t s
which demonstrate that the A-theory (but not the E-theory) requires
~nx to r~ceive special treatment by the grammar in connection with
rules such 3S restrictions on quantifier scope and tag questions. (3)
Distributional arguments cut both ways, but seem to be on the side of
the E-theory. (4) Arguments on the ground~ of simplicity do not
necessarily favor the A-theory: it was demonstrated that the A-theory,
but not the E-theory, is complicated by the existence of NPIs, the
non-complementary distribution of gn~ and ~~~r~, and by the surface
structure restrictions on polarit.v .a.n~. Furthermore, the 'Inunediate
Scope Constraint' on f.'se choice Anx complicates the account of the
complementary d stribution of the two An~S.
Neverthe 1ess \ the homonyml ty of the two .anxs and the i r conunon
need to be 'triggered' by an immediately adjacent logical element
suggast quite strongly that the correct analysis of an~ will turn out
to be a univocal one, at least diachronically. In Chapters 6 and 8
below I ~il1 examine Fauconnier's analysis of 'scalar endpoints',
which perhaps allows us to tell a plausible story about the two a.n~s
and their relation to one another.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Of course, .any. does not have to take wide scope with respect to
every operator in the sentence, only with respect to its actual
trigger. (And, in fact, see sections 3.2.3 and 5.5 concerning the
Immediate Scope Constraint on free choice anx.) Thus the A-theory can
account for the ambiguity of (i), which has been cited as a
counterexample to it, by assigning to (i) the representations (ii) and
(iii): the trigger is NOT in (ii) and pass in (iii).
(i) He can't do anything.
(ii) Ax NOT POSS (he do x)
(iii) NOT Ax POSS (he do x)
2. Alternatively, D~vison (1979) and Fauconnier (1979) argue for a
univocal existential analysis of ~nx.
3. The inability of the A-theory to account for the opaque reading of
An~ in b&lief contexts is also noted in Carlson (1980) and Kayne
( 1979) .
4. See ladusaw (1979) and sec·iun 5.5 below concer~ing such an
argument.
6. This sente1ce was pointed out to ~e by Frank Carroll.
6. Lasn1k (1975)
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7. I assume that w~nl is the trigger, and hence that the reading (52)
does not violate the free choice ~nl Immediate Sccpe Constraint.
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CHAPTER 6: LADUSAW (1979)
In this chapter I will examine a recent analysis of NPIs that
contrasts sharply with the proposals that I have made.
Ladusaw (1979) attempts to define 'triggerhood' on the basis of
the entailment relations of sentences. The starting point for
ladusaw's th~ory is the notion of 'scalar endpoint' developed by
Fauconnier (1975a,b). Fauconnier observes that exprassions like g~~n
~QUi1i, A~QIRh Hil1~L' and 1ng mQ~1 ~iffi~Yli nr2Rl~m in (1)-(3) below
furction pragmatically as universal quantifiers because they may be
regarded as lower endpoints on the prpgmatic scales associated with
the propo~ition schemata JQhn in~i!~~ !, JQhn WQUlg Q~ UQlil~ 19 X,
and MALl &~n ~21Y~ X.
(1) John ~ven invited loui3e.
(2) John would be polite to Adolph Hitler.
(3) Mary can solve the most difficult problem.
The lower endpoint of a pragmatic scale associated with a
Droposition schema is the value for X for which the proposition is
least likely to be trUd: thus if it is true for this value of X it can
be (pragmatically, not logically) inferred that it will be true for
all other values of X. For example, if Mary can solve the "lost
difficult problem we can infer t~at she can selve any problem, most
difficult problems being assumed to be the least likely to be solved.
In Fauconnier's account, if a scale S is associated with a
proposition schema P, the reverse of S, S', will be associated with
the proposition schema NOT P: the lower endpoint of S, that is, is the
upper ~ndpoint of S'. Alternatively, we may say that the same scale S
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is associated with P and with NOT P, but that the truth of P licenses
'upward' inferences on this sc~le S (from least likely values for X in
P) while the t ru t h of NOT P licenses 'downward' t nf e r-enc e on the same
scale S (from most likely values for X in P): if P is not t r ue for the
m0 S t 1ike 1y val ue 0 f X ~ i tean be p rag Ina tic all yin fer I'edthat i tis
not true for any of the less likely value~ either.
(4) John didn't even invite louise.
(5) John wouldn't be polite to his best friend.
(6 ) Mary can·t solve the easiest problem.
Thus in (4)-(6) we can distinguish two scales, Sf associated with the
entire loglLal forms NOT P or S associated with the subpart P of the
logical form: in (4), @Y~ll forces Louise to be taken as a low~r
endpoint of some scale, bitt there is an amb i qu i ty arising out of the
possibility of this scale be:1Q either S or S'. If Louise is the
lower endpoint of S, then (·1) has an 'external negat.ion' reading, as a
denial that John invited a lmos t eve r-ybo dy , if Louise is the lower
endpoint of S', then (4) implies that John invited a lmos t nobody,
since JQhn ~i~n'! in~il~ ! is true even when X has as its value the
least likely person not to be invited. Alternatively, we can say that
the same scale S is associated with both Jghn in~il~d X and JQhn
Jiil1n',t inti.ti X: in non-negative contexts the direction of unp l t ca t t on
is 'upward' while in negative contexts the direction of irnplication is
•downward' .
Sentences (5) and (6) are unambiguo~s only because hi~ D~~t
f£1in~ is most likely to be taken as the lower endpoint of the scale
S' associated with JQh.n w.Qul.dn'.t ilJ! D21i.ti .12 X but not of the scala S
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associated with .J.o!.ln w.Q.ul~ 12!! Jl.Qli.ti 12 X: thus the 'external
negation' readin{, is missing. Si~ilarly, lhi ~a~i~~t arQbl~m is more
plausibly taken as the lower endpoint of the scale S' associated with
MA.c~ kAnt! ~Ql~i X than as the lower endpoint on the scale S
associated with ~AL~ ~Bn ~21~§ X.
Many NPIs are expressions which are appropriate as scalar
endpoints in negative contexts. If s~meone 'hasn't lifted a finger',
fOf- example, it can be pragmatically inferred that he hasn't moved at
all. Fauconnier, Fodor (1979), and Ladusaw all propose that there is
so~e correlation betwAen the properties o. licensing downward
entailments and triggering NPIs. Ladusaw attempts to correlate
triggerhood not with the kind of pr aqma t t c phenomenon observed by
Fauconn~er but wit~ a strictly logical notion of downward entailment.
It is Ladusaw's theory that will be exam i ned here: in Chapter n,
however, I Argue that NPIs and the 'pragmatic quantification'
described by Fauconnier do, in fact, occur in the s ame env i r orunen t s ,
although these environments cannot be captured by the strictly logical
formulation of downward entailment that Lad~saw proposes.
Ladusaw makes the following proposal.
(7) A negative-polarity' item is acceptable on l y if it is
interpreted in the scope of a downward-entailing expression.
( 1979b)
That is, he identifies the property of being 'affective'
(licensing NPIs) wlth the property of being downward-entailing,
defined as below. He is concerned, however, with logical rather than
'pragmatic' downward-entailment.
(8) An expression ;s affective [= downward-entailing] iff it
licenses 1nference~ in its scope from supersets to subsets.
(197gb)
. --
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let us first consider NOT. Expressing the fact that brussels sprouts
are a subset of the class of green vegetables in terms of the
entailment from (9)(a) to (9)(b), we see that (lO)(a) en t a i l s (lO)(b)
by contraposition. Since in (10) we are able to substitute subset for
superset ~~l~~ Y~Lila!~, NOT qualifies as a downward entailing
expression. We therefore expect it to license NPls, and (11)
demonstrates that, as the reader may havb observed, it does.
(9) P-->Q
(a) John ate brussels sprou~s (P)
(b) John ate a green vegetab 1e. (Q)
(10) NOT Q-->NOT P
(a) John didn't eat a green vegetable (NOT Q)
(b) John didn't eat brussels sprouts (NOT Pl
(11) John didn't eat any green vegetables.
The basic strategy followed by L. is ex emp l i f t ed by his tests
for the direction of entailment for Determi~ers and Quantifier NPs:
(12) For any Determiner 0, if '0 men walk' entai Is '0 fathers
walk', then 0 is downward-entailing .... For- any Quantifier
NP P, if 'P walks' entails 'P walks slowly', P is downward-
entailing. (1979a)
This test predicts that EXH£J and ~2 are DE determiners with
respect to the N in their scope, as (13) and (14) demons t r-a te : but
that f~~L~ Nf is not DE with respect to the VP in its scope although
Ng Nf is DE with respect to the VP in its scope, as (15) and (16)
rJemonstrate.
(13)(a) Every man has a brain. -->
(b) Every father ',as a brain.
(14)(a) No man has a brain. -->
(h ) No father has a bra~n.
(15){a) Every man walks.-I>
(b ) Every man walks slowly.
(16)(a) No man wal~s.-->
( b ) No man walks slowly.
Similarly, consider relative clauses embedded under
quantified relative clauses:
(17)(a) Evaryone who knows anything about physics
will laugh him out of Ie room.
(b) Everyone who has a pet will get in free.-->
(c) Everyone who has a pet cat will get in free.
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universally
Just as in (t3) above, ~~~rj is seen t~ be DE with respect to the
nominal in its scope; thus NPIs are ex~ected to ~e acceptable 10 such
relative clauses, as demonstrated by (17)(a).
Consider the antecedent clauses of conditionals: since they may
contain NPIs, as demonstrated by (18)(a), they must, in L. 's account,
be in the scope of a DE operator.
(18)(b) to (18)(c).
And in fact there is DE from
(18)(a) If you have any pets. you will get in free.
(b) If you have a pet, you will get in free.-->
(c) If you have a cat, you will get in free.
The downward entailment f r om (18)(b) to (IS)(c) is sirnply an instance
of logical implication given the upward entailment in (19) below:
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(19) P-->Q
( a) You have a cat (P)
(b ) You have a pet CQ)
(20) Q-->R
( a) You have a pet (Q)
(b ) You get in free (R)
(21) P-->R
(a) You have a cat (P)
(b ) You get in free (R)
Note from the above cases that if is DE with respect t( the
antececent clause only (the substitution te~t fails when applied to
the consequent clause, as the reader may verify).
So far Ladusaw's account predicts quite cleanly SOll18 of the part
(b) cases which in my account ~re treated rather unsatisfyingly as
involving allusions to negative sentences. I will clarify this
proposal before determining whether it is workablo.
SCOPE: L. defines scope in terms of Montague gralnlna~, although
he suggests (1979a) that the same arguments could be made within a
framework in which scope is defined 'geometrically' at the level of
logical f orm. Basically, an expression, is in the s cops of another
expression y if x denotes an argument to the function which y denotes.
Any expression contained in x is also in the scope of y.
SUeSETS AND SUPERSETS: The basic test for whether an o~erator is
DE is to determine whether there is an 'upward entailment' for it to
revers" the upward entailment expressing the subset/supqrset
rE)lation. So given the upward entailment from (22)(a) to (22)(b), we
would expect there to be DE under negation; as demonstrated by (16)
~.
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above, this is the case.
(22)(a) Some man walks slowly.-->
(b) Some man walks.
'IN THE SCOPE OF A DE OPERATOR' VERSUS '!N A DE CONTEXT': L. is
not claiming that an NPI must occur in a DE context but that it must
be in the scope of a DE op~rator. The sentences in (23) belnw
demonstrate that being in a DE context is not what is relevant to NPI
acceptability: by a 'DE context' I mean a co~text 0 such that 0(A)
entails 0{a), where ~ is a subset of A.
(23)(a) Hp ate a green vegetable, or birds are birds.-->
( b) He ate b r IJ sse "I ssp r 0 U t s , 0 I' b i r d s are b i r d s .
(c).He ate any green vegetables, or birds are birds.
Sin c e (2 3 ) ( a) e n t ail 5 (2 3 ) ( b ), both be i n9 nee essa I' i 1Y t rue , we
might expect to find NPIs acceptable in such a context; 3S (23)(c)
demonstrates, this is not the case. This is not a pr ob Iam fOI' L. 's
account since there is no 'downward entailing operator' in whose scope
we might expect to find NPIs.
NECESSARY VS. SUFFICIENT: L. c l a ims {1979aj that 'the pr op e r ty
of being a trigger is completely predictable f r-om the
truth-conditional meaning of an expression.' This claim is too strong,
as will be demons tr ated in section 6.3, given the great many cases of
unacceptable NPIs in the scope of a DE operator. Recall from Chapter
3 that being in the sco~a of NOT is not sufficient to guarantee NPI
acceptability. Thus I will consider only the claim that it is a
necessary condition on NPIs that thQY occur in the scope of a DE
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operator, not that their occurence there is sufficient to guarantee
acceptability.
Thusin bot h L.' sac co un tan d r,li net hereli n9u i s tic con d ; t ion son
NPIs ( par t ( a )) af. din add i t ion t ne"eare ext r a1 j n9u i s tic con di t -j0 ns
( par t (b ) }: t It e dis t i .1 c t ion is:.•1atin my ace au n t par t ( a ) i s a
sufficient but not necessary condition, and part (b) 8xtends the class
of acceptable sentences beyorti part (a) to those that "j mp l y ' a
sentence with the NPI in the tmme d t a t e scope of NOT. Tn L. '5 account,
on the other hand, 'part (a)' is a necessary hut not sufficient
condition which allows all senten~es in which an NPI is in the scope
of a DE operator, relying on 'part (b)' to filter out unacceptable
sentences in this set in some as yet unspecified way. That is, L. 's
part (a) allows, and my part (a) does not allow, NPIs in the following
contexts (not an exhaustive lir:ting): NOT 0 questions,
antecedents of conditionals, af t er comp ar at t ve s , in relative clauses
headed by universals, ill complement.s of adve r s a t i ves like ~!!.~jlri.§gt in
sen ten c e s wit h .tQQ an ct Q.nl~ , aft e r p r i vat i ve s . L . c ha rae tel' i zes
almost all of the relevant operators in these part (b) cases as DE.
Having attempted to determino more precisely what it is that L.
is proposing, we can ask whether it works.
Unfortunately, it seems to me that L.'s theory has a number of
very severe problems, which will be discussed below.
(1) Since many 'triggers' are themselves verbs of propositional
attitude, e.g. ~YrR!iii, dQun1, r~gL~!t ~~nx, L. 's account must
incorporate a theory of entailment from opaque contexts. The sorts of
entailments that the distribution of NPIs requires him to predict do
not seem to hold. To save his view we must abandon the ~otion of
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'truth-conditional' entailment of sentences Hnd adopt a notion of
entailment that incorporates assumptions about what the subject of n
verb of belief actually knows, appreciates about the consequences of
his beliefs, etc. Furthermore, L.'s arguments rely heavily on
distinctions between the presuppositions or implicature of a sentence
and its truth conditional meaning, and his attempts to ignore
presupposition or implicature in giving an account of the entailments
of sentences with affectives like ~~rn£i~~ compounds the oddness of
his notion of entailment. This is discu~sed in 6.1.
(2) Even if we grant him his odd theory of entailment, the sorts
of en t a t lman t s that L. mus ; argue for in connection with adversatives
like .s.!!rR.Li.s.~ interact in a devastating way with more general
principles of entailment, as we see in 6.1.
(3) There are environments which tolerate NPIs but do not see~ to
be downward entailing; they are discussed in section 6.2.
(4) His theory is further weakened (and his claims to d
truth-conditional definition of t r i qqer hoo d de s t r oye d ) by the fact
that there are many cases of unacceptable NPIs in the sco~e of a DE
operator and the fact that their unacceptability hinges on
oxtralinguistic matters. These cases are reviewed in section 6.3.
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6.1 BELIEF CONTEXTS AND DCWNWARD ENTAILMENT
As noted above, there is a very large class of affectives which
are themselves verbs of propositional attitude: ~~rRri~g, gm~Ig,~QMQ1,
£~gLgl, ggn~, £g~gnl, n~ unwilling, Qft ~ygr~g !Q, Qg Qffgnggg, rgfu~g,
fQr9~1, etc. In Baker's account, the ability of these verbs to
trigger NPIs is explained by their ability to be used to make
allusions to negative sentences: ng ~Yrnri~~g 1h~! S can convey that
one §XR§&l~g ing! NQI S, and so forth.
Ladusaw, however, attempts to account for the distribution of
NPIs without invoking any such allusions to negative sentences:
whatever licenses NPIs must be part of the 'truth conditional meaning'
of the sentence. In the case of s imp l e negative sentences or if
clauses. it is clear that downward entailment is predictable on the
basis of the truth conditional meaning of tho sentence (via
contraposition and simple implication). The ad~ersativest however,
require great effort on L. 's part to be incorporated into his theory
of NPIs. In section 6.1.1, I will examine the rather odd notion of
entailment that L. proposes in order to account for them: in section
6.1.2, I will exam i ne that problems that arise if we grant L.'s notion
of entailment and examine it in connection with other entailments.
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6.1.1 LADUSAW'S NOTION OF ENTAILMENT
Compare ~YLRLi~~, which L. designates as DE, with g~Q~~!. which
L. designates as upward entailing (UE): he argues for the entailments
marked below.
(24)(a) MJry was surprised that John ate a green vegetable.-->?
( b ) Mary was surprised that John ate brussels sprouts.
( c) Mary was surprised that John ate any vegetables.
(25)(a) Mary expects that John will eat hrussels sprouts.- u >?
(b ) Mary expects that John will eat a green vegetable.
(c)*Mary expects that John will ;:'JL any vegetables.
(NOTE: '--->7' marks entailments claimed by L. but contested here;
'-->7?' marks ental lments to which L. t s theory commits him but which I
doubt that he would argue for.) Ignore the free choice reading for
~n~ in the (c) sentences above. He makes exactly the same
argument for ~QYYl (DE) versus Qglig~g (UE); that is, ho argues for
the entailments marked in (26) and (27) below.
(26)(a) Mary doubts that John ate a green vegetable.-->7
(b ) Mary doubts that John ate brussels sprouts.
( c ) Mary doubts that John ate anything.
(27)(a) Mary believes that John ate brussels sprouts.-->?
(b) Mary believes that John ate a green vegetable.
(c)*Mary believes that John ate anything.
Concerning the question of whether these are logical entailments, he
says:
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... [(27)(a)] at least leads us to expect that [(27)(b)] is
t rue , and s i mi 1a I' 1Y for [( 26) ( a )] and [( 26 ) ( b ) ] . .. Whe the r
we would want to say that the (a) sentences .e.n.tgil the (b)
s e 11 tel) cesis a que s t ion 1ar 9e r t han the 0newe hav e set 0u t
to cons i del". I wi 11 as sume for these verbs ... that these
i n t u i t ion s of 1 j keli hood do jus t i f yea11 i n9 !!gll!~Jlg [or
g~I!~~.t] upward entailing and flQ!!Q! [or ~!!I:R.Li~g] downward
entailing. (1979a)
Considering that a ma jor result that he c l aims for his theory is its
success in predicting the necessary conditions fOI' the occurence of
NPIs on the basis of truth conditional meanings of sentences, the
casualness of the above r emar-k s is somewh a t startling. If the (a)
sentences don't truth conditionally entail the (b) sentences, then
thay don't entail them at all: they may in s ome way suggest them, but
they do not entail them. Since L. seems to lean toward the vi aw that
in fact the an t a t lmen t s above are strictly logical (cf. his c omme nt
in the summary (1979a), quoted above, that 'the property of being a
trigger is completely predictable from the truth-conditional meaning
of an expression'), we will examine the consequences of his claim that
such entailments exist.
What sort of claims and assumptions would we have to make in
order to say that (24)(a) entails (24)(b)?
First, as L. himself argues, we must distinguish between the
truth conditional meaning of ~urJ!ri~~ and its preslJppositio'ls or
implicatures, notably its factivity. In order to avoid being confused
by the presupposition or implicature that John actually did eat
brussels sprouts in (24)(b), we must grant that hA did when evaluating
the relation between (24)(a) and (24)(b). So, for examp l e , let us
examine (24) in a world in which John ate brussels sprouts, spinach,
and brocoli. Under those circumstances, L. claims. Mary could not be
surprised that John ate a green vegetable without also being surprised
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that he ate brussels sprouts. This seems like quite an unusual view
of entailment, since it is certainly easy to imagine a world in which
( 24 ) ( a ) i s t rue and (2 4 ) ( b) i s f a1se, e. 9 . a W0 r 1din wh; c h MaI' Y i s
unaware that John ate brussels sprouts.
This leads to the second set of as sump t i on s that we must make in
cnnnection with (24). We must assume at least the following: (t) Mary
believes that John ate brussels sprouts. (2) Mary is attending to
this belief at the moment that she feels surprise about his eating a
green vegetable. (3) Mary believes that brussels sprouts are a green
vegetable. (4) Mary is attending to this knowledge at the moment that
she feels surprise about his eating a green vegetable. (5) Mary
believes the consequences of her beliefs.
L. suggests (p.e.) that we must look at 'entailments' such as
the one from (24)(a) to (24)(b) 'in a model consistent with the
knowledge of' the subject of the verb of belief. 'The knowledge of'
is insufficient; we would have to say 'in a model consistent with the
knowledge and current beliefs of'. In other words, we must evaluate
the entailment from 'Mary was surprised that John ate a green
vegetable' to 'Mary was surprised that John ate hrussels sprouts' only
in a model in which Mary believes and attends to the fact that John
ate brussels sprouts, believes and attends to the fact that brussels
sprouts are a green vegtable, and knows and attends to the fact that
eating brussels sprouts entails eating a green vegetable.
Clearly, what we have here cannot possibly be called entailment
from truth conditional meaning. And the great number of assumptions
involved brings to mind the French proverb, 'With an if you can put
Paris in a bottle.'
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The problem for L. 's theory posed by opaque contexts is virtually
identical to the problem which these contexts pose for tho
representation of p01arity ~n~ as a universal quantifier (discussed in
Chapter 8): when 0 is a predicate of belief, there must ~e some way
to represent NOT 0 ( ... ~nl ... ) as something other than AxNOT 0(x).
And, of course, truth-conditional semantics generally, not just L.'s
theory of NPIs, comes to grief in connection with these contexts.
We have seen that the adversatives require L. to hold that
sentences like (24)(a) 'entail' sentences like (24)(b); we have also
seen that whatever the relation be twee n (24)(a) and (24)(b) is, it
simply cannot be one of entailment. Thus L. cannot claim to have
stated the necessary conditions on the occurence of NPIs in terms of
entailments of the truth conditional mean i nqs of sentences.
It seems worthwhi le to recall f r om Chapter 4 that NPIs appear ~.o
be licensed by ~urRri~~d !h~! S only when there is the implicature
The relevant sentences ((46)(a)-(d)) are
repeated below:
(28)(a) She was surprised that there were any buffaloes in
the dining room.
(b) She had expected that there wouldn't be any buf-
aloes in the dining room.
(c) She was surprised that there were buffaloes in the
dining room, although she had never considered the
possibility of such an infestation.
(d).She was surprised that there were any buffaloes in
the dining room, although she had never considered
the possibility of such an infestation.
The acceptability of (28)(c) shows that (28)(b) is not part of the
meaning of (28)(a), but only an implicature. That is, one can be
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surprised at S without ever having considered the possibility of S or
expected that NOT S. The unacceptability of (28)(d) shows that it is
not simply the truth-conditional meaning of ~~IRLi~~ that ljcense~
NPIs. but the implicature ~xng~lgd NOI S.
As noted earlier, L. is only at t emp t i nq to formulate a necessary
condition on NPI acceptability, not a sufficient one. So the
unacceptability of (28)(d), in which an NPI is pmhedded under an
allegedly DE expression ~Y[a£il~, is not in itself fatal for him. But
it is not clear how he can rule out (28)(d) without invoking some sort
reduction to negation of the sort that he is trying so hard to ~~oid.
What is wrong with (28)(d) is that it does not have the implicature
( 28 ) ( b ) t i . e . the imp 1 i cat u r e g~ng~lJ~!! .th.a! nat S. ( The que s t : 0 n of
unacceptable NPIs in the scope of DE operators will be discussed
further i:l section '6.3.)
6.1.2 INTERACTION WITH OTHER ENTAILMENTS
In addition to committing him to an untenable theory of
entailment, L. 's claim that there is downward entailment from (24)(a)
to (24)(b) and upward entailment f r om (27)(a) to (27)(b) has
devastating consequences for the theory of entailment in general.
That is, if we were to grant that there were such en t a t Imen t s , his
problems would only just begin.
Consider first the consequences of the DE from (24)(a) to
(24)(b), repeated below.
(24) p- ..>Q 7
(a) Mary was surprised that John ate a green vegetable. (P)
(b) Mary was surprised that John ate brussels sprouts. (Q)
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(29) Q-->R
If Mary is surprised that John ate brussels
sprouts (Q),
then Mary must believe that John ate brussels
sprouts (R).
(30) P-->R 77
If Mary ;s surprised that John ate a green
vegetable (P),
then Mary must believe that John ate brussels
sprouts (R).
It follows from the most basic principles of entailment that if P
implies Q, and Q impli~s R, then P implies R. And (30) is false even
in a world (1) in which John ate brussels sprouts and (2) which is
consistent with Mary's beliefs. However, it is obvious that (30) is
false. And even if we say that it's a presupposition 01' imp l t cat ur e
of ~Y£R£il~ in (24) that Mary believes the complement S of ill£U£llg,
there is absolutely no way that we could claim that this
presupposition or implicature has been inherited in (29) and (30).
A similar argument can be constructed on the basis of the claimed
upward entailment from (27)(a) to (27)(b).
clearer~ (27) is recast slightly in (31) below.
To make the argument
(31) P-->Q?
(a) Frank believes that a quadraplegic crimi~al was
involved. (P)
(b) Frank believes that a criminal was involved. (0)
(32) Q-->R
If Frank believes that a criminal was involved (0),
then he must be a good detective (R).
(33) P-->R 17
If Frank beliaves that a quadraplegic criminal was
involved (P).
then he must be a good detective (R) •
Once again, the entailments that L. is forced to argue for have
devastating effects when tied to a chain of other entailments. Thus
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in (31)-(33), we are forced to the absurd conclusion (33) by the
following chain of reasoning: P-->Q, Q-->R, hence P-->R. That (33)
can in no way be concluded from (32) is obvious: he may be astute to
detect a criminal touch to some event, but if, for example, the event
involved mountain climbing a quadraplegic criminal would not be likely
to be involved, and one could certainly not conclude that Frank was a
good detectiv~ if he believed that a quadraplegic had been involved.
SUMMARY OF SECTION 6.1. In order to account for the large number
of verbs of propositional attitude which license NPIs, L. is forced
to claim entailments like the alleged entailment from (24)(a) to
(24)(b). Two prcblems arise in connection with this claim. First, a
huge set of assumptions about the knowledge, current awareness,
rationality, and consistency of the believer must be made, and we are
clearly outside the realm of truth conditional entailment: a sevr.re
weakening of L.'s theory. Second, the proposed notion of entailment,
when embedded in a chain of reasoning, leads to indisputably false
conclusions.
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6.2 ACCEPTABLE NPIs NOT IN THE SCOPE OF A DE EXPRESSION
A diff i cu1ty wit h the cha I' act e r i za t ion of the affective
environment as 'the scope of a DE expression' is that NPIs some t imes
seem to be acceptable in environments which cannot possibly be said to
be i nthesc0 pe 0 faD E e xpre s s ion . I nth iss e c t ; 0 n I will e xa In; ne
four such environments: (1) in the complement S of a verb or noun of
incorrect belief; (2) in the compl ement S of a verb or noun of loss
and forgetfulness; and (3) in sentences with Qnlx.
6.2.1 INCORRECT BELIEF: Consider the following sentences.
(32)(a) I attribute it to his delusion that he knows
anything about physics.
(b) X has a delusion that he ate a green
vegetable.-I>
(c) X has a delusion that he ate k~le.
As we see in (32)(a), NPIs may sometimes occur i~ the complemant of
Clearly, however, having a delusion that one has eaten a
green vegetable does not entail that one has a delusion that one has
eaten kale. Thus there seems to be no explanation in L's account for
the acceptability of the NPI in (32)(a).
It has been suggested to ~e that ~~lY~iQn might have as its
'truth-conditional' meaning simply the falsity of the belief; the
existence of the belief would be simply a presupposition. (If this
were the case, g§lY~iQn would of course be DE: (32)(b) would in fact
entail (32)(c) because they would be equivalent to (33)(a) and (b):
(33)(a) x didn't eat a green vegetable -->
(b) x didn't eat kale
206
I find this quite implausible on its own merits, and such a suggestion
is completely contradicted by (34):
(34) If he has a delusion that he has a car, he will
invite us to the drive in.
Clearly, the conditions under which he will invite us to the drive in
include a belief that he has a car, not only the falseness of such a
belief. That is, (34) will not be false if he simply lacks a car and
does not invite us to the drive in.
Q~ly.§iQn, that is, presents slightly different problems than the
problems posed by other affectives of propositional attitude
(discussed in the preceding section), because there ;s so clearly an
entailment of belief: there is no way that the element of belief can
be merely a presupposition of ~glY~iQn.
6.2.2 LOSS, FORGETfULNESS: NPIs are often acceptable in S
complements of verbs and nouns denoting loss and forgetfulness:
(35)(a) He forgot that he had eaten anything.
(b ) He forgot that he had eaten a green
vegetable.-I>
( c) He forg0t that he had eaten kale.
(36)(a) He. lost the ability to do anything with his hands.
(b) He lost the ability to fold paper. -I>
(e) He lost the ability to construct origami peacocks.
The (b) sentences entail the (e) sentences only if previous possession
;s not part of the truth-conditional meaning of fQL~g! and ID~~ but is
rather presupposition or implicature; that is, if fQL~~i is roughly
equivalent to fiQ! knQI and 12~ is roughly equivalent to llQ1 h~Yi.
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But consider (37) and (38): in both cases the consequent is contingent
upon not merely failing to have the re1evant knowledge or ability, but
upon having had it a~d lost it.
(37) If someone forgets where $1 million is bur t ed , he is c r azy .
(38) If s omaone loses $1Ini~lion, he is irresponsible.
(37) and (38) don't seem to be asserting that the mere lack of $1
million or of the knowledge of where it w~s buried would be sufficient
grounds to be judged insane or irresponsible: that is, (37) is not
proved false by the existence of sane people who are not in ~ossession
of the knowledge of where $1 is buried. In other words, (37) is not
truth conditionally equivalent to (39):
(39) If someone doesn't have the knowledge of where $1 million
is bar i ed , he "i s crazy.
So some sort of prior possession or access seems to be part of the
'truth conditional' meaning of such expressions. As a result, they
cannot be DE for the same reasons that ~glY}iQn cannot be, no matter
how many assumptions we make about the rationality and knowledge of
the believer.
6.2.3 ONLY. Sentences with QUI! tolerate NPIs, although with
considerable variation (see Chapter 4); L. includes Qnl.x in his class
of proposed DE expressions. While I don't object to his argument that
.Qnl.x Nf is DE with respect to the VP in its scope, his argument that
2nlJ is DE with respect to a nominal in its scope seems weak.
(40)(a) Only John ate anything.
(b) Only John walked.-->1
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(c) Only John walked slowly.
(41)(a) No one who was not John walked.-->
(b) No onG who was not John walked slowly.
(42)(a) Daly people who have ever been to Paris
will be admitted to the lecture.
(b) Only people whQ know a language
will be a dinittQ d tothe 1ec t ur e . - - > ??
(e) Only people who know a Romance language
will be admitted to the lecture.
(40)(a) demonstrates that NPIs are acceptable in the part of the
sentence which is not the focus of Qnl,X. and (40)(b) is argued by L.
to entail (40)(c). He argues f cr this entailment on the grounds that
the assertion of (40)(a) is roughly as in (41)(a), it being merely a
presupposition or implicature that John actually walked. Since
(41)(a) doas entail (41)(b). it follows from this r epr as an t at i on of
Qnl~ that (40)(bl entails (40)(c).
To clarify this suggestion. a sentence with Qnl~ can be construed
as a conditional of the following form:
(43) Ax (NOT (XE ~ocussed item) »--> {NOT(0(x»)
o above represents the non-focussed part of the sentenca. This way
of rep res e ntin 9 sen ten ces wit I~ Q!!l~ seems p1a tJsib 1e en0 U9 '1) and i fit
is correct then gnl~ does seem to be DE with respect to 0.
But what about the focus of Qnl~? As (42)(a) demonstrates, NPIs
are (sometimes) acceptable in a relative clause which is part of the
1
focus of 2nl~. But even if we ignor~ implicature, how can wa say
that (42)(b) entails (42)(c)? Following the above way of representing
.Qnb. we can represent (42}(b) as in (44):
2Q9
(44) Ax (NOT(x ~ipeople who know a languag~» -->
(NOT(x will be admitted to the l&~ture».
How can (44) possibly entail (45) below? L. suggests that Qnl~ can be
paraphrased, with less interference from implicature, by B1 mQ~!; but
there still do&sn't seem to be DE.
(45) Ax (NOT(xE-(people who know a Romance langu~g~» u>
( NOT ( x wi 11 be adinitt.ed to the 1ec t ur e ) ) .
(46)((1) At most peopl~ who speak a language will be
admitted. -->7?
(b) At most people who speak a Rornanc.e language
will be admitted.
The problem, than, is th i s : as demons t r a t ed by (42)(a), NPIs (nay
occur in relative clauses in the focus of Q!!.l~. Representing (42)(b),
in accor-dance with l.'s suggestion, as in (44), it is clear that (44)
does not entail (45): that is, it is clear that Qnl~ is .io t DE with
respect to its focus. Fher e t or e L. has no way to explain the
acceptability of NPIs in re1ative clauses in the focus of Qnl~, as in
(42)(a).
I think that: the pron l em with Qnl~ is that it licenses NPIs by
the relation to if nQi; that is, the sent~nces in (42) could be
paraphrased as below:
(47)(a) If scmeone hasn't ever been to Paris, he will not be
admitted.
(b) If someone doesn't speak a languagq, he will not be
admitted.-I>
(c) If sumeone doesn't speak a Romance language, he will not
be admitted.
(48) below demonstrates that the antecedent clause of (47)(c) doesn't
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entail the antecedent clause of (47)(b); thus there is no UE for IF to
rever se , and the f ail UI' e 0 f (4 7) ( b ) toent ail ( 47 ) ( c ) pre sen t s n0
problem for the characterization of IF as a DE expression.
(48)(a) X doesn't speak a Romance language-I>
(b) X doesn't speak a language
(NOTE: Ignore specific readings of ~ l~ngu~gg in the above examples.)
But since Q.nlt is to be treated as a single expression, to c l a im
that it is DE is to claim that IF (NOT 0--) is a DE context, i.e. a
context in which upward entailments should be reversed. But clearly
it is not: and QnlJ is not DE with respect to its focus, although it
may be decomposed into IF (NOT 0--), which contains two DE
expression~. Therefore the acceptability of NPIs in the focus of Qnly
presents ~ problem for L.'s account.
SUMMARY OF SECTION 6.2. We have seen in this section that NPIs
are sometimes acceptable in non DE environments. Since L. is
attempting to define the necessary conditions for the occurence of
NPls, such contexts are a very serious problem for his account.
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6.3 UNACCEPTABLE NPIs IN THE ~COPE OF A DE OPERATOR
In this section I will examine some cases of unacceptable NPls
which are in the scope of a DE operator. Such cases are not in
themselves counterexamples to L. 's fairly restricted proposal, as he
is only attempting to describe the necessary conditions for an
operator to be a trigger: these conditions may not be sufficient to
guarantee NPI acceptability. However, the range and extensiveness of
this set of cases raises some questions abcut the char'acterization of
affectives as DE operators. We will note the following cases:
intervening logical elements (6.3.1), promises (6.3.2), comparatives
(6.3.3), NPI squishiness (6.3.4), and queclaratives (6.3.5).
6.3.1 INTERVENING LOGICAL ELEMENTS.
In Chapter 3 I showed that when quantifiers, predicates like
CAUSE or TRUE, or other logical elements intervene between NOT and the
representation of the NPI in semantic representation the NPI is
frequently unacceptable, despite that such ~Qn!gAl~ are DE.
Consider external negation (treated, for simplicity's sake, as
the intervention of the operator TRUE) and intervening quantifier's.
(49)(a) *He didn't give everybody a red cent.
(b) NOT Ax (he gave x a red cent)
(60)(a) He didntt give everybody a book.-->
(b) He didn't give everybody a blue book.
(51)(8) .It is not the case that he holds a
candle to John.
(b) NOT TRUE (he holds a candle to John)
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(52)(a) It is not the case that he gave me a book.-->
(b) It is not the case that he gave me a blue book.
(NOTE: Ignore the wide scope readings for g RQQK and ~ Qlyg nQQ~ in
(50) and (52).) Despite the unacceptability of NPIs in the abovs :
sentences, DE is possible in the s ame contexts.
functioning as a DE operator in these sentences.
6.3.2 PROMISES
NOT, t hat is, i s
The second example of an environment which permits DE but not
NPIs comes from promises introduced by if. In Chapter 4 it was
observed that for apparently pragmatic reasons NPIs are unacceptable
in the antecedent clauses of such sentences. Of course, IF is a DE
operator in L. 's account. For example:
(53)(a) If you contribute a red cent, I'll slap you. THREAT
(b)*If you contribute a red cent, I'll give you
five dollars. PROMISE
Since the if clauses appear to be equally DE in promises or threats,
the DE theory has no explanation for the difference in acceptability
between (53)(a) and (b). (Of course, the DE theory is not disproved
by it, either.)
6.3.3 COMPARATIVES
The case of promises shows that if does not automatically license
NPIs. Similarly, comparatives do not automatically render NPIs
acceptable, as was demonstrated in Chapter 4 in connection with
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sentences such as the following.
(54)(a) Cows fly more often than John lifts a
finger to help Louise.
(b).I breathe more often than John lifts a finger to
help Louise.
The di fference between (54) (a) and (b) was seen to be de t e rm i ned by
real world context; during a contest to see who can hold his breath
longest, (54)(b) might sound more acceptable. But mQ£g is equally DE
in both cases, as the entailment from (55)(a) to (55)(b) demonstrates.
(55)(a) It rains more often than I eat bread.-->
(b) It rains more often than I eat whole wheat bread.
Clearly (55)(a) entails (55)(b). So we find another case of NPIs
unaccepte~le in the scope of a DE operator.
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6.3.4 NPI SQUISHINESS
It has long been noted that NPIs vary greatly among themselves
with respect to the contexts in which they are acceptable. The list
of tr i qqar s in Chapter 4 should make this clear.
This squish raises some questions about L.·s account. First, it
creates additiunal cases of DE environments which are not uniformly
hospitible to NPIs. Some account must be given of the unacceptability
of the {d~ sentences in the list of triggers in Chapter 4. Although
such an account is hardly available in our theory either, the rough
correlation between the 'strength' of an NPI and the semantic
'distance' from negation that it can tolerate offers at least the
beginnings of an explanation for these cases. But how can one
operator be more or less downward entailing than another? And in fact,
since NPIs do not even have to be in a DE context at all, but only in
the scope of a DE operator, they can't be all that sensitive to
'degrees of DE-ness', were there to be such a thing. That is, it's
rat her s us pic i 0 U S that a 11 NPIs are ace eptab1e i n t he i mme d i ate scope
of NOT and that it is only in the other contexts that their
acceptability varies.
6.3.5 QUECLARATIVES
The tendency of NPIs to force the queclarative interpretation of
questions containing them. noted in Barkin (1975), will have to be
dealt with in l.'s 'part (b)'. Given that he claims NPIs to have no
particular affiliation with negation, it is not clear how his theory
can explain this fact.
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SUMMARY OF SECTION 6.3
We have seen that there is a large residue of 'part (b)' cases
for L. 's account: they are presumably assigned interpretations by the
grammar (since an NPI is in the scope of a DE operator) and filtered'
out later on the basis of use. But what do these unacceptable
sentences have in common that can be described without reference to
negation? Do they 'allude' to non-downward-entailing environments?
Having banished ;mplicature (as distinct from entailment from
truth-conditional meaning) from part (a) even at the cost of claiming
that speakers jUdge NPI acceptability on the basis of such extrem~ly
unnatural 'entailments' as that claimed for (56) below, it seems
awkward to bring it back in to rule out the bad sentences.
(66)(a) He was surprised that she had a dog.-->?
(b) He was surprised that she had a dog worth
$3 million.
Thus part (b) seems to present problems for L.'s account. because
the unacceptable sentences that his theory must filter out "do not form
as natural a class (on the face of it) as the class of part (b) cases
which in our account have at least a common allusion to negation,
whatever its mechanics. And in any event it is important to take note
of how much is still left outside sentence grammar in L.'s account;
this is of course not a weakness of his theory, but it makes ·his claim
that 'the property of being a trigge~ is completely predictable from
the truth conditional meaning of a sentence' appear somewhat inflated.
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6.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 6
In thi~ chapter I have examined Ladusaw's attempt to characterize
NPI triggers in terms of the entailments of the sentences in which
they occur. Such a characterization of 'affective' would be quite
desirable and much more satisfying than the hand-waving that r have
argued for in the preceding chapters. Unfortunately, even L. 's highly
restricted proposals (requiring that NPls be 'in the scope of a DE
operator' but not necessarily in a DE context, stating this
requirement as a necessary but not sufficient condition on NPIs, and
restricting the entire account to scalar endpoint NPIs) seem beset by
serious problems.
The first set of problems arises in connection with the large
class of adversatives of propositional attitude, e.g. ~Yrnri~~. They
force L. to make claims about entailments from opaque contexts which
(1) require so many additional assumptions that we are no longer
talking about entailment at all, and (2) lead to false conclusions
when embedded into a chain of other entailments.
The second set of problems arises from expressions which trigger
NPIs but are not DE: expressions denoting wrong ideas, loss, and
forgetfUlness; and 2nl~.
A third set of facts which to some extent weaken L. '5 theory are
the cases that he will have to treat as part (b). The
characterization of part (b) in his theory may turn out to be quite
problematic on account of his claim that NPIs have no special
connection with negation.
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FOOTN~TES
1. NPIs are not generally acceptable in the focus of Qnl~, however,
as demonstrated by (i) with hQl~~ ~ ~gn~l~ 1Q as the focus.
(i)*Ha only holds a candle to us, he isn't BETTER.
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CHAPTER 7: SURFACE STRUCTURE RESIDUE
In Chapter 3 it was suggested that the only restriction placed on
NPIs by sentence qr ammar is the Immediate Scope Constraint. wh-ich
marks as unacceptable <SS.LF> pairs if the representation of an NPI is
not i~ the immediate scope of negation in IF. It was claimed that the
sensitivity of NPIs to their surface structure ~elation to the trigger
(demonstrated by sentences (1)-(7) in Chapter 1. for example) is not
statable in terms of any explicit surface str'ucture restriction on
NPIs. Rather. certain configurations are unacceptable because (1)
they result. when they are input to the SS-->LF mapping rules sketched
i~ Chapter 3, in <SS,LF> pairs which fail the ISC; and (2) these
sentences not only fail the ISC but on account of the logical
structure that they have as a result of these mapp i nq rules also fail
to give rise to appropriate implicature for part (b).
In this chapter I consider in more detail the possibility of
eliminating explicit reference to surface structure constraints on
NPIs. Section 7.1 concerns the desirability of such a move; section
7.2 is a review (and expansion) of the evidence presented in Chapter 3
that independently motivated SS-->LF mapping rules are sufficient to
predict the varying NPI acceptability in sentences like (1)-(7) in
Chapter 1. Section 7.3 is an examination of some problems associated
with this position; specifically, of Yna"~Rtabl~ sentences (1) which
contain NPIs preceding the negative in surface structure, and (2) for
which the SS-->LF mapping rules might be expected to produce lFs of
the form X NOT NPI Y. Do such sentences consitute evidence that there
are surface structure restrictions on NPIs in addition to the ISC?
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7.1. THE DESIRABILITY OF ELIMINATING SPECIFIC SURFACE
STRUCTURE RESTRICTIONS ON NPIs
The first reason for attempting to eliminate such restrictions
is. of course, the simplicity of having only one rule of sentence
grammar (the ISC) governing the distribution of NPIs. And the surface
structure restrictions on NPIs are not simple to state. Recall from
Chapter 3 the restriction on adversatives that they may not be
commanded by the NPI they trigger unless the NPI occurs in an
expression that receives a propositional interpretation. This
restriction, which renders (1) unacceptable, does not apply to fiQ1, as
demonstrated by (2).
(1).1 dislike any linguists.
(2) I don't like any linguists.
Thus there would h~ve to be, in addition to the 15C, at least two
distinct sentence grammar restrictions on NPls, depending upon whether
or not the trigger is an adversative. This clearly complicates the
task of the language learner.
The second reason for attempting to eliminate explicit surface
structure restrictions on NPIs is that the same restrictions apply to
a wide variety of part (b) triggers, not merely to llQl and the
neg-incorporated words.
(3)(a) Only John ate any bagels.
(b) Nobody but John ate any bagels.
1
(c) *Any bagels' were eaten only by John.
(4)(8) About one person in a million shows any interest in
the sUbject.
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(b) Nobody shows any interest in th9 subject.
(c)*Any interest in the subject is shown by about one
person in a million.
(d).Nine out of ten people show any interest in the subject.
The (a) sentences above contain NPIs acceptable by virtue of part (b), .
with implicature along the lines of the (b) sentences above. The (c)
sentences show that the NPI may not precede and command such a part
(b) trigger. «4)(d) demonstrates that gYQY! Qng n~r~Qn in g milliQll
is in fa~t the trigger in (4)(a).) Thus if there is a specific surface
structure restriction on NFls, it will presumably also apply to the
relationship between NPIs and part (b) triggers, i.e. expressions
that are identifiable as triggers only at the level of 'complete
semantic representation'. Thus if there is such a surface structure
restriction we will have to say that notions like 'precede and command
in surface structure' play an explicit role well beyond sentence
grammar.
Third, it is not always clear that there is a specific lexical
item or items that can be identified (for the purposes of the surface
structure restriction) as the trigger. For examp 1e , what is the
trigger in (6) below? (This sentence was discussed in Chapter 4.)
(5) lift a. finger and I'll shoot!
;. I
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7.2. SS-->LF MAPPING RULES AND NPls: THE EASY CASES
In Chapter 3 I sketched a rough scope component along the lines
of the proposals in Krach (1974) in which the basic surface order of
quantifiers, negatives. and other logical elements;s followed, with
readjustment rules such as the following: A E-->E A, E A-->A E,
NOT E-->E NOT, A NOT-->NOT A. (A, E, and NOT may have various lexical
representations; m~n~ he treats as a manifestation of E.) Roughly,
then, order is almost free, with a conspicuous exception being that E
NOT cannot be readjusted to NOT E. Thus (O)ea) is first mapped onto
(6)(b). but readjustment rules allow the reading (G)(e). (Notice that
no special intonation is required in order to effect this switch.)
Sentence (7)(a), however, can be assigned only the LF (7)(b), although
(8)(a) can be assigned (B)(b) or (8)(c).
(6)(a) Everybody didn't answer question 5.
(b) [Ax: x is a person] NOT (x answered question 5)
(e) NOT [Ax: x is a person] (x answered question 5)
(7)(a) Many people didn't answer question 5.
(b [MANYx: x is a person] NOT (x answered question 5)
(8)(a) He didn't answer many questions.
(b) NOT [MANYx: x is a question] (he answered x)
(e) [MANYx: x is a question] NOT (he answered x)
If the additional rules needed for structures with focus and external
negation (whose relevance to NPIs was discussed in Chapter 3) are
added to these rules, and if it is also assumed that at least some
adverb1als are assigned scope analogously to quantifiers (since they
exhibit scope ambiguities with respect to NOT and quantifiers), then
222
perhaps it is possible to account for the distribution of NPIs without
any more specific reference to surface structure.
Of course, scope is much more Gonstrained by surface structure
2
than this rough set of rules r~flects. And clearly additional rules
are required to assign the corrpct scope to the negation operator in
sentence~ like I n~Y~L hQug !Q ~~g ~ nYrRl~ tQW, where the negative
3
seems to fuse witn the verb. But these rules seem to cover the scope
phenomena most relevant to NPIs.
Below, six surface structure configurations of NPls and their
triggers are exemplified. and their unacceptability (or acceptability)
is seen to be determined by this rough scope component, with no
specific reference to NPIs. For each configuration there is given (a)
an example sentence, (b) the LF of that sentence, with a paraphrase in
some cases, and (c) a possible implic~ture derivable from the LF, for
those sentences which are acceptable.
(9) NPI PRECEDING AND COMMANDING NOI:
(a) *Anybody didn't laugh.
(b) [Ex. x is a person] NOT (x laughed)
'There is someone who didn't laugh.'
(e) ?
(10; NPI COMMAHDING ADVERSATIVE TnIGGER (NO PROPOSITIONAL
INTERPRETAT ION) :
(a) .1 dislike any linguists.
(b) [Ex: x are linguists] (I dislike x)
'Tnere is a linguist whom I dislikd.·
(c) 1
(11) NPI IN COMPLEMENT CLAUSE OF ADVERSATIVE:
(a) ! dislike having to invite any lingu~sts.
(b) I dislike ([Ex: x are linguists] (I have to invite x»
'I dislike the situation in which I have
to invite a linguist or linguists. t
(c) I want (NOT [Ex: x are linguists] (I invite x»
'I want there to be no linguists invited by me.'
(12) NPI PRECEDING BUT NOT COMMANDING HOI:
(a) That he had stolen anything was never proved.
(Ross (1961»
(b) {(Ex (He stole x» was never proved.
(e) POSSIBLE NOT Ex (he stole x)
'Qu;te possibly, there is nothing that ne stole.'
(13) NON-QUANTIFIER NPI PRECEDING AND COMMANDING
NEGATIVE INCORPORATED WORD:
(a) He gives a damn about no one but himself.
(or: She can help doing NONE of those things.)
(b) NOT [Ex: x is a person and x~him](he gives a damn
about x)
'There is nobody who he cares about.'
(e} [Ax: x is a person and x/him] NOT (he gi~es
a damn about x)
(14) I)UANTIFIER t:PI PRECEDING AND COMMANDING
NEGATIVE INCORPORATED WORD:
(a).1 gave any pictures to no on8.
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(b) [Ex: x ;s a picture] NOT Ey (I gave x to y)
'There is a picture which I didn't give to
anybody. '
(e) ?
The configurations (9)-(11) were discussed in Chapter 3, and the
reasons for acce"tability or unacceptability are self-evident from the
LFs that the scope component assigns in each tase. S i In i 1ar 1y ,
although (12)(b) does not satisfy the ISC, it is clear that there is
an implicature as in (12)(c) derivable from this LF. The difference
between (13) and (14) can be attributed to the fact that giY~ ~ ~Mmn
AhQu! is not a quantifier: since it is not a~signed scope, it is in
the scope of NOT in the LF (13)(b): the intervening existential
quantifier violates the ISC (it was argued in Chapter 3) but there is
clearly ~n implicature (13)(c) derivable from this LF. But in (14),
the existential quantifier AllX precedes the negative ng Qn~ (which,
incidentally, must be treated as a negative rather than as an
existential quantifier in terms of the readjustment rules) in surface
structure and hence the LF (14)(b) must be assigned: as with (9) and
(10). this IF not only violates the ISC but does not SAem to give rise
to any appropriate implicature.
So for at least the basic case~ (9)-(14) we can rely on the scope
component to generate. for the acceptable sentences only, LFs which
either allow the <SS,LF> pair to satisfy the ISC or give rise to
implicatures that do.
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7.3. PROBLEMS
Some difficulties with the proposal made abGve will be discussed
briefly here.
7.3.1 NONSPECIFIC NPs
It is perhaps a problem for this analysis that indefinite NPs
preceding DQl in surface structure can sometimes be assigned a
nonspecific interpretation. Thus in (16) ~ dQ&lQ[ has as its most
natural reading the nonspecific one; it has often been suggested that
indefinite NPs can be represented by the existential quantifiAr, and
that in sentences with negation the specific reading is to be
distinguished from the nonspecific one by the fact that the latter is
4
in the scope of negation. Following this suggestivn, (15) would be
represented by (16)(a) or (16)(b), with the former the specific
reading and the latter the nonspecific reading.
(15) A doctor wasn't available.
(16)(a) [Ex: x is a doctor] NOT (x was available)
'There w~s a doctor who was not available.'
(For example, in answer to the question 'What was
the complaint about?')
(b) NOT [Ex: x is 8 doctor] (x was available)
'There was no doctor available.'
HPls, of course, are not acceptable in the same position, as (17)
shows:
(17).Any doctors weren't available .
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The SS-->lF mapping rules discussed in section 7.2 can only assign to
(17) an LF like (16)(a) above; similarly an existential quantifier
like mADy--let us follow Krach in treating it as existential. although
it is not indisputably so--cannot readjust its scope with NOT, as
demonstrated by the lack of ambiguity of (18).
(18) Many doctors weren't available.
That is, (17) and (18) can only be assigned LFs with the scope order
E NOT, while (15) does have a reading in which the order is NOT E.
I don't have any explanation for this difference between
indefinite NPs on the one hand and anx/m~nl on the other. Krach
(1974) notes that only certain predicates permit the sUbject NP to be
nonspecific (and hence a meaning-blind readjustment rule could not
account f~r the difference between surface and interpreted order of
the indefinite article and NOT in (15)). For example, compare (15)
above, which has as its preferred reading that in which the subject is
nonspecific, with (19):
(19) A doctor didn't know what to do.
In (19), A ~g'lQr must be specific; there simply isn't the reading
'there wasn't a doctor who knew what to do.'
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KrOLh makes the following suggestion:
In forming the initial semantic representation for a
sentence all existential quantifiers that correspond to
simple indefinite plural [or singular] NP's should be placed
to the right of all auxiliary operators in the sentence
(i.e., fiQ!, m2d~11).
In any event, the fact that indefinites seem to differ
systematically from indisputable quantifiers like MANY and ANY
suggests that (16) is not necessarily fatal for our account: that is,
the fact that an indefinite NP preceding the negative can receive a
nonspecific intel~pretation does not mean that anx preceding llQ1 in the
same position has the possibility of being assigned narrow scope with
respect to NOT. (If this were the case, there would be a serious
problem since the unacceptability of such sentences (e.g. (17)) would
have to be attributed to the surface structure configuration of dllX
and ll21 rather than to the LF onto which the sentence is forced by its
surface structure to be mapped.
Note that this difference between indefinite NPs and quantifiers
like mjn~ affects the acceptability of NPIs in relative clauses
preceding the negative:
(20)(a)1 couldn't find many doctors there who knew anything
about acupuncture.
(b)I couldn't find a doctor there who knew anything
about acupuncture.
(21)(a) A doctor who knew anything about acupuncture was
not available.
(b) *Many doctors who knew anything about acupuncture
were not available.
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(22) *A doctor who knew anything about acupuncture did
not agree with the diagnosis: in fact. he called
Dr. Smith a 'despicable quack'.
The generalization about (20)-(22) is. as widely noted, that NPIs
are acceptable in relative clauses headed by existentially quantified·
NPs only if the NP is nonspecific (conditioned by negation). Since in
(20) the head of the relative clause (whether it is m~n~ dQ~lQL~ or ~
~Qk!Qr) follows the negative. it can be nonspecific: NPIs are
therefore acceptable in the relative clause by part (b). as discussed
in Chapter 4. But if the head precedes the negative then only
relative clauses headed by indefinite NPs are acceptable, as (21)
demonstrates. If the head is m~n~. NPIs are not acceptable in the
relative clause. This of course follows from the fact that the
indefinite NP, but not m~nl. can be interpreted as taking narrow scope
with respect to NOT: thus only the former can be nonspecific and
therefore able to trigger NPIs in the relative clause. «(22)
demonstrates that if the head is specific NPIs may not occur in the
relative clause.)
Thus even if the relative clause with the NPI follows fiQl the
NPIs are unacceptable if the head is man~ Nf:
(23)(a) A ~octor wasn't available who knew anything
about acupuncture.
(b).Many doctors weren't available who knew anything
about aGupuncture.
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7.3.2 RAISED QUANTIFIERS
The scope rules proposed in section 7.2 would predict that
(24)(8) has only the interpretation (24)(b), whereas in fact it has a
reading in which mAnx is in the scope of NOT.
represent this reading as in (24)(c).
Let us tentatively
(24)(a) Mary people aren't lik31y to arrive on time.
(b) [MANYx: x is a person] NOT LIKELY (x arrive on time)
'There are many people who are unlikely to arrive
on time.'
(e) NOT LIKELY ([MANYx: x is a person] (x arrive on time»
'It's not likely that many people will arrive
on time.'
But NPls are still unacceptable in the same position as man~:
(25)(a)*Any linguists aren't likely to arrive on time.
POSSIBLE LFs OF (26)1
(b) [Ex: x is a linguist] NOT LIKELY (x arrive on time)
(e) NOT LIKELY([Ex: x is a linguist] (x arrive on time»
(26) It's not likely that any linguists will arrive on time.
Notice that NPIs are acceptable (by part (b), since LIKELY
intervenes) in (26), which is the paraphrase of (25)(c).
So there is a problem: if man~ in (24) can be interpreted as
being in the scope of negation, why can't ADX in (25)1 Since the most
obvious difference between the acceptable (26) and the unacceptable
(26)(8) is that n21 precedes ADX in th6 former but not in the latter,
some alternative explanation must be found if specific surface
structure restrictions on NPIs are to be eliminated.
The only explanation that I can offer for this is that (24)(8)
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seems to require, in order to receive the interpretation (24)(c), that
it be in response to some suggestion that many people WILL arrive on
time. That is, it is difficult to interpret (24)(a) as introducing
the fact that there will be few people arriving on time, i.e.
(24)(c); (27) below seems to be a more felicitous way of introducing
this fact:
(27) It's not likely that many people will arrive on time.
That is, it's possible that (24)(a) receives the interpretation
(24)(c) only if it is a denial or external negation: certainly (24)(a)
must be spoken with a fair amount of stress on gL~n'1 in order to get
the reading (24)(c). Thus we can say that (24)(a) and (25)(a) do not
actually receive the interpretations (24)(c) and (25)(c) respectively,
but rather (28) and (29) below. As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, NPIs
are generally unacceptable in sentences which are interpreted as
denial or external negation. That is, (29) will be unlikely to give
rise to an appropriate implicature and (25)(a) is therefore
unacc9ptable.
(28) NOT TRUE (LIKELY ([MANYx: x is a person] (x arrive on time))
(29) NOT TRUE (LIKELY ([Ex: x is a person] (x arrive on lime)
This is not, of course, a particularly satisfying story_
7.3.3 PART (B) TRIGGERS
As noted above, there seem to be surface structure .'astrictions
on the configuration of NPis and part (b) triggers.
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In (30) below, l~~~ !hAll ~~Dl~ 21 ih~ RQUYl~!iQn functions as a
pragmatic negative, aliowing NPIs by part (b), while 1§~~ 1han lDDI
does not. In (31). NPIs are unacceptable because passivization
reverses the surf1ce order of the NPI and the pragmatic trigger.
(30)(a) Less than .001% of the population made any progress.
(b).Less than 100% of the population made any progress.
(31).Any progress was made by less than .001% of the
population.
(32) Almost nobody made any progress.
(30)(a) is presumably acceptable because it implies (32). Note that
there is an acceptable reading of (3l), where the an~ is interpreted
as heading an implied relative clause: 'Any progress that was in fact
made was made by .001% of the population.'
These sentences pose a problem for any attempt to dispense with
specific surface structure restrictions on NPls since the most obvious
difference between the acceptable (30)(a) and the unacceptable (31) is
that the quantificational expre~sion functioning as a pragmatic
negative precedes An~ in the former but not in the latter. The scope
rules proposed above account for the unacceptability of NPI
quantifiers preceding an actual negative, since NPI quantifiers are
uniformly existential and there are no readjustment rules to derive
NOT E from E NOT. But in (31) the expression l~~~ lh~n ~~Dl~ is not
an explicit negative so it might be expected to be able to switch
scope ordering.
Again. I can only appeal to the parallel behavior of MANY. As
(33) and (34) demonst~ate. the scope ambiguity that is possible
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between MANY and a quantifier like SEVERAL doos not seem to be
possible between MANY and FE~ or LESS THAN .001%. Perhaps the
semantic 'topicalization' effect associated with reassigning wide
scope to the righthand quantifier in surface structure is
inappropriate if the meaning of the quantifier is roughly FEW. This
inappropriateness is parhaps paralleled by the oddness of (35)(~ J as
contrasted with (35)(b).
(33)(a) Many people agreed with several of his suggestions.
POSSIBLE LFs:
(b) [MANYx: x is a person] [SEVERALy: y his suggestions]
(x agreed with y}
'There were many people who agreed with several
suggestions.'
(e) [SEVERALy: y his suggestions] [MANYx: x is a person]
(~ agreed wlth y)
'There were several suggestions which met with
widespread approval.'
(34)(a) Many people agreed with less than .001% of his
few of
suggestions.
(b) [MANYx: x is a person] [LESS THAN .OOl%y: y his suggestions]
[FEWy:
(x agreed with y)
'There were many people who agreed with (only) .001%
of/few of his suggestions.'
(c) NOT AVAILABLE?
[LESS THAN .OOl%y: y his suggestions] [MANYx: x is
[FEWy:
a person (x agreed with y)
'Less than .001% of/few of his suggestions met with
widespread approval.'
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(36)(a)??Few of his suggestions many people agreed with.
(b) A few of his suggestions many people agreed with.
If there is such a reading as (34)(c), it has a strong flavor of
denial.
7.3.4 WH-WORUS AND NPIs
It is suggested in lawler (1971) that there is a surface
structure requirement on NPIs in wn-questions: that the wh word. prior
to being extracted, precede (and of course command) the NPI. He cites
sentences like the following:
(36)(a) Who ate anything?
(b)?oWhat did anybody eat 7
He suggests that (36)(b) is unacceptable and cit~s it as evidence of
such a surface structure restriction on NPIs and the 'trigger', which
restriction must apply before the wh word moves.
If this were true, it would be a problem for the attempt to
eliminate specific reference to surface structure and NPIs, for the
following reason. Let us assume that in such questions the WD word
prior to m6vement is to be regarded as the 'trigger': why else would
there be such a surface structure restriction on it and the NPI7 The
problem 1s that since the wb-word is almost always assigned widest
scope in LF, such a restriction on surface order could not be
explained by saying that the surface order simply resulted in a
certain order in LF. No matter which surface order they occur in, the
!h-word should generally end up with wider scope than AnX in LF.
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In fact, there does not seem to be any such restriction.
(36)(b), for one thing, would be acceptable as a rhetorical question
in the right context (Lawler in the same article observes the tendency
of NPIs in wh-questions to force the rhetorical reading: see Chapter
4); furtherm~re, the following sentences seem to be indisputably
acceptable, hence a counterexample to his claim that the wn-word must
precede the N?I prior to wh-movement.
(37) What have any of them ever done for you?
(38) Which books have any students complained about?
(38) does not have to have a rhetorical interpretation; it would
be appropriate as a true question if, for example, I am making up a
reading list for a course and want to know which books have elicited
complaints in the.past.
This concludes the summary of problems raised by the attempt to
eliminate specific reference to surface structure restrictions on
NPIs.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Ignore the reading 'any bagels that there might have been ... '
2. See May (1977), Krach (1974).
3. See Kiparsky (1970).
4. See Chapter 3, section 3.2.4, on the question of NP specificity
and the scope of negation.
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CHAPTER 8: WHAT ARE NPIs?
Since the Immediate Scope Constraint applies only to NPIs, they
must be lexically marked as such. The problems associated with the
attempt to demarcate such a class within the lexicon are examined in
this chapter, along with the more general question of why NPIs exist
at all.
Let us take the set of NPIs to comprise only those expressions
whose presence 'dn cause the <SS,LF> pair of the sentence in whic~
they occur to be marked as unacceptable by the ISC. While it is
obvious that the class of NPls must include g~gf or hQ14 g ~~n~l~ !Q,
what about ~ thing? Consider (1)-(3) below.
(1) I don't want a thing.
(2)1?1 want a thing.
(3)(a) I want a thing--a toy. a book, something concrete.
(b) He wrote a thing up for .L-J-I..L yesterday.
Despite the extreme oddness of (2), thing is obviously aot an NPI, as
the sentences in (3) demonstrate. Expressions like ~ !hing are cited
in Schmerling (1971) in a discussion of the difficulties associa~ed
with simply labelling lexi~al items as NPIs.
Thus .t t is necessary to distinguish between cer t a i n uses of
non-HPJ expressions in negative contexts, e.g. the use of fiQ! .. ~
lhing in (1) to mean Dnlhing; and expressions which can only occur
w;th NOT, £.g. ~Xi[. In this chapter I examine three ways in which
regular lexical items may coma to be used I!abitually in the immediate
scope of NOT. and argue that there are NPI subsets of these classes of
habitually negated expressions: the NPIs, that is, are the frozen
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forms. These classes are: (1) 'scalar endpoints', (2) 'understaters',
and (3) habitually negated verbs. The point at which an expression
has become an HPI, i.e. when it m.u~.t occur in this negative
environment, is of course hard to fix. For eAch of th3 three types of
habitually negated expressions there can be distinguished, on the
basis of their degree of dependence upon NOT, three subclasses: (1)
'independents', (2) 'near NPIs', and (3) 'true NPIs'.
In section 8.1 the first class of habitually negated eypreSS10ns,
the scalar endpoints, is examined. In section 8.2, the three degrees
of dependence upon NOT are defined upon this class. In section 8.3
the second class of habitually negated expressions, the understaters,
i sexam i ned: insec t ion 8 . 4 • :;oIne habituall y ne!J ate d v6 r bs are
exami ned.
The ~~rpose of~tha f~llowing discussion, then, is to determine
whether it is possible to lexically mark the NPIs, i.e. those
expressions whi~h must (in the paradigm case) occur in the immediate
scope of NOT. It 'tS argued that only if we clarify the distinction
between the habitual occurence an expression in the env i r onmen t of N(~T
and its restriction to that context will we be able to mar-k NPIs as
NPIs. and hence to constrain their distribution by the ISe.
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8.1 SCALAR ENDPOINTS
Recall from Chapter 6 the observation of Fauconnier that many
NPIs, e.g. lift A fingg.c. are expressions which are appr-oj.. iate as
scalar endpoints. From the failure of someone to lift a finger, for
examplo, one can reasonably conclude that he hasn't moved at all.
tlQlg ~ ~An~l~ 12 is another example: to be IJnable to hold a candle to
someone is to be unfit even to perform the subordinate's duty of
holding up a candle to provide iight; thus if one isn't even fit to be
someone's subordinate. one cannot possibly be superiol' to him.
Clearly in the r1ass of scalar endpoint NPIs are all those NPIs which
have an ~~istential interpretation: ~nx, ~ rg~ ~gn!, ~ bQQ~ in hftll, a
~~ill, etc.
It was demonstrated in Chapter 6 that logical 'downward
entailment' does not seem to playa role in the distribution of NPIs.
We will see here that it also does not correlate ~ith the pragmatic DE
described by Fauconnier (henceforth 'DE' to distinguish it from
logical DE).
Consider, for example, ID§ iimRl~~! RrQnl~m in (4): it can
function as the upper endpoint of the scale associated with the
proposition schema Alh§£l ~An ~21~~ X and therebj induce 'downward
entailment' of the truth of the proposition for all values of X lower
on the scale. That is, since the simplest problem is the most likely
problem to be solved, there is downward implicature that Albert can
1
solve no problems whatsoever.
(4) Albert can't solve the simplest problem.
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What is interesting is that lhg ~imQlg~1 R£Qnlgm cannot necessarily be
taken as s~ch an upper endpoint if it is not in the immediate scope of
NOT. Thus consider the following sentences (with the readings given):
!hi ~imRl§~t Dr2Ql~m does not seem to function as an upper endpoint in
those readings in which it is not in the immediate scope of NOT.
(5)(a) It's not true that Albert can salve the simplest problem
(b) NOT TRUE (Albert can solve the simplest problem)
(6)(a) Albert CAN NOT solve the sim~lest problem. (DENIAL)
(b) NOT TRUE (Albert can solve the simplest problem)
(7)(a) All my friends can't solve the simplest problem.
(b) Reading in which 'DE' is impossible:
NOT [Ax: x is a friend of mine] (x can solve the
simplest problem)
'It's not the case that each of my friends can
solve the simplest problem.'
(c) Reading in which 'DE' is possible:
[Ax: x is a friend af mine] NOT (x can solve the
simplest problem)
'It's true of each of my friends that he can't
solve the simplest problem.'
(8)(a) ALBERT can't solve the simplest problem. (AtF)
(b) NOT (the x such that (x can solve the simplest
problem) = Albert)
In (5)-(8) abovQ, the inability of ih~ ~imal~~! nLQhl~m to
function as an upper endpoint, i.8. the impossibility of pragmatic
'DE', is in contrast to the possibility of logical DE. That is, if a
R£2blim is substituted for tht ~imRl§l1 Rr2Rl~m in the above
sentences, and if the entailment in (9) holds, then a ~imal~ D£2hl§m
is substitutable for A Q£2hlim 1i~j ~i£ili!i.
(9)(8) Albert can solve a simple problem. -->
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(b) Albert can solve a problem.
The reader can verify that expressions like ~~~n R£2nl~m J and 1 Rlu~
1 behave like lhi ~imDl~~t R[Qbl~m in (5)-(8): that is, they behave
like upper endpoints inducing pragmatic 'DE' primarily in the"
immediate scope of NOT.
Pragmatic 'DE' seems to have a part (~), as demonstrated by (10):
(10) I didn't hire him because I think he can solve
~the simplest problem.
tall that many problems.
Sentence (10) seems to have the implicature (11), as discussed in
Chapter 4.
(11) I think that he can't solveUhe simplest problem.
(all that many problems.
Thus th~ ~imDl~~! R£Qbl~m functions as an upper endpoint in (10) by
virtue of the same implicature which iicenses the NPI all !h~! mAnx.
That is. pragmatic 'DE' seems to have roughly the same
distribution as NPIs: given an expression which is p~agmatical1y
appropriat~ as an upper endpoint, a sufficient condition on 'DE' is
that this expression occur in the immediate scope of NOT. Like NPIs,
'DE' can occur in other environments given appropriate implicature.
2
Those NPIs which denote scalar endpoints, then, may be seen as
froze" forms in the much larger class of expressions which induce 'DE'
in the immediate scope of NOT: the Immediate Scope Constr-a f nt simply
encodes this fact.
As Fauconnier observes, both polar;ty ADl and free choice An~
denote scalar endpoints, although at opposite ends of the scale. Thus
their hcmonymtty and mirror-image 'Immediate Scope Constraints' are
far from coincidental.
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The 'Immediate Scope Constraint' for free
choice ADX (discussed in Chapter 3) may well have pragmatic analogues;
this is a question still to be pursued.
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8.2 DEGREES OF DEPENDENCE UPON NOI
NPIs like lifl ~ fing~r, then, represent a subset of the class of
expressions which can be used as scalar endpoints if they occur in the
immediate scope of NOT. Only the NPIs, however, MUST occur in the"
immediate scope of NOT (or in a sentence with the appropriate
implicature). But it is not always clear when an expression is an NPI
and restricted to this environment or simply an expression that tends
to be so used but is free to occur elsewhere. In the attempt to bring
some order into th9 discussion, I will set up three rough classes
based upon the extent to which an expression is restricted to the
immediate scope of NOT. These three classes are (1) independents, (2)
near NPIs, and (3) true NPls.
(l) INDEPENDENTS. In this class are expressions which may be
used as scalar endpoints but occur freely, with their literal meaning,
outside the immediate scope of NOT. An example of an independent is ~
~i[~i, which acts as an endpoint in (12) but not in (13):
(12) He hasn't read a verse of the Bible.
(13) He read a verse of the Bible yesterday.
Clearly, the independents are not lexically marked as NPIs and their
specialized functioning in the immediate scope of NOT can be predicted
from the meaning of the sentence and the relevant facts about the
world.
The use of the independents as scalar endpoints by virtue of a
kind of 'part(b)' for scalar endpoints is not very common. In (14),
for example, it ;5 difficult to take A ~[1i as a scalar endpoint.
in any way marked, they would be
than marked NPIs to trigger a part(b)
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(14) I didn't realize that he had read a verse of the Bible.
Since the independents are not
expected to be less likely
reconstrual.
(2) NEAR NPIs. These are ~xpressions which have been used so
frequently with their specialized meaning in the environment of NOT
that they have begun to sound odd in non-negative contexts. They
still can occur in some such contexts, however; thus they cannot be
said to be only NPIs and the question of whether or not they are
lexically marked is thorny. For example, a thing in (1) above is
functioning as a scalar endpoint, but is a perfectly respectable
English word in non-negative contexts, as seen in sentence (3) above.
However, it sounds sufficiently odd unadorned by modifiers that it
triggers a part (b) reconstrual more easily than, say. ~ ~gL~~. which
has a more robust literal meaning.
(15) I didn't realize that he knew a thing about the Bible.
By 'trigger a part (b) reconstrual' I mean that the occurence of a
thing in (15) forces one to search for an implied sentence in which it
is in the immediate scope of NOT. (See Chapter 4.)
(3) True NPls. These are expressions which are unacceptable in
non-negative environments. and whose occurence out of the immediate
scope of NOT triggers a part (b) reanalysis. This reanalysis need not
be successful in order for an expression to be an NPI; for instance
(18) is unacceptable or at least very marginal but it nevertheless
conveys the 'need' for an appropriate impl~ed sentence.
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(16) His paper doesn't hold a candle to Mary's.
(17).H15 paper holds a candle to Mary's.
(18)1H9 doesn't realize that her paper holds a candle to his.
Thus we have established three rough subgroups of expressions
associated with NOT: the independents. the near NPIs, and the true
NPI5; they represent differing degrees of dependence upon negative
contexts.
As noted above, there has been considerable confusion about the
meaning of the term 'NPI'. The most general interpretation includes
in the class of NPIs all three of these subgroups; includes, that is,
any expression dependent upon NOT for a particular use or
interpretation. The most specific interpretation includes only the
expressions whose presence can cause the <SS,LF> pair associated with
the sentence in which they occur to be marked as unacceptable by the
ISC. The HPI environment is the same under both interpretations of
the term NPJ, of course: it is the immediate scope of NOT.
The independents and near NPIs in the class of scalar endpoints
have been cited as a problem for any theory of negative polarity which
requires that NPI~ be marked in the lexicon. Most notably. Schmerling
(1971) observed the open-ended nature of the class of scalar endpoints
3
of the form ALnl Hf, as in (19) below:
(19) I didn't do a thing.
hear a sound.
see a soul.
eat a bite.
say a word.
move a muscle.
sing a note.
598 a gray hair on his head.
pay a cent ..
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Noting the difficulties associated with trying to mark all the members
of this class as NPIs, she raises the possibility that NPIs cannot be
marked in the lexicon. However, it seems reasonable to make a
distinction, as above, between a certain pragmatic use of expressions
like A ~2Ung above and true NPIs, since only the latter are
unacceptable outside of a negative environment. The class of scalar
endpoint NPIs is drawn from the constantly changing pool of pragmatic
scalar endpoints. In the list in (19) above, only a ~Qul strikes me
as a true NPI, given the outright unacceptability of (20) below, with
the reading in which ~Qul means 'person' (as in 'a town of 2,000
souls').
(20).1 saw a soul at the party.
SUMMARY OF 8.2. In this section I have attempted to answer. for
the class of scalar endpoint NPIs, the question of whether or not NPIs
are marked as such in the lexicon. If we take the term 'HPI' in its
most general sense, i.e. as comprising all the lexical items or
particular uses of these lexical items which require t~e immediate
scope of NOT, then the answer is clearly 'no': the ability of
expressions to function as scalar endpoints is predictable by
pragmatic. principles and it would be absurd to mark these expressions
as possible scalar endpoints in the lexicon. Everything is a possible
scalar endpoint.
If, however. we use the term NPI in a more restricted sense to
include only those expressions which mUli occur in the immediate scope
of NOT or in a sentence with the appropriate implicature, then the
answer is clearly 'yes'. The difficulties noted by Schmerling apply
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only to the attempt to mark as an NPI any lexical item which ever
enters into one of the constructions which requires the immediate
scope of NOT.
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8.3 UNDERSTATERS
In this section I will examine a second pragmatic phenomenon
which gives rise to NPIs; again, the NPIs can be characterized as a
subset of frozen forms in a larger class of expressions which dre used"
in a certain way in the immediate scope of NOT.
These expressions include lbBi in its nonreferential usage (as in
'I don't know that much about it'. where ina! refers to no previously
established degree), unstressed mu~h, 122 not in the sense of
excessively (as in 'I don't know too much about it') and other
expressions whose meaning is roughly MANY rather than E. (Thus they
are not scalar endpoints.) These may loosely be called 'understaters'
because they seem in many cases like a way of softening by MOST NOT by
understatement, with an analogue in the use of lhLill in (21) to
convey 'I'm actually displeased.' That is, the full extent of one's
displeasure is understated by the denial that one is thrilled, just as
in (22) one is understating the extent of one's displeasure by simply
denying excessive delight. Such a usage might also be termed
sarcastic.
(21) I'm not thrilled by your suggestion.
(22) I'm not too pleased.
Is there any reason to actually mark these expressions as NPIs1
(That is, are they true NPIs. near NPIs, or independents?) After all,
199 has a literal meaning in non-negative contexts and its use in (22)
parallels the use of 1bLill in (21). It is clear that this use of
expressions like 1htill or 199 requires the immediate scope of NOT or
some allusion to it:
J
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The situation with NPIs of this class is similar to that of the
contains some true NPIs which have to be marked in the lexicon but
use of .tgQ and l.brillg{j. And in (25) the t n t e vven tnq pr e d i c a t e CAUSE
(26 )ashowever,
A subset of these
exist,cases
We have seen that the first class of NPIs
Otherwise, this class of NPIs seems to be
Some part (b)
Thus we have discovered another breeding ground of NPIs, another
not--unlike (24)--ambiguous between the sarcastic and non-sarcastic
unavailable.
This 'sarcastic' usage seems absent from (23); that is, it is
demonstrates.
immediate scope of NOT.
separates .tQQ and ihr.ill~~ f r om NOT, mak i ng t.his' sarcas tic' usage
perhaps be marked.
case, sarcastic understatement in the second) which requires the
what about the second? IQQ, mu~h, lh~1, etc. all have some sort of
scalar endpoints: there is a pragmatic phenomenon ('DE' in the first
predictable on some sort of pragmatic principles and does not require
corresponding non-sarcastic meaning outside of negative contexts,
although since destressed mu~h is unacceptable elsewhere it should
marking in the lexicon.
they are in the immediate scope of NOT in LF.
environment in which pragmatic rules apply to certain expressions if
(23) I didn't realize that She~new too much about it.
was (too) thrilled about it.
knew anything about it.
(24) I thought that She~didn't know too much about it.
wasn't (too) thrilled about it.
didn't know anything about it.
(25) She wasn't (too) thrilled about it because she had any
desire to actually go there ...
(26) I doubt that~he'S thrilled about it.
rhe knows too much about it.
I
I
I
I
I
J
I
t
I
J
l
J
l
l
I
I
I
r
expressions must be lexically marked as NPIs.
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8.4 NEGATED VERBS
In the preceding sections I have sketched two sources of NPIs,
i.e. two usages that occur primarily in the immediate scope of NOl.
In this section I will merely take note of a third source of NPIs:o
verbs which are very often negated and certain sUbcategorizations of
which become NPIs. The reasons for the frequent negation of these
verbs are clearly pragmatic; since I have no common principle to
4
propose, this class might as well be labelled 'other'. That only
certain subcategoroizations of these verbs must be negated is obvious
from the following examples. The (a) sentences contain the HPI
variant negated: the (b) sentences contain the NPI variant unnegated
and unacceptable; the (e) sentences contain the non-NPI variant.
(27)(a) She can't help telling George lies.
(b)7?She can help telling George lies.
(e) She can help George.
(28)(a) She didn't bother helping George.
(b)?7She bothered helping George.
(e) She bothered George.
(29)(a) She didn't believe how many books they had.
(b)77She believed how many books they had.
(e) She believed what he told her.
(30)(a) You needn't stay.
(b)??Vou need stay.
(e) You need money.
(31)(a) I don't care to stay.
(b)771 care to stay.
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(c) ! care.
(32)(a) I didn't dare leave.
(b)??I dared leave.
(c) I dared to leave.
That the true NPIs in this group require the immg~i~t~ scope of
the negative is demonstrated by the unacceptability of s~ntences like
(33)(b), where the universal quantifier intervenes between NOT and kaD
(33)(a) He can't help complaining.
(b)*Everybody can't help complaining.
(c) With the reading:
NOT [Ax: x is a person] (x can help complaining)
I wC:jld characterize verbs like ~~n ~!~ng as independent, given
tha accQptability of sentences like 'Go ahead, he can stand itt'.
That is, they tend be negated (for reasons having to do with the real
world: one is mor& likely to report on untolerability than on
tolerability, perhaps) but dQn't have to bo. Min~ seems like a near
HPJ, since it can only sometimes occur independently of NOT ('I really
mind his presumptuousness'). Thus the class of negated verbs contains
exprqss10ns with all degreos of depandence upon NOT.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Recall from Chapter 6 that the upper endpoint on a scale S
associated with a proposition schema P is equivalent to the lower
endpoint on a scale S' associated with the proposition schema NOT P.
2. The term 'endpoint' is used rather loosely here, since 'DE' is
possible from any value for X higher on the scale than another value
for X. Thus (~) below may have the implicature that he would eat
absolutely noth"ing, but !h~ mQ~! ~~li~iQY~ fQQg does not necessarily
denote what he is most likely to eat. He might be more likely to eat
food high in protein if it were his last meal for a week.
(1) He wouldn't eat the most delicious food.
3. In w~at sense is ~ 1hing a scalar endpoint? That is, is there a
scale associated with Qg on which thing is an endpoint? Many of these
expressions of the form BLnl Hf seem to be endpoints not by virtue of
the meaning of the NP but because (as argued in Schmerlin~ (1971) the
indefinite article there has the interpretation 'one': nQl Qn~ Nf can
be used to convey 'no NPs'.
4. I am not sugg9stin~ that all NPI verbs be treated as forming a
single class. H2~ A kAn~li 12 and DU~g§ at least originated as
'scalar endpoint' NPIs.
263
CONCLUSION
It may be useful to recall tho observation of Bolinger that the
distribution of NPIs 'lies precisely athwart the lines of transform
grammar and idiom grammar ... [and is] an interesting problem in
itself but a transcendent one when we view it as an illustration of
the confusion of the two grammars.' The sensitivity of NPIs to various
kinds of syntactic and semantic information, taking these terms in
their broadest sense. has been used by some linguists to argue for the
semantic condition;ng of syntactic rules. Similarly. Ladusaw (1979)
proposes that the distribution of NPIs argues for the inclusion into
sentence grammar a full account of meaning, or at least of entailment.
The primary concern of this study, therefore, has been to
determine the grammatical constraints on the distribution of NPIs. It
has been demonstrated that a sufficient condition on NPJ acceptability
is occurence in the immediate scope of negation in logical form. This
condition. the Immediate Scope Constraint, encodes the sensitivity of
NPIs to a purely structural relation to negation. Other aspects of
sentence meaning appear to be irrelevant to NPI acceptability in this
paradigm case.
The paradigm case must be stated on LF rather than on surface
structure because the Immediate Scope Constraint cannot be stated on
surface structure. NPIs therefore provide evidence for the existence
of such a level of representation, and for a particular representation
of its syntax. Thus, for example, the sensitivity of NP!s and other
quantifiers (including 'free choice' §qX to immediate scope relations
with other operators argues for predicate calculus like
representation in which logical elements are assigned scope with
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respect to one another. Further evidence about the syntax of logical
form is provided by the sensitivity of NPIs to propositional
interpretations of NPs and by the behavior of NPI gn~, which suggests
that it should be represented as an existential rather than as a
universal quantifier.
It has been argued that the role of the grammar in the
distribution of NPIs is restricted to the Immediate Scope Constraint,
since the apparent surface structure restrictions on NPIs are simply
the effects of independently motivated SS-->LF mapping rules.
The role of semantics in the distribution of NPls seems to be to
determine the acceptability of sentences with NPIs which are not in
the immediate scope of NOT. A sentence with such an untriggered NPI
may still be acceptable if the literal meaning assigned to its LF may
be construed as 'alluding' to some pro~osition in whose logical form
the representation of tha NPI is in the immediate scope of NOT.
This suggesti~n, that untriggered NPls require the sentence in
which they occur to be L~ken as '~lludingt to X NOT NPJ V, may sound
misleadingly exotic. The dependence of such a sentence upon a
semantic relationship to some other representation may be compared to
a discourse rule like VP deletion: in both cases the acceptability of
a given sentence can only be determined for particular occurences of
that sentence. Another analogue to part (b) is furnishe~ by
expressions like wb- 2ft iA£!h, which force the sentence in which they
occur to allude to some other linguistically defined representation
(in this case, a direct question), or by metaphor.
The possibllity of there being an implicature X NOT NPI V in a
well-formed <5,1> pair m~st be distinguished :rom the 'availability'
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of this implicature in the context of a given utterance. It seems
likely that the conditions on availability of the implicature may be
stated in terms of Gricean conversational maxims.
Thus it is possible to distinguish quite distinct syntactic,
semantic, and conversational systems affecting the acceptability of
sentences with NPIs.
Many problems remain to be solved. The semantic and
conversational constraints on NPIs have yet to be precisely
formulated, as do the relevant SS-->lF mapping rules. The question of
why NPIs exist at all remains unanswered, although it seems likely
that they are the frozen forms in certain classes of expressions used
as scalar endpoints, 'understaters', and so forth in the immediate
scope of NOT.
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